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PREFACE 
The origin of this thesis lay in an enigma. Why was it that in 
1940, at the end of a momentous battle which they had both won, 
or, at least had not lost, the two chief air commanders on the 
British side were removed from their posts? Neither Air Chief- 
Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, Commander-in-Chief, Fighter Command, 
nor Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park, Air Officer Commanding, No. 11 
Group, ever forgave those they considered responsible for their 
dismissals. Since that period the question has remained largely 
unanswered. Here, an effort has been made to throw more light 
on a problem which still infuriates or disconcerts many of those 
involved in a battle which occurred over half a century ago. 
For them, what exacerbates the argument is the later assessment 
of the importance of the struggle and the crucial part it played 
as a turning-point in the Second World War. Even at the arm's 
length of time, they reason, there should be a greater 
recognition of what the two commanders achieved and an admission 
that their treatment was less than generous. That was the 
starting point. 
The thesis is based on three main sources. First are original 
documents of the time, orders, Minute sheets, letters, notes, 
etc. Second, to gain a balanced view, a study has been made of 
the different interpretations offered in many books and lectures, 
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papers and letters written since, both by airmen who were in the 
battle and by historians. Third, meetings have been held to hear 
the recollections of former RAF personnel who were involved in 
action, whom it has been both rewarding and an honour to 
encounter. 
Thanks are due to many who have helped the progress of the 
dissertation and who are mentioned later as sources of 
information. In particular, I should like to acknowledge the 
kindness of Squadron-Leader Bruce Ogilvie (No. 601 Squadron) who 
knew Dowding well and who generously made available much material 
at the start of this study. Mr Sebastian Cox, of the Air 
Historical Branch of the RAF, and Air Marshal Sir Denis Crowley- 
Milling (No. 242 Squadron) have done much to assist with shrewd 
assessment and thoughtful reminiscence respectively. 
My tutors at the University of Kent, first Professor Richard 
Crampton, then Dr Julian Hurstfield, have offered wise and 
constructive critical advice in the gathering and presentation 
of the large amount of material gathered over several years. 
Thanks are also due to Mrs Tania Paddison who has typed the work 
with such care. 
No one deserves greater praise than my wife. She has created 
circumstances which have allowed unfettered study and has 
accompanied me as a cheerful helper and scribe on many of the 
visits to glean information about a battle which we both saw and 
which is still refought when those involved meet. 
Many people of my generation, and I upon starting this 
dissertation was not least among them, suffer from several pre- 
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conceived ideas about the Battle of Britain and the role of its 
various commanders. Having to exercise the rigours of historical 
discipline has caused me to alter a number of my, opinions on both 
the battle and its participants, often marginally, occasionally 
radically. The result will, I hope, provide some new thinking 
and raise not a few questions on what some observers consider to 
have been not only the greatest air contest in History, but also 
Britain's most important battle during the Second World War. 
1- 
Abstract 
Between July and December 1940 three contests were fought in 
British skies. The first was a battle for aerial supremacy 
between the Luftwaffe and the RAF. The second was a struggle 
inside the Luftwaffe to plan and follow a coherent strategy of 
attack. Third was a controversy among senior RAF commanders over 
the tactics required for daylight defence. Until mid-September, 
the Luftwaffe attempted alone to defeat Britain first by 
overwhelming Fighter Command, then by heavy bombing. It failed, 
partly, by starting too late and waging an unprepared campaign 
with unsuitable equipment. Fighter Command, possessing the 
world's best aerial defensive system, fought a tenacious battle 
for which it had been designed, namely the protection of the Home 
Base. From mid-September the Luftwaffe changed largely to night 
bombing, confronting Britain with an offensive more difficult to 
counter. For some months the RAF, lacking a suitable night 
fighter, appeared impotent in defence. This weakness was a 
catalyst for reservations felt by the Air council over the 
leadership, strategy and tactics employed by Sir Hugh Dowding, 
C-in-C, Fighter Command, who, in their eyes, had been unco- 
operative since pre-war days. When Churchill and Beaverbrook, 
previously his champions, appreciated that new leadership was 
needed in Fighter Command, more in tune with the aggressive role 
anticipated for the RAF in 1941, Dowding was replaced. With him 
went his protege, Keith Park, AOC No. 11 Group, who had borne the 
main burden of the daylight battle. Both later claimed that 
their removal stemmed from the Big Wing controversy over day 
fighting tactics, but other causes emerge from an examination of 
Dowding's career after 1936. Valid reasons can then be 
appreciated for his replacement; nevertheless, his later 




Few notable battles in British history have escaped a cloud of 
mythology. At no time has this been more true than when, in the 
popular mind, the event has involved a deliverance from the 
possibility of invasion. In the national memory the defeat of 
the Armada and the Battle of Trafalgar occupy pinnacles of 
resistance to attempts at foreign occupation which last succeeded 
at the Norman Conquest. 
This thesis sets out to explore several of the orthodox beliefs 
and actualities which marked a similar occasion in the twentieth 
century. The Battle of Britain has come to stand beside the two 
earlier feats of arms and has been invested with greater 
accolades not only because the events were more widely reported 
but also because the course of the struggle took place over the 
mainland of the United Kingdom. There were, and still are, 
thousands of witnesses who have often needed little prompting to 
explore the paths of recollection. In the minds of many, the 
fighting in the skies above southern England brought a personal 
salvation from disaster. 
A general understanding of the battle is often at fault at two 
levels. The first of these lies in the public mind, where amply 
fed myths have grown and developed over half a century; the 
second has emerged from a number of books dealing with the event, 
some of which are personal reminiscence of limited aspects of the 
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battle, while others, lacking a depth of research, tend to be 
superficial repetitions of what the authors presumed to have 
happened. (1) 
The aim of this dissertation is to investigate the battle in two 
particular areas. One concerns its nature, why and how it was 
fought by both sides, under what leadership and strategy, and by 
which tactics. It will examine and attempt to add balance to the 
general assessment of the contest as a struggle between the David 
of the Royal Air Force and the Goliath of the Luftwaffe. In the 
long run, the crux of the battle was a struggle for supremacy 
between two sets of single-seater fighters, over a small arc of 
southern England. Were 'The Few' so few, or was an inordinate 
pressure placed on them by strategy and tactics which could have 
been improved? 
The other area, explored in some detail, concerns the controversy 
over the contribution made to Fighter Command by its Commander- 
in-Chief, Air Chief-Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, and his 
relationship with other senior officers at the Air Ministry. 
This is examined from the pre-war period, through the Battle of 
Britain, until his replacement by Air Vice-Marshal W. S. Douglas, 
then Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, in November 1940. Closely 
linked with this episode is the fate of Dowding's protege, Air 
Vice-Marshal K. Park, Air Officer Commanding, No. 11 Group. He was 
superseded in the following month by Air Vice-Marshal T. Leigh- 
Mallory, AOC, No. 12 Group. 
people choose the past they need, or think they need'. 
J. C. Cairns, 'Some Recent Historians and the "Strange Defeat" of 
19401, Journal of Modern History (JMH), 46,1 (1974), pp. 60-85, 
p. 72. 
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First, the battle itself should be seen as an invasion of the 
United Kingdom, in spite of later claims that the campaign 
prevented invasion. For a period of almost four months the 
Luftwaffe mounted a considerable offensive, intruding each day 
into Britain. A nation's sovereign territory consists of land, 
territorial waters and air space; a German aircraft flying over 
a British town was carrying out an act of invasion as definite 
as that made by a warship entering territorial waters, or a tank 
attacking a strong-point in its streets. 
The reality was that the battle deflected the possibility of an 
enemy occupation of Britain, which could have been achieved in 
one or both of two ways. The first would have been by the 
successful landing of the German Army, as the Kriegsmarine was 
in no position at that stage to affect the outcome by itself. 
The second would have been by the destruction, or neutralising, 
of the power of the RAF, so that the threat of aerial attack from 
the Luftwaffe would have forced the British Government to seek 
peace terms. (2) 
The leadership, strategy and tactics of the Royal Air Force are 
examined, as responses were made to what were seen and feared as 
German threats of overwhelming proportions. However, it is now 
known that the menace was not so great as once believed and many 
2. See G. Douhet, Command of the Air (London, 1943), p. 63. 
Douhet, an Italian, advanced the theory that wars could be 
settled solely by air power. After an opposing force of aircraft 
had been defeated, the attacker would 'fly against the enemy 
while he has been deprived of the ability to do otherwise'. 
Aerial attacks would then destroy industries and commerce, and 
break the morale of civilians and armies. 
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writers have failed to examine the organisation, power and 
methods of the Luftwaffe at that time, to gain a more balanced 
view of the battle. 
Few, also, have gone further to explore the opinion of a number 
of German commentators that there was no Battle of Britain in the 
sense that so many British people believe. For them, the period 
of daylight attacks was no more than one episode in the Western 
Campaign which stretched from the invasion of Norway and Denmark 
in April 1940, to the slowing down of the night Blitz in May 
1941, prior to the invasion of Russia. They do not acknowledge 
that the Luftwaffe suffered defeat, as reported by most British 
sources, but that the German Air Force merely changed the course 
of its strategy and tactics when day bombing became less 
profitable than night attacks. (3) An enquiry is made into the 
question of whether this was a genuine alteration of policy at 
the time, or an excuse offered for failure. 
On the British side there has, hitherto, been great stress laid 
on the importance of the day battle and of its effect on the 
activities of the Royal Air Force. There has been a neglect of 
the study of the perceived threat posed by night bombing which 
was, especially for politicians, a deeply worrying factor from 
September 1940. Certainly, as more recent research has shown, 
the resulting combination of fear and frustration felt both 
3. See, for example, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Kesselring, 
translated by L. Hudson (London, "1953), p. 79. 
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within Parliament and at the Air Ministry, helps at least partly 
to explain the changes made at Fighter Command in leadership and 
strategy towards the end of the year. (4) 
In the second place, the role played in the battle by various RAF 
commanders is assessed. When, in October 1988, the Queen Mother 
unveiled a statue of Lord Dowding outside St Clement Danes, the 
RAF church in the heart of London, many British people whose 
memories stretched back almost half a century felt that, albeit 
belatedly, a kind of justice was done. For them, fair play had 
finally triumphed as a royal accolade was set posthumously on the 
shoulders of a man who, it appeared, had been deliberately 
snubbed by some of his colleagues and by politicians, ever since 
leading his fighter pilots during the Battle of Britain. 
Churchill had referred to these airmen as 'The Few'; for the 
British people, the period was 'their finest hour'. (5) 
There was, however, a feeling among some others, not present on 
the day, that an exaggerated praise was being offered. In their 
view, he had proved to be a competent leader in whom 
conscientious application far exceeded flair and one who had been 
adequately rewarded at the time. They believed that the wartime 
leaders of the RAF together with several notable politicians, had 
gauged justly the part played by Dowding during the struggle and 
had placed him fairly and correctly in the hierarchy of honour. 
4. See Group-Captain E. Haslam, 'How Lord Dowding Came to Leave 
Fighter Command', Journal of Strategic Studies (JSS), 4,2 
(1981), pp. 175-86. 
5. See The Times, 21 October 1988, p. 2. 
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A number of those who had worked closely with him had found the 
Commander-in-Chief to be intransigent and distant, stubborn and 
unadventurous. (6) 
The eye of the storm of controversy, in the opinion of his 
supporters, lay in the fact that, having led Fighter Command to 
a narrow victory over Luftwaffe daylight attacks stretching from 
July to October 1940, and thereby having saved the nation by 
making a German seaborne invasion of Britain impracticable, 
Dowding was apparently removed in summary fashion late in 
November. He was despatched to the USA to obtain war equipment 
on a mission for which he was temperamentally unsuited, lacking 
to the necessary degree the qualities of tact and diplomacy, 
followed by several minor appointments until his retirement in 
June 1942. (7) 
Two rewards came his way. On 30 September 1940 he was awarded 
the G. C. B. and on 11 May 1943 Churchill suggested that his name 
should be submitted for a Barony 'in view of your ever-memorable 
services to this country during the Battle of Britain'. (8) But 
two honours were never received and this has incensed his 
protagonists and caused waves of controversy that have not been 
6. See, for example, R. Hough and D. Richards, The Battle of 
Britain (London, 1989), pp. 314-34, and Air Marshal Sir Robert 
Saundby, 'Dowding and the Battle of Britain', The Ampleforth 
Journal (1970), pp. 81-84. 
7. See H. Probert, High Commanders of the Royal Air Force (HMSO, 
1991), p. 22, who writes of 'a role for which was quite unsuited 
and from which he soon had to be withdrawn'. 
8. Dowding Papers, Aviation Records Department, Royal Air Force 
Museum, Hendon, AC 71/17/2, HCTD/ S. 305, Churchill to Dowding, 
11 May 1943. 
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stilled since. First, he was given no higher degree of peerage, 
for example, an earldom; second, he was not promoted to the 
pinnacle of the Service with the rank of Marshal of the Royal Air 
Force. 
For many who sit in the Dowding camp, the circumstances of the 
Commander-in-Chief's removal from Fighter Command, together with 
the replacement of Park, are tainted with plot and intrigue. (9) 
In their view, ' the main plank of the case against him resulted 
from his refusal to counter large formations of Luftwaffe 
aircraft with Big Wings of RAF fighters, especially after 19 
August. (10) They believed that pressure against Dowding was 
exerted within the Air Ministry by Douglas and Leigh-Mallory, 
both of whom supported Squadron-Leader Douglas Bader, the chief 
exponent of the use of Big Wings. 
The charge continues with the claim that Flight-Lieutenant 
P. Macdonald, who was both Adjutant of Bader's squadron and a 
Member of Parliament, intervened by having a private meeting with 
Churchill at which he exposed the controversy. In this version, 
the Prime Minister followed up the matter with his customary 
vigour and steps were taken at a political level which 
accelerated Dowding's replacement. 
9. See, for example, L. Deighton, Fighter (London, 1977), pp. 271- 
73, and V. Orange, Sir Keith Park (London, 1984), p. 121. 
10. The "Big Wing' was a description of a formation of at least 
three squadrons flying into action as a unified force under the 
control of one commander. It was also known as a 'Balbo', after 
General Italo Balbo, who led a large combined flight of Italian 
seaplanes on a two-way crossing of the Atlantic ocean in 1933. 
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Although Dowding himself carried his succeeding disappointment 
with dignity, he was perfectly prepared after the war to allow 
two authors to set out his cause. Their books have been used by 
many other writers and students of the battle as if they were 
texts of unerring accuracy, complete in their assessment of 
Dowding and his background. Each, however, suffered from the 
disadvantage of having been written while the Commander-in-Chief 
sat close to the author's chair. 
The first of these, Leader of the Few, (11) was published in 1957 
when the writer, Basil Collier, had no access to a number of 
documents which have, more recently, placed different emphases 
on the battle and Dowding's subsequent treatment. The second 
work, Dowding and the Battle of Britain, (12) is a panegyric 
produced in 1969 by Robert Wright, who had at one time been 
Personal Assistant to the C-in-C. Wright claimed that the book 
was 'not a history of the Battle of Britain', but that it dealt 
with the personal story of what happened' to one of the 
participants. However, Wright was occasionally less than 
accurate and generally too uncritical, except of those whom he 
considered to be Dowding's enemies. 
On the other side, works have been produced which reject the 
charges. In particular, Flying Colours, (13) by Bader's brother- 
in-law, explains in some detail his view of the background to the 
controversy over Big Wings and denies that either Leigh-Mallory 
11. B. Collier, Leader of the Few (London, 1957). 
12. R. Wright, Dowding and the Battle of Britain (London, 1969). 
13. L. Lucas, Flying Colours (London, 1981) 
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or Bader was responsible for Macdonald's intervention. Wings 
Over Westminster, the autobiography of Lord Balfour, who was in 
1940 the Under-Secretary of State for Air, also spoke for 
Dowding's opponents, although the work suffers from several 
inaccuracies. (14) Sir Maurice Dean, in The Royal Air Force and 
Two World Wars, (15) summarised Dowding's relationship with the 
Air Ministry, as seen through the eyes of a civil servant there. 
A new aspect of the argument was unveiled through the article 
written in 1981 by Group-Captain Haslam, (16) which suggested that 
the main reason for the removal of the Commander-in-Chief was 
related more to his inability to counter the night Blitz than to 
any other cause. 
This thesis attempts to show that, in reality, there were seven 
reasons for Dowding's replacement. Three existed even before the 
Battle of Britain began. They were his age, his long period of 
service at Fighter Command, and his reputation in the Air 
Ministry for being less than co-operative. 
As the battle developed, four further reasons appeared. His 
failure to settle with authority the differences over tactics 
between Park and Leigh-Mallory was the first. Secondly, he 
appeared to lack a sense of urgency in meeting German night 
attacks after 7 September. Thirdly, a more aggressive commander 
was required to launch Fighter Command into a role of offensive 
14. Lord Balfour, Wings Over Westminster (London, 1973). For 
inaccuracies, see below, Chapter 7. 
15. Sir Maurice Dean, The Royal Air Force and Two World Wars (London, 1979). 
16. See above, note 4. 
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operations after Luftwaffe day attacks petered out. The fourth 
was that by October he had lost the essential political support 
of Beaverbrook, the Minister of Aircraft Production, and of 
Churchill, the Prime Minister, both of whom had earlier held him 
in the highest esteem. 
The thesis sets out to explain why, at the end of a phase of the 
air war to which they had contributed so much, both Dowding and 
Park were removed and replaced respectively by Douglas and Leigh- 
Mallory, who seemed to be their chief critics and opponents. 
Fifty years on, the apparent enigma remains and high passions are 
still aroused on both sides when some of the matters of 
controversy are reviewed. 
rs 
CHAPTER ONE 
DOWDING'S POSITION AT THE START OF THE BATTLE 
PART 1: 14. - 17 INTRODUCTION 
PART 2: QUESTIONS OF LEADERSHIP IN FIGHTER 
COMMAND, JULY, 1940 
PART 3: 36 - 
63 DOWDING'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE AIR 
STAFF BEFORE 1940 
PART 4: THE FRENCH CONNECTION 
PART 5: $3 -9Z CONCLUSION: WHY RETAIN DOWDING? 
16 
PART ONE - INTRODUCTION 
Critics of the removal of Air Chief-Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding from 
his post as Commander-in-Chief, Fighter Command on 25 November 
1940 explain it largely as a result of events which occurred 
during the daylight air battle in August and September, 
especially the controversy over the most effective tactics to 
counter Luftwaffe formations. They offer the same reason for the 
superseding of Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park as Air Officer 
Commanding, No. 11 Group, some days later. The two commanders 
themselves, in later writings and statements, concentrated on 
this aspect of their activities, giving rise to a widely accepted 
opinion that it was the main, or only reason causing their 
replacement. (1) 
What is not generally acknowledged by many who censure the 
motives and actions of several Service and political leaders 
during the later months of 1940 is that the campaign to replace 
Dowding was well under way even before the air battle opened. 
The events of October and November were no more than a 
culmination of long-standing dissensions over the leadership, 
strategy and tactics of Fighter Command. 
1. See particularly orange, Chapters 9-11; Wright, Chapters 11- 
14; J. Terraine, The Right of the Line (London, 1985), pp. 213-17; 
Collier, Leader of the Few, Chapter 22; Deighton, pp. 287-89; 
A. J. P. Taylor, English History, 1914-1945 (Oxford, 1965), p. 500. 
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To gain a balanced view, it is necessary first to examine in some 
detail the background of Dowding's relationship with the Air 
Ministry and with other colleagues. It may then become clear 
that continuing mutual antipathy over a number of points of 
policy was a salient factor in his subsequent replacement. Also, 
it can be demonstrated that the clear intention of the Air 
Ministry, even as the battle began, was for Dowding to be 
replaced as soon as conveniently possible, and certainly by the 
end of October. The main reason why he was still holding his 
position in July was, in the eyes of Air Council, more the need 
to maintain continuity of leadership at Fighter Command during 
a most difficult period than any respect felt by them for his 
abilities or character. 
In addition, at that time Dowding was enjoying the support of two 
powerful politicians, Winston Churchill, the Prime Minister, and 
Lord Beaverbrook, Minister of Aircraft Production. They believed 
that he was the right man for the task immediately at hand, 
namely holding off the Luftwaffe through a defensive campaign. 
to 
PART TWO - QUESTIONS OF LEADERSHIP IN FIGHTER 
COMMAND, JULY 1940 
Differences over Dowding's tenure of office can be seen at the 
highest level on Wednesday 10 July, the very day he later 
selected as the commencement of the Battle of Britain. (2) The 
Prime Minister felt compelled to send a Private and Confidential 
letter to Sir Archibald Sinclair, the Secretary of State for 
Air. (3) In view not only of what had happened to the fortunes 
of the Royal Air Force during the battle for France and the 
evacuation from Dunkirk, but also of the impending threat of a 
German assault upon the United Kingdom, his opening sentence was 
remarkable. 'I was very much taken aback the other night when 
you told me that you had been considering removing Sir Hugh 
Dowding at the expiration of his present appointment', he stated, 
'but that you had come to the conclusion that he might be allowed 
to stay on for another four months'. (4) 
2. See AIR 8/863, Sir Hugh Dowding's Despatch, the Battle of 
Britain, 20 August 1941, Public Record Office (PRO), Kew; also 
published as a supplement to The London Gazette, 11 September 
1946, pp. 4543-71. Dowding chose that day because it 'saw the 
employment by the Germans of the first really big formation 
intended primarily to bring our Fighter Defence to battle on a 
large scale'; p. 4544, paragraph 13. 
3. AIR 19/572, Secretary of State's file on Sir Hugh Dowding, 
Churchill to Sinclair, 10 July 1940. 
4. See Dowding Papers, HCTD/S. 305, Enclosure 1A, Newall to 
Dowding, 30 March 1940. In the letter, Dowding was requested to 
retire on 14 July 1940. 
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Churchill went on to say that, in his opinion, Dowding was 'one 
of the very best men you have got', a judgement made after 
knowing him for two years. He had admired the work of the 
Commander-in-Chief and expressed confidence in a man 'so gifted 
and so trusted'. In fact, Churchill recommended, Sinclair should 
consider prolonging Dowding's appointment indefinitely, while the 
war lasted. 
The letter then went further, even suggesting a possible 
promotion. Undoubtedly, Churchill had in mind the office of 
Chief of the Air Staff, occupied since 1937 by Air Chief-Marshal 
Sir Cyril Newall, whose popularity lagged as his time for 
replacement was approaching. The Prime Minister concluded 
by 
saying that he disapproved of making changes of that nature 
'except when there is some proved failure or inadequacy', an 
accusation which could hardly have been aimed at Dowding before 
the start of the air battle over Britain. 
Churchill, on that day, was expressing a firm and unequivocal 
belief in Dowding's suitability for his post and made plain which 
officer he wanted to lead Fighter Command. He appreciated the 
role which Dowding and his men would be compelled to play in the 
forthcoming months, yet it is surprising that he was prepared to 
recommend the offer of such a long lease of office to him; no one 
could foretell the duration of the war, or what changes might be 
required of Fighter Command before then. 
in assessing the career and subsequent dismissal of Dowding, it 
is instructive to assess the reputations of Newall and Sinclair 
at that stage of the war. Both were held in low esteem by 
several politicians. For example, Stanley Bruce, the Australian 
Z. 0 
High Commissioner in London, met Beaverbrook on 2 July and wrote, 
'We were in complete agreement that Newall had not the fighting 
weight necessary for the position of C. A. S. I. On 10 July, the 
very day that Dowding's future was under review, Bruce discussed 
Newall's abilities, or lack of them, with Sinclair. Bruce told 
him that he had always had 'the gravest doubts' of Newall's 
competence and, referring to the French campaign, that 'the 
difficulty in getting decisions was an obvious indictment of 
Newall, who after all was responsible'. Sinclair, in defence of 
his C. A. S., called him 'a first class Staff Officer', yet claimed 
that if he 'was not the man to be Chief of the Air Staff' he 
would remove him. 
Bruce, a shrewd politician, added an assessment of Sinclair. 'I 
have great doubts, however, whether he would take such definite 
action whatever was the result of such examination as he is 
making'. That was Bruce's second expression of reservation over 
Sinclair. On 10 June he had written, 'While a pefectly nice 
person I do not think Sinclair is much good or has any particular 
force and drive'. Bruce's papers underline the factor that 
political interest in, and effect on, the activities of the RAF 
at that time was very strong. (5) 
5. Bruce Papers, Australian Archives, Belconnen, Canberra, 
Australia, M. 100: 10 June 1940,2 July 1940 and 10 July 1940. 
J. Colville, Churchillians (Londbn, 1981), p. 145, gives more on 
Beaverbrook's opinion of Newall. "He was an observer in the last 
War and has remained an Observer ever since'. 
2.1 
Churchill's letter was only one in a long sequence of 
correspondence concerning Dowding's position and his future. It 
fitted into a cluster written around the opening of the Battle 
of Britain, but can also be linked to a series of notes and 
letters dating back to 1937. Taken together, they paint with 
some clarity the astringent relationship which grew between the 
Commander-in-Chief, Fighter command and various senior officers 
in the Air Ministry. They form a catalogue of controversy, 
acting as guides and pointers to his removal from office, his 
replacement by Air Vice-Marshal W. S. Douglas and to the strategic 
and tactical role of Fighter Command both before and after that 
date. Without a study of the development of this relationship, 
the fate of Dowding and, by extension, that of Park, cannot be 
seen in perspective. 
That most recent passage of arms between Dowding and his 
superiors can be followed back to the letter he received from 
Newall on 30 March 1940, one day before he was due to be 
retired. (6) This asked him to continue at his post until 14 
July, when he would have held office for four years. Newall 
hoped that Dowding would agree and reinforced one strong reason 
held by the Air Ministry for wanting him to remain, namely that 
'we may be on the verge of intensified air activity'. He then 
spoke highly of Fighter Command's efficiency and acknowledged 
Dowding's role in achieving it. 
6. See above, Note 4. 
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Nevertheless, Newall made the point that he sometimes had the 
'uncongenial task' of asking senior officers to resign, to 
provide opportunities of promotion for others. Therefore Dowding 
would be asked to retire on 14 July, although the RAF would 
'greatly regret' the move. 
On the following day Dowding replied that he would agree to the 
Air Ministry's wishes and asked the name of his successor. (7) 
No answer was received and when, by the early days of July, with 
his tenure almost expired and the Luftwaffe sitting at the gate, 
Dowding had heard no more, he contacted Newall to learn what was 
to happen. According to Wright, the exchange concluded with him 
sharply telling the chief of the Air Staff, 'If you want to get 
rid of me, then get rid of me, but don't do it in this way'. (8) 
After consultations with Sinclair, Newall wrote to Dowding on 5 
July, with the request that the Commander-in-Chief would stay on 
because of 'present conditions'. He offered an appointment until 
the end of October, a new terminal date obviously agreed with the 
Secretary of State-(9) 
Dowding's tenacity in battle over what was, to him, a point of 
principle, was just as great as in any struggle against the 
Luftwaffe. Two days later, he replied at length with a detailed 
account of previous episodes in the saga of his RAF service. (10) 
7. Dowding Papers, HCTD/S. 305, Dowding to Newall, 31 March 1940. 
8. Wright, p. 137. 
9. Dowding Papers, HCTD/S. 305, Newall to Dowding, 5 July 1940. 
10. AIR 19/572, Enclosure IA, Dowding to Newall, 7 July 1940. 
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It could be claimed that he also had a potent remembrance of 
real, or imagined, blows received. Newall was invited to cast 
his mind back to February 1937 when Marshal of the Royal Air 
Force, Sir Edward Ellington, the then Chief of the Air Staff, 
informed Dowding that he would not be succeeding him, but that 
his rank should ensure employment until the age of sixty, an 
anniversary that would have been reached in 1942. (11) 
However, on 4 August 1938 a letter from the Air Council had told 
him that his services would not be required after June 1939. (12) 
Then, claimed Dowding, on 23 February the Evening Standard had 
announced his impending retirement and named his successor, while 
on the following day Newall had telephoned him to say that the 
Air Ministry intended to make no change during the year. 
Dowding next stated that on 10 March 1939, during an interview 
with Sir Kingsley Wood, the Secretary of State for Air, he 
announced his unwillingness to continue without the full backing 
of the Air Council, previously denied to him. This resulted, he 
wrote, in verbal assurance, but a week later, he sent a reminder 
that an answer was still awaited. That was followed on 20 March 
by a letter from Newall asking him to serve until the end of 
March 1940. (13) 
11. Dowding Papers, HCTD/ 5.305, Ellington to Dowding, 5 
February 1937. 
12. Ibid, Air Ministry to Dowding, 4 August 1938. 
13. Ibid, Newall to Dowding, 20 March 1939. 
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This date rested in Dowding's mind until, one day before its 
arrival, he received another request from Newall setting the new 
destination of 14 July. It was the passage of correspondence and 
action following that which led to Churchill's intervention with 
Sinclair on the very day that the main Battle of Britain 
commenced. 
Dowding's letter referred to the discourtesy and lack of 
consideration he had been shown. He had, in total, been offered 
five retirement dates and reminded Newall that he would have been 
pleased to retire before the war. Now, however, he was anxious 
to remain, 'because I feel that there is no one else who will 
fight as I do when proposals are made which would reduce the 
Defence Forces of the Country below the extreme danger point'. 
Dowding never hesitated to speak his mind, a quality that not 
everyone found engaging. Here he was referring obliquely to the 
controversy which had existed between him and the Air Staff over 
two matters. The first was the number of squadrons needed by 
Fighter Command to comprise an adequate defence for the Home 
Base. The second was the attempt made during the recent French 
campaign to despatch more fighter squadrons to France. These 
efforts were, in Newall's opinion, resisted by him as leader of 
the Air Staff, with the support of Dowding. In the C-in-C's 
judgement, however, he alone had stood firmly against them while 
the Air Staff hedged. He well knew the effects his words would 
have, hence the reference was a barbed reminder. 
Dowding's letter concluded with the statement that he should not 
be asked to give up his post, except at his own request, before 
1942, or the end of the war, 'whichever is the earlier'. Such 
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a demand was unreasonable from a senior commander who should have 
realised that, with the exigencies of war, no one, from the Prime 
Minister down, had an irrevocable right to any position. The 
letter was then despatched to Newall and a copy sent to 
Sinclair. (14) Dowding's exasperation and tenacity in fighting 
for his own cause were matched by his determination that his 
sense of injustice should be widely known. 
Sinclair's reply was dated 10 July and, evidently in the 
meantime, he mentioned the matter to Churchill. His letter gives 
the impression that he wished the appearance of authority for the 
control of Dowding's position to be shared and agreed by himself 
and the Service. (15) 
Nonetheless, the C-in-C was in no mood to let matters rest and 
sent a further letter to the Secretary of State two days later, 
telling him particularly of 'circumstances which occurred before 
you assumed your present office'. He then pressed further, 
seeking an apology, and confirmation that he was to retire at the 
end of October. (16) 
Sinclair was noted as a paragon of good manners and his reply was 
tactful, as might have been expected of an experienced 
politician. (17) There were three parts of the letter worthy of 
4 
14. AIR 19/572, Enclosure 2A, Dowding to Sinclair, 7 July 1940. 
15. Ibid, Enclosure 3A, Sinclair to Dowding, 10 July 1940. 
Sinclair wrote 'I can only say that the Chief of the Air Staff 
consulted me before asking you to retain your Command'. 
16. Ibid, Enclosure 5A, Dowding to Sinclair, 12 July 1940. 
17. Ibid, Enclosure 6A, Sinclair to Dowding, 13 July 1940. 
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special note. The first avoided dealing with matters that had 
occurred before he came to office and spoke of concern only with 
a decision for which he was responsible to Parliament, namely 
that Dowding should remain until the end of October. This 
reinforced the fact that the final responsibility for service 
appointments rested with politicians. The second was a judgement 
tinged with prophecy, when Sinclair added that he did not look 
beyond October, by which time he believed that the issue of the 
war would be determined. His only pre-occupation, he asserted, 
was to have the best Commander-in-Chief for Fighter Command. His 
third statement, on the proposed length of Dowding' s service, was 
categorical. 'That decision must stand', he announced. 
The Secretary of State's diplomacy was shown when he promised to 
bear Dowding's point of view in mind before taking further 
decisions. Also, he'claimed to appreciate the importance and 
fairness of communicating with the C-in-C 'in good time'. 
Nevertheless, it is instructive to note the mood of the Air 
Ministry at the time to Dowding's employment. Sinclair would not 
agree to the C-in-C's request, but remained firm on 31 October 
as the target date. This was confirmed by an official letter 
sent the same day. (18) Dowding's response was an acceptance, but 
instead of agreeing to the suggested date, he cannily inserted 
the words, 'for so long as my services may be required' . (19) The 
18. Dowding Papers, HCTD/ S. 305, Air Ministry to Dowding, 13 
July 1940. 
19. Ibid, Dowding to Air Ministry, 14 July 1940. 
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Air Ministry's reply was equally shrewd, avoiding the mention of 
any further date, but noting 'your willingness to continue in 
your present appointment'. (20) 
Far more satisfying for the C-in-C was a longer and more 
conciliatory letter from Newall. (21) The opening paragraph was 
apologetic, mentioning inconvenience and lack of consideration, 
caused by the stress of events in recent years. Newall added, 
'May I ask you to accept my sincere apologies'. 
The CAS continued by explaining the pressures, on the one hand 
of needing to provide opportunities of promotion within the 
Service, while on the other, of maintaining continuity at Fighter 
Command. Then he crossed swords over which of them had done more 
to oppose the dissipation of fighter forces during the French 
campaign, deftly turning the tables by stating, 'I was glad to 
have your support'. This remark was guaranteed to infuriate 
Dowding who believed that he alone had saved them. 
Newall, on the other hand, had a broader view of the RAF's 
responsibilities and displayed it when he pointed out the dilemma 
of the Air Staff. On the one hand they had struggled hard to 
conserve forces for home defence, while on the other it was their 
20. Ibid, Air Ministry to Dowding, dated July 1940. 
21. AIR 19/572, Enclosure 7A, Newall to Dowding, 13 July 1940. 
Newall wrote, II must ask you to make it convenient to defer your 
retirement until the end of October. 
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duty to implement Government decisions. The letter closed by 
applauding Sinclair's expression of confidence in Dowding, but 
would not be moved on the new date for retirement. (22) 
This sequence of correspondence is revealing of Dowding's tenuous 
hold on his position at the start of an air campaign for which 
he had prepared during the previous four years. Little 
imagination is needed to estimate the time being used by the 
C-in-C to defend himself at a period when exceptional demands 
were being made upon him to counter a growing air offensive. The 
extent of Dowding's 'double-war' has not been sufficiently 
acknowledged and, regardless of where the fault lay, this was a 
heavy burden on his leadership. 
On 14 July he wrote two further letters. One, to Newall, 
immediately seized on the apology, which he accepted. To 
circumvent the CAS's claim regarding which of them had stopped 
the flow of fighters to France, Dowding said that he was thinking 
equally of events in the first two months of the war. He 
finished, however, on a less than amiable note by calling it a 
point on which they could not be expected to see eye to eye. He 
added that further discussion would be unprofitable. (23) 
22. See Sir John Slessor, The Central Blue (London, 1956), 
p. 241. In the opinion of Slessor, then Director of Plans 
(D. Plans) at the Air Ministry, Dowding has received public credit 
for his stand against sending extra fighters to France. 'It is 
far less remembered that Dowding's superior, the man who backed him and with whom (under the Prime Minister) rested the real 
responsibility for that decision ... was the C. A. S. I. 
23. AIR 19/572, Enclosure 8A, Dowding to Newall, 14 July 1940. 
29 
An apparent confusion between Churchill and Sinclair over the 
exact future length of Dowding's tenure of office was displayed 
in the C-in-C's other letter written that day,, to the Secretary 
of State. (24) It opened by claiming that, while dining with the 
Prime Minister the previous evening, he had learned that he had 
secured his confidence and that Churchill wished him to remain 
on the Active List, with no retirement date offered. Churchill, 
according to Dowding, had told him that he had written to 
Sinclair on the matter. 
An interesting partial recantation of the Prime Minister's views, 
as expressed on 10 July, can be deduced from a comment, written 
in Sinclair's hand, and signed 'ARMS' on the copy of the letter 
he had received from Churchill. He claimed that the Prime 
Minister had agreed that matters should rest 'at the point 
reached in my letter to C-in-C' and that the position could be 
reconsidered in a month or more. There is no written evidence 
of what passed between Sinclair and Churchill at that meeting, 
but obviously, at least in the secretary of State's 
understanding, the Prime Minister was no longer insisting on 
having Dowding's appointment extended indefinitely. (25) 
It is not clear why Churchill apparently changed his mind. There 
is a possibility that he was giving one judgement to both men on 
which they were placing different interpretations. It is also 
possible, however, that each man was being offered a separate and 
24. Ibid, Enclosure 9A, Dowding to Sinclair, 14 July 1940. 
25. Ibid, Churchill to Sinclair, 10 July 1940. 
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conflicting decision. A speculative explanation is that both 
Sinclair and Dowding were desperate for the Prime Minister's 
approbation; they therefore seized on any part of his remarks 
which appeared to support their particular case. 
Reference was made to Dowding's visit to Churchill at Chequers 
on the evening of the 13th by John Colville, one of the Prime 
Minister's secretaries. According to him, Churchill announced 
that the previous four days had been glorious for the RAF, 
showing the faith he had at that stage in what Fighter Command 
was achieving under Dowding's leadership. Yet it may well have 
been that at least part of that faith came from Churchill's 
acceptance of an incorrect ratio of casualties suffered by each 
side, through which he gained a distorted view of British 
success. (26) 
Dowding also assessed the merits and weaknesses of Hurricanes and 
Defiants. Referring to Luftwaffe aircraft, he was surprised that 
the Germans had not yet protected the rear of their engines with 
armour plate; if that were done, RAF tactics would have to 
change. An augury of troubles to come for the C-in-C arrived 
when there was discussion of the German beam which could be used 
to lead bombers over their targets in darkness. (27) 
26. See J. Colville, The Fringes of Power: Downing Street 
Diaries, 1939-1945 (London, 1985), p. 194. Churchill claimed that 
$the enemy had come and had lost five to one". Compare the 
figures offered, based on both RAF and Luftwaffe returns, in The 
Battle of Britain, Then and Now, edited by W. G. Ramsey (London, 
1980). For the period 10-13 July inclusive, the losses shown 
are: RAF, 20 aircraft; Luftwaffe, 43 aircraft. 
27. Colville Diaries, p. 194. The German beam was 'codenamed Headache'. Dowding's closeness to the Prime Minister allowed him to relate that recently 'he dreamt that there was only one man in England who could use a Bofors gun and his name was William Shakespeare'. 
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In his letter to Sinclair, Dowding was careful to distance 
himself from any possible accusations of currying favour. He 
claimed that no minister had learned from him of the approaching 
retirement, in case it was thought that the Prime Minister's 
intervention was more than a coincidence. In concluding, Dowding 
added, with, it may be suspected, a certain grim satisfaction, 
that he had received a letter from Newall containing an apology, 
which he had written to accept. 
The question presents itself why the C-in-C wrote to Sinclair on 
this occasion. Probably he believed that the Prime Minister was 
an ally at a time of considerable strain between himself and the 
Air Ministry, and one whose support he wanted to advertise. He 
did this to shore up his position in Fighter Command against 
those considered as enemies. Dowding obviously was very 
sensitive over the matter, as he emphasised that he had done 
nothing underhand to gain that support, a point made 
unnecessarily by an officer noted for honourable conduct and 
straight dealing. (28) The episode shows that he was more deeply 
affected by fears for his personal position than is generally 
acknowledged. 
28. Among instances offered by many people of Dowding's conduct 
being 'above board', his former Personal Assistant recollected 
that when the Commander-in-Chief received Christmas presents from 
various firms, he refused to accept them but had them returned, 
with a note of thanks. Interview, Wing-Commander H. H. Ironside, 
Norwich, 27 August 1989. 
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The importance of this passage of correspondence has not 
previously been assessed sufficiently. Collier's biography does 
mention the letters, but with little exploration of their detail. 
Wright refers at length to the letters between Dowding and the 
Air Ministry, but had no 'sight of Churchill's correspondence with 
Sinclair, which adds a further dimension to the controversy. (29) 
The letters are an explicit demonstration that the C-in-C, 
Fighter Command felt particularly aggrieved at the start of July 
by what he considered to be the shabby treatment offered to him 
by the Air Ministry. Nor was it, in his recollection, a sudden 
disagreement, but rather a saga which he could - and did in some 
detail - trace back to 1937. 
Also the letters display a less than general friendship between 
Dowding and Newall, a situation which had existed for some years 
while both held senior positions, and more especially since 
Newall had been preferred to Dowding for the post of Chief of the 
Air Staff in 1937. In Dowding's recollection, some rivalry had 
existed even in their young subaltern careers. (30) 
Nonetheless, the letters also show clearly the Air Ministry's 
intention that Dowding should be replaced. Newall's reference 
to the need to offer promotion to other officers was a most 
important factor in their policy and one often overlooked by the 
29. See Collier, Leader of the Few, pp. 72-75, and Wright, p. 25. 
30. See Wright, p. 25. 
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accentuation of their earlier thoughtless treatment of the 
C-in-C. Both Newall and Sinclair were apologetic for what had 
happened in the past, but, in examining the role of Dowding and 
Fighter Command, it is vital to recognise their agreement that 
after October there should be a change in leadership. 
In the minds of the Air Staff by July 1940 there were three main 
reasons why Dowding should be replaced. 
The first was his age. Dowding, born on 24 April 1882, was 
fifty-eight years old and the senior of all RAF officers holding 
an active Command. Although retirement was laid down for a man 
in his position at sixty years, that was regarded then as a 
comparatively greater age than it is at the present day, when the 
average expectation of life for men has increased. The 
importance of this point is that there were, on the sidelines, 
a number of staff some ten or fifteen years younger, who were 
ready and waiting for advancement. At all times, the Royal Air 
Force has recognised the need to offer opportunities of promotion 
to staff in their mid- and late-forties, with the result that at 
least some will reach the pinnacle of rank well before retiring. 
The value of this policy of encouraging talent can be realised 
by noting the careers of some of those officers who were, during 
the war years, presented with the chance of showing their 
abilities as commanders. Examples included five who finally 
34 
reached the rank of Marshal of the Royal Air Force - Sir Arthur 
Harris (born, 1892), Sir John Slessor (b. 1897), Lord Tedder 
(b. 1890), Lord Douglas (b. 1893) and Lord Portal (b. 1893). (31) 
Secondly, with the realisation of Dowding's age went the fact 
that he had been at Fighter Command since its foundation on 14 
July 1936. The Service custom was for an officer to hold such 
a position for two or three years before being moved to gain 
further and wider experience in another position. In Dowding's 
case his four years at Fighter Command was an exceptional length 
of time. (32) 
Dowding represented part of the 'Old Guard' of the RAF. He was 
aged thirty-two even at the opening of the First World War and 
had been, first in the Royal Flying corps, then in the RAF, 
continuously since then. of his closer contemporaries, Marshal 
of the Royal Air Force Sir Edward Ellington (b. 1887) had left the 
post of CAS in 1937 and was presently Inspector-General of the 
Royal Air Force. ACM Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt (b. 1886) had been 
relieved of his post as C-in-C, Bomber Command on 3 April 1940 
and had also been appointed an Inspector-General. MRAF Sir John 
Salmond (b. 1881), who had been CAS between 1930 and 1933, 
31. See, for example, Dean, p. 308. Dean wrote of Trenchard's 
'famous personal Air Force list' and his part in Portal's 
advancement. 
32. D. Richards and H. Saunders, Royal Air Force, 1939-1945,3 
vols. (HMSO, 1974), i, Appendices 1 and 2, show that between 
July 1936 and October 1940, Bomber Command had four Air Officers 
Commanding; between July 1933 and December 1940 there were five 
Air Members for Personnel (AMP). 
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was Director of Armament Production at the newly formed ministry 
of Aircraft Production. ACM Sir Cyril Newall (b. 1886), was 
himself approaching his final period as CAS. 
However, the third, and main, reason why the Air Council believed 
that Dowding should be replaced was the nature of their mutual 
relationship over a number of years. 
*** 
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PART THREE: DOWDING'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE 
AIR STAFF BEFORE 1940 
In the Commander-in-Chief's view, the Air Ministry had acted less 
than fairly towards him ever since 1937 when he was not appointed 
as Chief of the Air Staff. Although putting a brave face on the 
issue at the time and later acknowledging that his talents found 
greater fulfilment at Fighter Command than in the more 
claustrophobic atmosphere of the Air Ministry, there is no doubt 
that he felt the rejection deeply. (33) 
Over the following three years, Dowding developed an increasing 
disrespect for the Air Staff in general. He believed that they 
failed to share his enthusiasm for the overwhelming importance 
of fighter defence and thus regarded many of them as vacillating 
in policy and incompetent in its execution. 
But while his outlook was clear in a narrow field, to the extent 
that it sometimes became tunnel-vision, theirs was necessarily 
panoramic and thus tended to blur when options overlapped or 
competed. Ministers and Heads of Department there had suffered 
33. According to Wright, p. 60, Dowding had been told that he 
would be the next Chief of the Air Staff by Ellington himself, 
by MRAF Sir John Salmond, a previous holder of the post and by 
Sir Frederick Bowhill, the Air Member for Personnel. See also 
Collier, Leader of the Few, pp. 168-69. Dean, pp. 141-43, remarks 
that 'an apostolic succession in the military sense has never, 
and fortunately never, been part of our constitutional 
inheritance'. M. Smith, British Air Strategy Between the Wars 
(London, 1984), p. 39, believes that Dowding would not have made 
a good CAS, 'being rather too prickly a colleague as far as many 
of his contemporaries were concerned'. 
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for years from lack of finance, from the effects of the 
stagnation of the Depression and, at the late awakening to the 
need for rearmament, from the demands for resources from other 
Services. At one and the same time they had to register in 
perspective a variety of needs, including the building of all 
types of aircraft, provision of supplies, co-operation with the 
Army and the Royal Navy, the training of sufficient aircrew, the 
development of Radio Direction Finding (RDF) and Intelligence 
services, and, the construction of airfields. (34) 
These and many other commitments descended daily on their desks - 
and sometimes their heads - in an unremitting dive-bombing of 
urgent requests. It is small wonder that Dowding's needs had to 
be placed beside others, seldom to his appreciation - or theirs. 
In his view, nevertheless, the Air Staff consisted largely of men 
immersed in misguided policies, lacking the determination to 
fight for the needs of the RAF, by which he meant primarily 
Fighter Command. 
Dowding's feelings were demonstrated in notes he wrote in 
February 1939, while preparing a catalogue of complaint against 
them. It is instructive to note his claim that the 'very 
cavalier treatment' had started two years earlier, that is, the 
34. H. Montgomery-Hyde, British Air Policy Between the Wars, 
1918-1939 (London, 1976), Appendix vi, 'Comparative Table of 
Service Estimates, 1920-1938', shows that, in those years, the 
proportion allocated to the RAP was 17% of the total. See also 
Dean, Chapter 6 and Smith, Chapters 8 and 9. 
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period when he failed to become CAS. He wrote that he was 
dealing with vital matters neglected by them for fifteen years 
and accused them of inertia. They had taken, decisions about 
Fighter Command without consulting him and he finished by hoping 
that his successor would be persona grata, with the inference 
that he was not. (35) 
The Air Ministry's opinion of these matters presents a different 
picture. In the first place, Dowding had never been regarded as 
the pre-eminent RAF commander by three of the four Secretaries 
of State for Air under whom he served. The first of these, the 
Earl of Swinton, did not think of him as the best, placing Air 
Vice-Marshal W. Freeman first among air commanders when he took 
over. (36) 
The second, Sir Kingsley Wood, had difficulties with Dowding in 
February and March 1939, which led to the Commander-in-Chief's 
critical notes. (37) The third, Sir Samuel Hoare, who held the 
post briefly, for a period of 35 days in April and May 1940, 
offered higher praise to Dowding in his memoirs. Nevertheless, 
35. Dowding Papers, HCTD/ S. 305, Dowding's notes, written about 
21 March 1939. He claimed that he had written to the Deputy 
Chief of the Air Staff (DCAS), 'begging him to ensure a proper 
liaison and consultation in matters affecting my command'. 
36. Dean, p. 142, described Swinton as 'the greatest as well as 
the shrewdest of all the political heads of the R. A. F. '. Swinton 
himself, after giving Air Marshal Sir Wilfred Freeman the pride 
of place, wrote, 'Next among the seniors I would put Dowding, 
Newall and Bowhill'. Earl of Swinton, Sixty Years of Power 
(London, 1966), pp. 230-31. 
37. See above, Note 35. 
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his statement that expansion of the fighter force was 'due to his 
foresight' would have been contested by a number of the Air 
Staff, and some politicians. (38) 
Others, also, found Dowding less than easy in their relationship. 
This was noted by a number of senior commanders who had close 
dealings with him. Arthur Harris, subsequently C-in-C, Bomber 
Command, for example, was told in 1938 that he was being posted 
to Fighter Command as Dowding Is Senior Air Staff Officer (SASO). 
Later he commented, 'My heart went into my boots'. He had had 
many rows when the C-in-C was Air Member for Research and 
Development (AMRD), and he was in Plans. As an instance, there 
had been disagreement over the need for aircraft to be better 
equipped with instruments for blind flying and for navigation. 
Harris claimed that he could not afford to be polite to Dowding 
on these matters 'when he started laying his ears back and being 
stubborn. Stubborn as a mule, but a nice old boy really. He was 
just out of touch with flying'(39) 
The impression of 'the somewhat prickly Dowding'(40) and his 
aloofness was shared by some in the aircraft industry. Harold 
Penrose, the Manager of Westland Civil Aircraft from 1928, and 
later their chief test pilot, wrote that his sobriquet, 'Stuffy', 
38. Viscount Templewood, Nine Troubled Years (London, 1955), 
pp. 355-56. 
39. D. Saward, 'Bomber' Harris (London, 1984), p. 80. 
40. J. Cross, Lord Swinton (Oxford, 1982), p. 150. 
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was apt. 'Humourless, withdrawn, he masked his quick perception 
and kept his distance with designers and directors of the 
aircraft industry'. Penrose continued by saying that Dowding was 
a magnificent leader, blessed with good judgement and the courage 
to uphold it. However, he suffered in comparison with his 
successor, Wilfrid Freeman, who was a taller, younger man of 
charm and handsome appearance to whom the industry quickly 
responded with mutual friendliness. (41) 
Air Marshal Sir Philip Joubert, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff 
(ACAS), who differed from Dowding over a number of issues, (42) 
wrote that he could be 'extremely exacting and tiresome to his 
subordinates' and that, although good on technical matters, he 
was inclined 'to spend too much time on details and less than 
sufficient on principles'. (43) 
41. H. Penrose, British Aviation: Ominous Skies, 1935-1939 (HMSO, 
1980), p. 59. Dowding's reserve was remembered by a former 
Personal Assistant who once travelled with the C-in-C sitting 
beside him, in the back of a Staff car from Bristol to London. 
'We never spoke a word. I, as a junior officer, never felt in 
a position to open the conversation and he never did. I felt 
that he was totally pre-occupied with his own thoughts, planning, 
etc. '. Ironside interview, 27 August 1989. 
42. The difference between Joubert and Dowding stemmed from a 
root of controversy over filtering, that is, the best method of 
transmitting information received from Radio Direction Finding 
(RDF) to fighter squadrons. See AIR 2/5056, Fighter Command 
Interception problems, January 1940, for some disagreements in 
the early stages of the war. Afterwards, Dowding felt that he 
had 'seen off' Joubert. More critical differences arose during 
discussions on night fighting later in the year. See below, 
Chapter 6. See also AIR 20/4298, Night Air Defence Committee, 
especially Enclosure 12,1 October 1940. For information on 
filtering, see AIR 41/18, Air Defence of Great Britain (ADGB), 
iv, The Beginning of the Fighter Offensive, November 1940- 
December 1941, part 1, paragraphs 33-48. 
43. Sir Philip Joubert, The Third Service (London, 1955), 
pp. 129-30. 
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These views have been summarised by Denis Richards, author of the 
Official History of the RAF, in referring to Dowding's 
unclubbable and less than co-operative nature, often displayed 
to those with whom he disagreed. 'Dowding was really very 
difficult', in his opinion and, as several opponents appreciated, 
'tact was not a weapon in Dowding's armoury'. (44) 
The relationship between Dowding and his subordinate, Air Vice- 
Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory, Air officer commanding, No. 12 
Group, was far from cordial. This salient factor in the later 
controversy over tactics was remembered by one of Leigh-Mallory's 
aides, present at the conference following the Air Defence 
exercises of 1939. Dowding spoke for over an hour on the fifty- 
six items on the agenda, then turned to his two commanders of 
Groups. 'Gossage, you've got five minutes; so have you, Leigh- 
Mallory'. Even less friendliness was attracted by the remark the 
aide heard Dowding make in front of several other senior 
officers. . 
'The trouble with you, Leigh-Mallory, is that you 
sometimes cannot see further than the end of your little 
nose'. (45) 
44. Letter, Denis Richards, 2 December 1989. See also Dowding's 
obituary which noted that, in official dealings, 'he was not an 
easy man. To him slackness, hypocrisy and self-seeking were not 
peccadilloes but scarlet sins'. He was 'sometimes impatient with 
colleagues and subordinates whom he suspected of adopting 
standards lower than his own'. The Times, 16 February 1970, 
p. 10. 
45. Interview, Air Chief-Marshal Sir Kenneth Cross, RAF Club, 
Piccadilly, 25 September 1989. Air Vice-Marshal E. L. Gossage was 
then AOC, No. 11 Group. 
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Leigh-Mallory's attitude to his Commander-in-Chief varied, 
according to eye-witnesses. Sir Kenneth Cross recollected that 
he never heard Leigh-Mallory make a disparaging remark about Park 
or any remark at all about Dowding, (46) a point also made by Sir 
Harry Broadhurst, then a Wing-Commander in No. 12 Group. (47) Yet 
Park in 1968 had a different memory. Looking back at an incident 
that occurred in 1940, when he was Dowding's SASO, he said that 
Leigh-Mallory came into his office after a meeting with the 
Commander-in-Chief and complained about his obstinacy. 'He said 
that he would move heaven and earth to get Dowding sacked from 
his job'. (48) 
The mutual antipathy between Leigh-Mallory and Dowding on the one 
hand, and between Park and Leigh-Mallory on the other, came to 
the surface while the Battle of Britain was being fought. This 
was a disagreement destined to play a major part in the changes 
of leadership, strategy and tactics at Fighter Command. (49) 
*** 
46. Ibid. 
47. Interview, Air Chief-Marshal Sir Harry Broadhurst, RAF Club, 
Piccadilly, 10 November 1989. 
48. Wright, p. 94, gives an account of Dowding's reaction to 
learning of this incident in 1968. See also orange, p. 120. 
49. See below, especially Chapter 5. 
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In assessing some of the differences between Dowding and the Air 
Staff at that time it must be borne in mind that such contests, 
though less unrelenting, were not unusual. For example, an 
examination of the career of Air Chief-Marshal Sir Edgar Ludlow- 
Hewitt and of parts of the correspondence between him and the Air 
Staff concerning Bomber Command, shows that he was carrying out 
the duty of a Commander-in-Chief, namely to 'fight for his 
corner' with a proper vigour. Yet in the eyes of those who 
received his sharp comments, Ludlow-Hewitt was generally regarded 
in a more acceptable light than was Dowding. (50) 
Thus a brief examination is needed of some of the specific 
differences between the Commander-in-Chief, Fighter Command and 
the Air Council, especially in the eighteen months prior to the 
outbreak of war. In John Terraine's opinion, these differences 
resolved themselves into 'a three-pronged argument', which he 
lists as the question of deployment, the intentions of the 
Germans and the conflicting needs of the Royal Air Force-(51) 
50. Possibly this was because Ludlow-Hewitt was more easily 
replaceable than Dowding. There were more senior staff with the 
experience necessary to lead Bomber Command than there were to 
take over Dowding's role at the rapidly changing Fighter Command 
between 1937 and 1939. For Ludlow-Hewitt's relations with the 
Air Ministry, see, for example, AIR 8/243,1938, Role of the 
Royal Air Force in National Defence: Air Staff Policy. See also 
Sir Charles Webster and N. Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive 
Against Germany, 1939-1945,4 vols. (HMSO, 1961), 1, Chapters 2 
and 3. See also Dr M. Smith, 'Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt and the 
Expansion of Bomber Command, 1939-40', Journal of the Royal 
United Services Institute (JRUSI), 126,1, (1981), pp. 53-55. 
51. Terraine, p. 72. 
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All three became matters of varying controversy. However, 
Terraine might well have added that at the heart of Dowding's 
squabbles with the Air Staff lay a basic difference of strategic 
thought on air power in the later 1930s. The majority of 
officers there were wedded to a policy which Dowding did not 
endorse wholeheartedly, namely the Trenchard Bomber Doctrine, in 
both its parts. 
Lord Trenchard, 'The Father of the RAF', had an unequalled 
influence on the Service from its foundation in 1918. Among his 
attributes were an indomitable spirit, an ability to inspire and 
ideas 'dominated by the offensive'. (52) His belief in the 
importance of aerial bombardment as a strategic weapon permeated 
his outlook and, by extension, that of the Air Staff. Under his 
leadership and that of his succeeding disciples, 'until the last 
declining year of peace at least two new bomber squadrons were 
formed for every new squadron of fighters'. (53) 
His relationship with Dowding was never easy from as early as 
Royal Flying Corps (RFC) days. When, after the Battle of the 
Somme in 1916 Dowding asked for squadrons to be relieved 
periodically, Trenchard referred to him as a 'dismal Jimmy' and 
spoke of him 'being obsessed by the fear of further 
casualties'. (54) Dowding was posted back to England, in charge 
52. Dean, p. 11. 
53. Richards and Saunders, i, p. 22. 
54. A. Boyle, Trenchard (London, 1962), p. 184. On the same 
incident see Wright, pp. 35-36 and Collier, Leader of the Few, 
p. 115. 
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of Southern Training Brigade, removed from active service. Their 
mutually tolerant relationship continued as the RAF expanded in 
the late 1930s, but when the importance of Fighter Command grew 
after 1937 and, with it, the role of Dowding, Trenchard's Bomber 
Doctrine was still the lynchpin of policy for the majority of the 
Air Staff. As will be seen later, Trenchard's influence within 
both Service and political circles, enabled him to play a 
significant part in Dowding's dismissal in November 1940. (55) 
The first part of the Bomber Doctrine foresaw the devastating 
power of German air attack on British cities and industrial 
centres, with attendant damage and breakdown in morale. Stanley 
Baldwin, the Prime Minister, encouraged the people of Britain to 
believe this in 1932 when he told Parliament that the man in the 
street should realise that 'there is no power on earth that can 
prevent him from being bombed. Whatever people may tell him, the 
bomber will always get through'. (56) Writing in 1935, Air 
- Commodore L. E. O. Charlton, formerly Air Attache to the USA, 
envisaged bombers flying in close formation, destroying cities, 
with fighters unable to prevent the attacks. Fighters, he 
claimed, would have no superiority in armament, for the bombers 
55. See below, Chapter 7. 
56.270 H. C. Deb. 5s, c. 632,10 November 1932. Baldwin added, 
'The only defence is offence, which means that you have to kill 
more women and children more quickly than the enemy, if you want 
to save yourselves'. 
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could be equipped with double guns firing forward, broadside and 
aft. Their sole advantage would be speed - but even the bombers 
would be flying at 200 m. p. h. (57) 
The threat of the bomber caused men of usually balanced judgement 
to suffer, then transmit, inordinate fear. 'London for several 
days will be one vast raving bedlam', one wrote, going on to 
speak of hospitals being stormed and traffic coming to a halt. 
'What of the government at Westminster? It will be swept away 
by an avalanche of terror'. (58) 
There was no doubt in the minds of the Joint Planning Committee 
in 1936 that the Luftwaffe would attempt to strike 'the knock-out 
blow' and thus resolve the course of the war within a few days 
or weeks. 'It is clear that in a war against us', they reported 
57. L. E. O. Charlton, War From the Air (London, 1935), p. 147. Of 
RAF fighters in 1936 only the Hawker Fury and the Gloster 
Gauntlet could exceed 200 m. p. h. at maximum level speed. Each 
aeroplane's armament was two Vickers rifle-calibre machine-guns. 
Eighteen fighter squadrons were available for operations but only 
half of these comprised Gauntlets or Furies, See Chaz Bowyer, 
Fighter Command (London, 1980), pp. 19-20. At the formation of 
Fighter Command in July 1936 there were still four Bristol 
Bulldog squadrons in service, a type that was 'frequently 
outpaced by the contemporary light day bomber, the Hawker "Hart", 
during air exercises'. See O. Thetford, 'on silver wings', 
Aeroplane Monthly, Part 12 (September, 1991), pp. 523-24. 
58. See Correlli Barnett, The Collapse of British Power (London, 
1972), pp. 436-37, quoting Major-General J. F. C. Fuller, Towards 
Armageddon: The Defence Problem (London, 1937). Of 'Roney' 
Fuller, Terraine suggests, p. 49, that he 'was passing through a 
period of searching doubt about democracy's survival capacity'. 
Smith, p. 61, claims that Fuller considered, in Chapter 10, that 
'it was the Jewish element in the East End that had panicked in 
the bombing of 1917, and would do so again in a new war'. 
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in October 1936, 'the concentration from the first day of the 
war, of the whole German air offensive ruthlessly against Great 
Britain would be possible. It would be the most promising way 
of trying to knock this country out'. (59) 
In the same vein, wild estimates of anticipated damage were 
presented to the Cabinet in December 1938, while the 
repercussions of the Munich Crisis were actively engaging 
people's minds'. These suggested that if bombs landed in a built- 
up area, 'then in the first three weeks 465,000 would be totally 
destroyed and 5,375,000 damaged out of some 14 million houses in 
the country'. (60) 
As a further example of the exaggerated estimates of the effect 
of air power in war - and a sad commentary on the accuracy of RAF 
Intelligence - Sir Hugh Seeley told the Supply Committee of the 
59. AIR 41/14, The Air Defence of Great Britain (ADGB), i, The 
Growth of Fighter Command, July 1936-June 1940, Appendix 6, 'Air 
Attack on Great Britain', part of 'Appreciation of the Situation 
in the event of War against Germany', by the Joint Planning Sub- 
Committee, 26 October 1936 (COS 513 [J. P. ]). In view of his 
later attitude to the efficacy of aerial bombing, it is 
interesting to note that the RAF's representative on the Sub- 
Committee was Group-Captain A. Harris, subsequently Commander-in- 
Chief, Bomber Command. 
60. CAB 4/29,1499B, Committee of Imperial Defence, Sub- 
Committee on Emergency Reconstruction Report, 16 December 1938. 
See also J. B. Haldane Air Raid Precautions (London, 1938), p. 7 and 
p. 63. Writing for Gollancz, Haldane was, in company with many 
Socialists and Communists, opposed to rearmament and war. 'This 
book is intended for the ordinary citizen', he wrote, 'the sort 
of man and woman who is going to be killed if Britain is raided 
again from the air'. He predicted that bombers could drop nearly 
double the 'total weight dropped in Britain during the whole of 
the last war in half a minute', and that 'the "knock-out blow" 
might kill 50,000 to 100,000 Londoners'. 
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House of Commons in May 1938 that by the end of 1939 Germany 
would possess a first-line strength of 6,000 aircraft, rising to 
8,000. (61) 
It is easy, from the stronghold of hindsight, to note how far 
from reality these fears were, but to Service leaders of the 
inter-war period, they were not necessarily extreme. No one knew 
for certain what the effects of mass bombing might be. An Air 
Staff estimate- of 1925, based on casualties caused by German air 
raids between 1914 and 1918, suggested that in London in the 
first two days of attack, some 3,000 people would be killed and 
almost 6,000 injured. (62) 
Sir John Slessor, formerly Director of Plans (D. Plans) at the Air 
Ministry, later explained that if heavy German bombing of Britain 
had taken place, 'then we should have been blameworthy if it had 
occurred and we had uttered no warning of the possibility or 
taken steps to guard against it'. (63) 
61.335 H. C. Deb. 5s, c. 1752-53,12 May 1938. 'Germany has the 
power to produce 400 to 500 a month', Seeley claimed. The 
latest of these schemes will bring us in two years' time up to 
2,700 front-line machines'. Ironically, in 1939 the Luftwaffe 
possessed no long-range heavy bomber. M. Williamson, The 
Luftwaffe, 1939-1945 (New York, 1986), p. 18. 
62. Quoted in Webster and Frankland, i, pp. 62-63, referring to 
a Report by the Committee on Air Raid Precautions, 6 July 1925; 
General Staff Memo, 14 October 1925 and Air Staff Memo, 24 
October 1925. See also B. Liddell Hart, The Defence of Britain (London, 1939), pp. 153-54. For a critical assessment of the 
criteria governing the Air Staff's estimates, see Air Vice- Marshal E. J. Kingston-McCloughry, 'The Strategic Air Offensive', 
JRUSI, 107,2 (1962), pp. 61-64. 'No realistic test or exercise 
was made in bomb damage before the outbreak of the second world 
war', (p. 61). 
63. Slessor, p. 151. 
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To reinforce this point of view, Lord Douglas, then Assistant 
Chief of the Air Staff (ACAS) wrote, of the Spanish Civil War, 
that the Air Ministry were affected both by the bombing of troops 
and of Guernica. 'The results perhaps over-impressed us and 
probably had some effect on our attitude at the time of 
Munich'. (64) 
The second part of Trenchard's Doctrine, in the view of the 
Bomber Lobby, was to match threat with threat. Therefore the aim 
of the Royal Air Force was to retaliate against aerial attacks 
on the United Kingdom by launching raids on an enemy, hitting 
especially at the economy. The bomber was invested with a 
deterrent power far exceeding its actual ability at the time. 
In 1938, Trenchard told the House of Lords that the only thing 
which would stop war-makers was the knowledge that if they 
attacked they would be hit harder in return. (65) As Trenchard's 
biographer pointed out, his views on strategy 'had the hallmark 
of simplicity'. (66) 
In a sense, Dowding's appointment to the leadership of the newly 
formed Fighter Command in 1936 was equivalent to being given 
captaincy of the Second Eleven. At the time, in the world of 
military aviation, the bomber was supreme and it was anticipated 
that, in any future war, fighters would play no more than an 
64. Douglas Papers; the Papers of Lord Douglas of Kirtleside, 
Imperial War Museum Department of Documents, London, File 2, 
Notes sent by Lord Douglas to Robert Wright, 13 June 1963. On 
the same point, see U. Bialer, 'Humanization of Air Warfare in 
British Foreign Policy on the Eve of the Second World War, 
Journal of Contemporary History(JCH), 13,1(1978), pp. 79-96. 
65.112 H. L. Deb. 5s, p. 235, c. 1 and p. 237, c. 1, debate, 15 March 
1939. 
66. Boyle, p. 706. 
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ancillary role. However, the developments of Radio Direction 
Finding (RDF) and the revolution in design, speed and armament 
of monoplane fighters altered the balance. These changes 
naturally also increased the importance of Dowding's position. 
The spotlight fell more brightly on his Command, thus stressing 
the significance of the nature of his relationship with the Air 
Staff. (67) 
Consequently 'Dowding, s Fighter Doctrine was propounded, 
especially from 1938, together with his unwavering belief in the 
necessity to protect the Home Base, 'The best defence of the 
country is the Fear of the Fighter' he wrote to Sir Arthur 
Street, Permanent Under-Secretary (PUS) at the Air Ministry, in 
September 1939. If Britain were strong in fighters, he 
continued, she would probably never be attacked in force. 
Limited strength would draw attacks which would gradually be 
stopped, but only after great damage had been done. Then came 
his most profound worry, which was that a shortage of fighters 
would lead to unstoppable attacks, land the productive capacity 
of the country will be virtually destroyed'. In that event, 
Dowding predicted, other parts of the RAF - and by that he was 
referring particularly to Bomber Command - would 'become a 
wasting asset' and maintaining them would have been 'a fruitless 
sacrifice'. 
67. Terraine, p. 71, refers to a 'dramatic transformation' in 
Dowding's status. For a map of Radio Direction Finding stations 
established by 1939, see Richards and Saunders, i, p. 153. For 
early developments of Hurricanes and Spitfires, see, for example, 
Penrose, pp. 50-51 and 68-69. 
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At the end of his homily he pointed out, with an argument which 
failed to persuade all of the Bomber Lobby at the Air Ministry, 
that "the continued existence of the nation and all its services, 
depends upon the Royal Navy and Fighter Command'. (68) 
All of Dowding's strategy was turned towards the goal of building 
a complete system of aerial defence for Britain and in this, by 
the outbreak of war, he had succeeded to an extent that no other 
commander probably could have achieved. But this concentration 
upon a laager defence was not in line with the thinking of those 
on the Air council who felt, at heart, that fighters were no more 
than a placebo for the public. They believed that bombers alone 
would bring the enemy to his knees and thereby obtain victory. 
'It is not enough to avoid losing a war', suggested an Air Staff 
note in November 1938, shortly after the Munich Crisis had 
uncovered some of the RAF's gross deficiencies in fighter 
strength. 'We have got to be able to win it; and we can never 
win a war merely by protecting ourselves'. The report then 
turned to a comparison with the boxing-ring, saying that there 
would be no victory for a boxer who only parried blows. He 
needed a big punch of his own, 'and he must be able to keep on 
punching until. his opponent is out'. (69) 
68. AIR 16/255, Fighter Strength - Policy (1939) , Dowding to Sir Arthur Street, Permanent Under-Secretary (PUS), the Air Ministry, 
25 September 1939. 
69. AIR 8/243, Air Staff note, 26 November 1938. 
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In boxing terms, Dowding was an astute counter-puncher, learning 
to husband and employ limited forces in a defensive battle aimed 
at preventing the Luftwaffe from achieving mastery in British 
skies. The nature of the task which he was set to solve 
prevented him from taking a direct involvement in the strategy 
of the Bomber Lobby, which was firmly entrenched in Whitehall. 
Yet, of course, their basic argument was sound. Wars cannot be 
won by fighters; they may be won by bombers. 
A second, though related example of Dowding's differences with 
the Air Staff during the later 1930s came from their respective 
attitudes towards the number of squadrons needed by Fighter 
Command to fulfil its tasks. The matter became a running battle 
over several years, both before and after the watershed of 
Munich. 
In brief, when worries were expressed in January 1938 that only 
38 squadrons were available for home defence, the Air Staff were 
prepared to accept the figure. Dowding, however, and the Home 
Defence Committee (HDC) were not, bearing in mind particularly 
the limitations of the biplane fighter when set against the 
performance of the emerging monoplane bombers being built in 
Germany. (70) 
70. CAB 13/7, Home Defence Committee 256, Sub-Committee on the 
Re-Orientation of the Air Defence System of Great Britain. 
'Ideal' Scheme for the Air Defence of Great Britain - Possible Economies Report, 2 February 1938. 
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By March, Dowding believed that there should be not less than 45 
squadrons, yet in July Air-Commodore Slessor, then Deputy 
Director of Plans (D. D. Plans) at the Air Ministry and thus an 
officer of great influence, (71) considered that 35 squadrons of 
fighters - 28 in the line and seven in reserve - should be the 
minimum home defence strength. Again, Fighter Command, with 
spreading responsibilities, wanted more. (72) 
The crisis over Czechoslovakia in late September concentrated the 
minds of politicians and Service officers very rapidly. At once, 
the needs of the Royal Air Force, so long neglected by 
governmental policies, became the centre of a decision for swift 
expansion. 
On 1 October Britain's fighter strength was 406 machines. The 
sobering thought for those who made a distinction between numbers 
and quality, nevertheless, was that, of the total, only 70 were 
Hurricanes and fourteen Spitfires, with the latter at that time 
being non-operational. Their 322 biplane fighters, of which the 
most effective were 84 Gladiators, could barely catch, let alone 
71. Smith, pp. 38-40, considered the Plans department 'the major 
progenitor of theory and forward thinking'. In his view the 
relationship between the Deputy Director of Plans and the CAS was 
'one of the most crucial in the entire organisation' and the 
former had 'more influence than his opposite numbers in the other 
services'. See also Slessor, Chapters VII and IX for his 
autobiographical recollections of this period. 
72. See AIR 20/313,1938-41, Strength and Deployment of Fighter 
Squadrons. 
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shoot down, the contemporary Luftwaffe bombers. (73) Dowding, 
writing to the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff (DCAS) on 12 
October, commented, 'I should consider 41 squadrons upon the 
presence of which I could rely would be adequate for Home Defence 
purposes'. (74) 
Leaders of the RAF, particularly after 1936, followed a double 
strategy as the power and value of monoplane fighters grew. 
Firstly, in forward planning, they hoped to create a strike-force 
of heavy bombers able to devastate an enemy's economic power. 
secondly, through expanding Fighter Command, they intended to 
inflict unacceptable losses on any attacking force, which, 
thereby, would be compelled to call off the offensive. 
After Munich, more of the Air Staff came to realise not so much 
that their creed of the power of the bomber was over-optimistic 
as that there was a need for a stronger force to defend the 
British Isles. This requirement arose directly from the fear of 
73. For fighter deliveries made in 1938, see AIR 19/524, Fighter 
aircraft deliveries, 1939. For fighter strength in 1938, see AIR 
8/218, Strength Returns of Metropolitan Force Squadrons, 1938. 
74. AIR 16/255, Dowding to Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, 12 
October 1938. 
55 
bombing on a mass scale by a Luftwaffe whose numbers and 
capabilities had been greatly exaggerated by Air Force 
Intelligence. (75) 
Faced by a pressure to build up the RAF at great speed, with 
fewer resources than required, the Air Staff had no little 
difficulty in reconciling the dual need. The dichotomy can be 
deduced from statements made by Sir Kingsley Wood in the 
immediate aftermath of the Munich Crisis. In the first, he told 
the Air Staff that the strong are not those who can merely 
defend themselves but those who have the will and the means to 
give, in the last resort, the backing of force to their influence 
in the world. This we cannot do if we are inferior in air power, 
which means striking power,. (76) However, on 10 November he 
assured Parliament that he proposed to provide 'the highest 
priority to the strengthening of our fighter force, that force 
which is designed to meet the invading bomber in the air'. (77) 
75. See AIR 8/243,26 November 1938. The document admitted that 
'there has been a tendency in the past to overstate the case that 
"the bomber will always get through", and perhaps also to lay too 
much stress on the claim that the counter-offensive is the only 
effective means of defence in the air'. The developments of 
monoplane fighters, with great speed and firepower, sharpened the 
case against deterrence by bombing. What the Air Ministry failed 
to allow for adequately, however, was that what could happen to 
unescorted German bombers over Britain could also be suffered by 
unescorted RAF bombers over Germany. For a full background to the 
problem of information available to Britain about the emerging Luftwaffe, see Wesley K. Wark, 'British Intelligence on the German Air Force and Aircraft Industry, 1933-19391, Historical Journal 
(HJ), 25,3 (1982), pp. 627-48. 
76. AIR 8/277, The Strength of the Bomber Force in relation to the principle of parity, Memo by the Air Staff, 2 November 1938. 
77.341 H. C. Deb., 5s, c. 351,10 November 1938. 
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It is noteworthy that even at a time when Dowding's Command was 
the prime candidate for expansion, considerably greater financial 
allocation was given to bombers. Under Scheme M the cost of 
fighters was estimated at £45 million; bombers were allocated 
£175 million. (78) 
By March 1939 Sir Kingsley Wood spoke in the Commons of 'building 
up what I would call a balanced Air Force'. Britain's strategic 
policy of relying on the counter-offensive, he claimed, had not 
been abandoned, because it was a vital part of any sound system 
of defence. However, the argument that the bomber would always 
get through had been over-emphasised and, with it, the supremacy 
of the offensive. (79) 
Although rapid advances in the production and provision of 
monoplane fighters were made from late 1938 to December 1939, by 
which time the war had started, Dowding still did not believe 
that his forces were adequate. Nonetheless, it is apparent from 
the figures that a great effort was made by the Air Council; 
awarding credit for the expansion solely to the Commander-in- 
Chief, Fighter Command, is no fair assessment. (80) 
78. AIR 8/240, Programme of development of Scheme 'M', 1938. 
For details, see Smith, Table VIII, p. 355. 
79.344 H. C. Deb., 5s, c. 2388,9 March 1939. Kingsley Wood added 
that 'security of the base is one of the vital principles of war 
and it would be just as foolish to concentrate on the offensive 
and neglect defence as it would be to do the reverse'. 
80. See AIR 16/116, Operational Requirements - Fighter Command 
Squadrons Available for War, which shows, for example, that on 
1 May 1939, seven squadrons of Spitfires and twelve of Hurricanes 
were available. The figure had risen to thirteen squadrons of 
each type by 1 January 1940. From January to December 1939, 
production for home and export was 586 Hurricanes and 435 
Spitfires. See AIR 19/524, Fighter Aircraft Deliveries, 1939. 
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Yet the tone of Dowding's feelings on the matter may be judged 
from his Battle of Britain Despatch. Dissatisfaction broke 
through. 'I wrote on the 16th September, 1939, a letter to the 
Air Ministry', he claimed. 'In the letter I pointed out that the 
Air Staff Estimates of the number of Fighter Squadrons necessary 
for the defence of the country was 52, and that on the outbreak 
of war I had the equivalent of 34 (allowing for the fact that 
some Auxiliary Squadrons were only partially trained and 
equipped) '. (81) 
The controversy between him and the Air Council over fighter 
numbers endured throughout the remainder of his time at Fighter 
Command. 
*** 
A further area of dissension for Dowding concerned the provision 
of aerodromes, together with the construction of concrete 
runways. Harold Balfour, the Under-Secretary of State for Air, 
remembered some of the arguments when he wrote of the Air Staff 
belief in 1938 that 'there was no need to plan for hard runways. 
The idea of training on anything except a grass field was a sin 
in thought against the true faith of flying instruction'. (82) 
This view, in Balfour's opinion, epitomised the attitude of 
several leaders whose thought and planning had advanced little 
since their own flying days in combat before 1918. 
81. AIR 8/863, p. 4544, paragraph 16. The background to the 
figure of 52 squadrons, which was first proposed in 1923, is 
shown in Marquess of Londonderry, Wings of Destiny (London, 
1943), Chapter II, 'Fifty-Two Metropolitan Squadrons'. 
82. Balfour, p. 104. 
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Dowding realised the need for all-weather surfaces so that his 
modern monoplane fighters, heavier and faster than the biplanes, 
would not be grounded in times of poor weather, thus putting at 
risk his plans for constant defence of the United Kingdom. (83) 
As late as the end of February, 1939, Air Vice-Marshal W. Welsh, 
Air Member for Supply and Organisation, (AMSO) claimed that 
concrete runways were often unnecessary. He raised the objection 
that they were difficult to camouflage, a reason which failed to 
impress Dowding. After discussions within the Air Ministry, 
however, the attitude changed and by the middle of March it was 
suggested that by the following winter, all fighter aerodromes 
would be provided with concrete runways. (84) 
An effort was made to achieve this and there was some progress 
by the early stages of the war. In reality, the operation of 
83. For example, compare the Hawker Fury, with a maximum speed 
of 223 m. p. h. and a maximum take-off weight of 3,620 lb. with the 
Hawker Hurricane, whose comparable figures were 316 m. p. h. and 
6,040 lb. See Bill Gunston, Fighters, 1914-1945 (London, 1978), 
pp. 54-55 and 74-75. 
84. AIR 6/37, Secretary of State's Progress Meetings on RAF 
Expansion Measures, 24 January-20 March, 1939, Meetings held on 
21 February, 28 February and 14 March, 1939. At the first 
meeting, Welsh raised the additional objection of high cost - an 
average of J70,000 for changing one fighter aerodrome. See also 
AIR 20/251,1939-40, Deployment of fighter squadrons and 
provision.. of runways, taxi-ing tracks and dispersal points at 
fighter aerodromes, for Minutes of conferences held at the Air 
Ministry on 28 April and 29 June, 1939, to discuss matters, at 
which Dowding listed 'wet' and 'dry' aerodromes. 
59 
fighters from aerodromes in the south of England during the 
Battle of Britain was made easier by the generally dry weather 
of that period. (85) 
*** 
A small, yet telling example of Dowding's care for his pilots - 
and the occasion of another difference with the Air Staff - arose 
from his desire that men should be well protected in their 
aircraft. Bearing in mind the scarcity value of pilots to 
Fighter Command, both his concern and sense of investment were 
understandable. 
In 1938 a decision was taken that during the early months of the 
following year fighters would be equipped with an external 
armoured glass windscreen; also, by September 1939 a sheet of 
armour plate would be fitted behind the cockpit seat to protect 
the pilot's back. Dowding, never reticent over recounting past 
battles with the Air Ministry, remembered the discussions and 
commented, years later, that his request for bullet-proof glass 
85. In the opinion of Dr. Montgomery-Hyde, historian of the Air 
Ministry, 'Dowding strongly advocated the use of concrete 
runways, but he was overruled by colleagues in the Air Ministry, 
who favoured grass. He rightly knew that concrete runways had 
to come and if they had been ready for the Battle of Britain it 
might well have made a substantial difference'. Letter, 
Dr. H. Montgomery-Hyde, 17 December 1988. Ramsey, Battle of 
Britain, pp. 30-236, gives excellent background detail on twenty 
aerodromes used during the battle, showing that a number still 
had no concrete runways by July 1940. For weather of that 
period, see Hough and Richards, Appendix 1. This shows that, 
during a period of 83 days from 10 July to 30 September, during 
which the main daylight battle was fought, there were showers, 
light rain or rain on only 25 days. Clear, or fine weather 
occurred on 43 days. Other days were mainly cloudy, but dry. 
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to be fitted to Hurricanes and Spitfires was met with laughter, 
as if he had demanded 'something grotesquely impossible'. He 
said that his reply was, 'If Chicago gangsters can have bullet- 
proof glass in their cars I can't see any reason why my pilots 
should not have the same'. (86) 
Dowding's third area of overall disagreement with the Air 
Ministry stemmed particularly from their respective views of the 
strategic use to be made of Fighter Command. The difference lay 
in the separate pressures exerted on each side. 
In the eyes of the Commander-in-Chief his squadrons existed 
primarily, if not exclusively, for the air defence of Great 
Britain. In the years prior to the war he had interpreted that 
responsibility as largely to provide cover for two of the vital 
areas which lay within the radius of attack from unescorted 
German bombers, flying from their homeland. The first of these 
encompassed London and south-east England, where he planned to 
deploy the fighters of No. 11 Group. The second was the wider 
geographical area of the midlands and the north, particularly 
industrial centres, where No. 12 Group was to be used. In 
Dowding's view, his Command would be exercised to the limit in 
offering protection to those areas, especially in view of 
86. See Wright, p. 72 and F. Mason, The Hawker Hurricane (London, 
1962), p. 36. See also R. Cross, Spitfire (Cambridge, 1971), p. 32, 
for a clear photograph of an early windscreen with external 
armoured glass panel, and, p. 53, a list of cockpit protection for 
pilots. The introduction' of these devices, strongly supported 
by Dowding, saved the lives of many pilots. 
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an insufficient number of fighters at his disposal. Any further 
demands on Fighter Command, he believed, could be met only if he 
were provided with greater resources. (87) 
By September 1939 and the coming of the war, the expanding 
defensive role of Fighter Command was recognised by the formation 
of No. 13 Group and the planning of No. 10 Group. The latter, 
in 
time, would defend the south-west of England, beyond Portsmouth 
and Southampton, while the former was created primarily to cover 
the wide sweep of coastal Britain lying to the north of the area 
covered by No. 12 Group. This showed the existing concern over 
providing an aerial guard for naval establishments in Scotland, 
stretching from the Firth of Forth to Scapa Flow. (88) 
This extra responsibility for assisting in the defence of the 
Royal Navy's bases at Scapa was increased in the late summer. 
Fighter command was also required to give protection to coastal 
shipping, especially the trade plying the east coast. Then the 
decision was taken to add the city of Belfast, a large industrial 
centre, to the list. The difficulties involved in these requests 
were appreciated by the Cabinet, as is shown by a Memorandum 
87. See AIR 20/252, Air Requirements of the Field Force, Dowding 
to Under-Secretary for Air, 7 July 1939. When Dowding learned 
that ten of his squadrons might be allocated to France, he wrote 
that 'the air defence of Great Britain will be gravely imperilled 
... If 10 Regular squadrons were withdrawn the remaining 
resources would be altogether inadequate for the defence of this 
country'. 
88. No. 13 Group was formed on 1 August 1939, under the terms of 
Scheme M. No. 10 Group became operational on 13 July 1940. See 
Hough and Richards, pp. 64 and 115-16. See also AIR 20/393, 
Planning and Expansion of Air Defences, 1939, pp. 57-63. 
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produced on 6 September by the Chiefs of Staff (COS) Committee. 
They saw the need for Fighter Command's brief to cover Scapa 
Flow, but felt unable to propose that the 'aircraft defence of 
Great Britain, which is still short of fifteen squadrons, should 
be further depleted by taking two for Scapa'. (89) 
As war started, Dowding had to face the fact that what he once 
considered to be a commitment to protect, in the main, London, 
the south-east, the industrial midlands and the north of England, 
had grown to a far wider responsibility. He was required to 
offer protection to the nation's factories, especially those 
producing aircraft; to ensure the safety of the system of supply 
and distribution, particularly at the major ports; to provide 
some cover for Royal Navy shore bases, especially Scapa Flow; to 
offer cover, in spite of his feeling that this was the Navy's 
task, to coastal shipping; to have one squadron ready to defend 
Belfast; and to provide fighters to protect the Field Force in 
France. (90) For this multitude of duties, the planned strength 
of Fighter Command had risen to 57 squadrons. The reality, on 
3 September 1939, was that Dowding commanded a force of 39 
squadrons, of which 25 were Regular, and fourteen Auxiliary. To 
compound his difficulties, four squadrons immediately flew to 
France, as previously arranged. (91) 
89. CAB 66/1, War Cabinet Memoranda, 1939-40, W. P. (39)8, Air 
Defence of Scapa, Memorandum by Chiefs of Staff Committee, 6 
September 1939. See also AIR 16/190, Fighter Policy, September 
1939- May 1940, pp. 13-16. 
90. Ibid, p. 19. 
91. See AIR 16/116, figures for 31 August 1939. 
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An argument can be advanced that, on occasion, Dowding gave the 
impression of wanting to select which duties his Command would 
undertake, showing an air of paternalism, verging on ownership, 
towards his men and machines. Although possessing an almost 
messianic sense of mission towards the defence of the Home Base, 
he was still the servant of the Air Ministry. With hindsight, 
the correctness of his burning belief in the need to retain 
fighters for combat over Britain, according to his carefully 
prepared plan, * has received extensive praise. (92) Nevertheless, 
the burdens laid on the Air Staff at the time must be recognised. 
They were immediately affected by requirements from Government 
and from the needs of the other two Services. Blaming them for 
the problems laid at the door of the RAF is easy, but unjust; 
they were servants of masters with whose decisions they did not 
always concur. 
*** 
92. See, for example, Terraine, pp. 150-52, Deighton, pp. 61-64 
and Wright, pp. 103-07. 
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PART FOUR: THE FRENCH CONNECTION 
Nowhere did the divergences over Fighter Command's leadership and 
strategy show more clearly than in the difficulties and 
differences which divided Dowding from the Air Council on the 
question of fighters for France. The argument lasted from the 
reappraisals made after the Munich Crisis, until the end of the 
French Campaign in June 1940. The main casus belli was the 
extent to which Fighter Command should be instructed to give 
support to the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in France and 
to the French themselves. 
The claim has been advanced that Dowding fought virtually single- 
handed to retain his squadrons in Britain, an attitude formed by 
his prescience that they would be needed to defend the mainland 
of the United Kingdom when the inevitable German air offensive 
was launched. (93) The disagreement developed during two phases, 
growing more urgent with the passage of time. The first period 
stretched from the preparations made during 1939 and lasted until 
the eve of the German Blitzkrieg in the West on 10 May 1940. 
Following immediately, the second phase lasted until the collapse 
of France in late June. However, the claim of Dowding's single 
opposition does less than justice to the efforts of some other 
senior officers. 
93. See, for example, Wright, especially Chapters 5 and 6. 
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At the root of the problem lay British mistrust of entanglement 
in a war on the European mainland and, when such an involvement 
became inevitable, an unwillingness to commit forces on a large 
scale. (94) Nevertheless, it was obvious that RAF aircraft would 
have to be part of the force despatched, both to fulfil the Air 
Ministry's expectations of the efficacy of bombing targets in 
Germany(95) and also to protect British ground forces. As a 
matter of government policy, the planned sending of four 
squadrons from Fighter Command was far from unreasonable, a 
decision approached by the Air Ministry with guarded charity and 
towards which Dowding was distinctly hostile. 
The creation of a Fighter Command whose defence was based on a 
close liaison between Radio Direction Finding stations, 
Controllers and the squadrons themselves had undoubted strengths 
for the protection of the United Kingdom. However, the system 
evolved under Dowding's leadership also limited the Command's 
strategic use, although this weakness could be laid at the door 
of the Air Council, who had altered the concept of the 
indivisibility of air power when they created separate Commands 
94. Terraine, p. 63, comments that 'the Army's dislike of the 
French alliance and the Continental commitment was in no small 
part due to a dread of once more becoming pawns on a French board'. The background to British foreign policy at this time is explained clearly in Taylor, English History , pp. 439-51, underlining Britain's mistrust of Russia ('No alliance has been 
pursued less enthusiastically'; p. 448) and inability to help the 
Poles ('They had no teeth for this purpose'; p. 443). 
p 
95. For a summary of Bomber Command's proposed role, see Terraine, Appendix A, 'Western Air Plans, September 1,1939'. 
Reasons for the choice of the Ruhr as a target are shown in AIR 41/40, The RAF in the Bombing Offensive against Germany (BOAG), ii, Restricted bombing, September 1939- May 1941, p. 36. 
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in 1936. (96) If the alliance of Great Britain and France were 
to be utilised completely against Germany, then such a potent 
weapon as Fighter Command would need to be employed to the full. 
Slessor, an able strategist, foresaw the static role that could 
be forced on Spitfires and Hurricanes when he wrote, in April 
1939 that, 'Unless we can make some arrangement for operating 
fighters from French bases, we might be faced in the initial 
stage of such a war with the spectacle of five or six hundred 
good short-range fighters sitting in England unable to contribute 
at all to the issue in the Low Countries -a struggle on which 
the subsequent fate of England might ultimately depend'. He 
pointed out that 'our quite natural and proper obsession' with 
the fear of a 'knock-out' blow could lead to an insular outlook. 
This would give little help to France, whose defeat could be 
followed by heavy attacks on Britain. (97) 
As Chief of the Air Staff, Newall felt more than most the double 
pressures exerted on Fighter Command when war drew near. He 
appreciated that the four squadrons allocated to the Field Force 
represented barely more than a token gesture of support for the 
96. The reasons for the decision to create separate Commands in 
1936 are shown in AIR 41/14, ADGB, i, pp. 15-23 and 30-34, and in 
AIR 41/40 BOAG, i, Pre-War Evolution of Bomber Command, 1917- 
1939, pp. 11OA-11OE. See also Webster and Frankland, i, p. 83, who 
believe that 'It made still wider the gulf between attack and 
defence ... combined operations were made more difficult. Joint tactical planning was neglected'. A contrary view is taken by 
Derek Wood, co-author of The Narrow Margin. See The Battle Re- 
Thought, edited by H. Probert and S. Cox (London, 1991), p. 4, in 
which he states that 'this centralization was vital; one command, 
one purpose'. 
97. AIR 20/220,1938-1939, Deployment of fighter squadrons, 
Director of Plans to Director of Organisation, 6 April 1939. 
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Army and realised the urgency of requests made by the French for 
more support from the RAF, particularly as they knew the 
weaknesses of their own Armee de 1'Air. Yet at the same time he 
was aware of Fighter Command's prime responsibility for the 
defence of the British mainland, a task which could be carried 
out only through the operation of the controlled system set up 
under Dowding. 
Newall, in May 1939, resisted undertakings being given to the 
French in advance to despatch more fighters to France. 'Any 
further reinforcement of that sector of the allied air front in 
France', he wrote, 'must be a matter for decision by the Cabinet 
in the light of the circumstances at the time'. (98) And yet, at 
the same time, Newall planned for a further six squadrons of the 
best fighters to be put on a mobile basis from early 1940, so 
that they might be despatched to France if needed. 
Dowding's objections to this policy lasted unremittingly through 
September and October. 'The secure base must be the foundation 
for all our war plans', he warned sternly within a fortnight of 
the outbreak of hostilities, 'and, at the present moment, our 
base is dangerously insecure'. However, the demands made on the 
Commander-in-Chief, Fighter Command were at least equalled, if 
not exceeded, by those aimed at the Chief of the Air Staff and 
the Air Council, as is shown clearly by the correspondence 
between Dowding and his masters at the time. (99) 
98. CAB 53/49, Committee of Imperial Defence, Chiefs of Staff 
Committee, COS 912, Memorandum by CAS, 13 May 1939. 
99. See, for example, AIR 16/255, Dowding to Kingsley Wood, 12 
September 1939 and Air Ministry to Dowding, 21 September 1939. 
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In this matter, Dowding's reputation for obstinacy and an 
unwillingness to co-operate readily was drawn into sharper focus. 
Concerning his attitude towards bringing his command up to the 
planned number of squadrons, Denis Richards writes of his 
'vigorous, sustained and absolutely justified campaign', but then 
adds, 'in this, though he often seemed unaware of it, he had the 
Air Staff with him all the way'. (100) His reaction to other 
senior staff could be combative. In September 1939 Douglas had 
to approach Dowding over a proposal to send more fighters to 
France and 'bearded Dowding in his office in Bentley Priory. I 
stated the Air Ministry's case, and, almost as I expected, I got 
a smart rebuff. Dowding was rightly concerned about nourishing 
his own strength, and when it came to doing that he was 
adamant'. (101) His attitude was not forgiven by some of those 
who had suffered from his tongue and pen, and they stored it as 
ammunition for a future campaign. (102) 
Yet Dowding's supporters have painted a portrait of a lone 
campaigner, virtually without allies, struggling to ensure the 
aerial security of Britain. Wright wrote of 'the long and lonely 
struggle that he was to have to wage during those first eight 
months of the war to maintain, let alone build up, what he felt 
to be sufficient forces for the air defence of the country' . (103) 
100. Hough and Richards, pp. 76-77. 
101. Lord Douglas of Kirtleside, Years of Command (London, 
1966), p. 51. 
102. Terraine, p. 77, refers to 'Dowding's outspoken 
disputations' with the Air Staff. The 'future campaign' refers 
to the moves to replace Dowding, from September to December, 
1940. See below, especially Chapters 5-7. 
103. Wright, p. 87. 
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Such a claim does not present a balanced view of the feelings of 
the time. The reality was that both Dowding and the Air Staff 
were less than prepared to weaken the defensive arm of the Royal 
Air Force; the difference was one of degree. The Air Ministry 
were, more particularly, servants of military and political 
demands to give adquate cover to the BEF and to demonstrate that 
Britain was an ally of France not in words alone. (104) 
*** 
The different appreciations of the role of Fighter command, made 
by those at the heart of Britain's air defences, were sharpened 
by a cause other than the need to retain in the United Kingdom 
a basic number of squadrons required for the protection of the 
Home Base, with no reductions for any other duties. This cause 
was an awareness, a deeply worrying omen in view of the 
104. See AIR 16/255, Newall to Dowding, 5 October 1939. The 
wider pressures on the Air Staff, as opposed to DowdingIs single- 
mindedness are displayed here. The CAS concluded, 'Finally let 
me repeat I am not preparing to sell Fighter Command to the 
French. I am merely asking you to take the necessary steps to 
ensure that if we are in danger of losing the war in France 
through lack of fighters (a situation which I do not think is 
likely to arise) , we shall not find ourselves caught unprepared'. 
For more evidence of Newall's resistance to the 'bleeding' of 
Fighter Command, see AIR 20/293, pp. 87-88. 
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forthcoming struggle, of the weaknesses of the French Air 
Force. (105) Dowding mistrusted the abilities of the French to 
fight a war in the air, disturbed both by their pessimistic 
outlook and the lack of an integrated system of defence 
comparable with the one devised to protect the United 
Kingdom. (106) 
This mistrust was fuelled by personal experience. In 1939 he 
flew to Lille to see the working of their defensive system. The 
meeting was preceded by a long luncheon at a public restaurant 
during which Dowding, an abstemious man, drank far less than 
several French commanders. He was then taken to a basement, 
where the system was unveiled. It consisted of a French airman 
seated beside a public telephone, taking occasional calls, then 
entering chalked arrows on a squared blackboard. Dowding, anger 
blended with disappointment, could barely wait to return to his 
aircraft with his Personal Assistant. (107) 
105. Alistair Horne, To Lose a Battle (London, 1969), pp. 70-71, 
refers to General Vuillemin, Commander-in-Chief of l'Armbe de 
1'Air as 'an elderly bomber pilot not over-endowed with 
dynamism'. The Private Diaries of Paul Baudouin, translated by 
Sir Charles Petrie (London, 1948), p. 18, offers Baudouin's 
description of him as "a nonentity as usual, but with no 
pretensions to be anything else'. D. Wood and D. Dempster, The 
Narrow Margin (London, 1961), p. 187, give French fighter strength 
in September 1939 as 442 machines, all of which were inferior to 
the Me. 109. They attribute the poor French position at least 
partly to the nationalisation of the aircraft industry under 
Blum's government in 1936. For further details, see P. Lamarche, 
'The French Air Force Today', in the Aeroplane, 7 September 1939. 
106. General Vuillemin's pessimism in 1938 after visiting the 
Luftwaffe was later recollected by the then French Foreign 
Minister, Georges Bonnet. 'Or le general Vuillemin, rentrant 
d'Allemagne oü il a ßt6 invite par Goering, est categorique. 
"Notre aviation est complttement surclasse par celle de nos 
voisins ... deux semaines apras le dfibut de la guerre, il n'y 
aura plus un seul avion franpais en fairl". Georges Bonnet, 
'Pourquoi j'ai approuv4 les accords de Munich', Historama, 238 
(Paris, 1971), pp-61-88 (p. 61). 
107. Ironside interview, 17 August 1989. 
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A generally accepted figure for the number of aircraft possessed 
by 1'Armee de 1'Air just prior to the opening of the German 
offensive in 1940 is not easy to discover, as some totals 
disguise the inclusion of many obsolescent machines. This was 
to prove a crucial factor in battle because, in Terraine's 
estimate, of the 170 bombers and 614 fighters ready en ligne on 
1 February 1940, only 37 of the former and 523 of the latter had 
been built within the previous two years. On 10 May the probable 
figures were, on strength, 663 fighters, with 465 operational and 
793 bombers/reconnaissance aircraft, of which 459 were 
operational. (108) 
Through discussions and observations, the Air Staff were 
painfully aware of their ally's failings - factory production, 
squadron organisation, lack of RDF defence, problems of spares 
and replacements and fighter performance - all fell well below 
the standards of the Royal Air Force. Thus, an even greater 
burden was destined to fall on Fighter Command when the main 
battle in the West opened. The French machines, supported by the 
comparatively meagre, yet most valuable RAF contingents, were 
faced by a Luftwaffe force of almost four and a half thousand 
aircraft, of which about one thousand seven hundred were fighters 
or dive-bombers. (109) 
*** 
108. Terraine, pp. 119-20. See also C. Dunning, L'Armee de 1'Air, 
1939-40 (London, 1989), p. 22. For more detail and assessment of 
various types of French fighter, see Gunston, pp. 70-73. For 
French bombers, see B. Cooper, The Story of the Bomber, 1914-1945 
(London, 1978), pp. 69-71. 
109. Wood and Dempster, Appendix 16. For a general background 
of pre-war Anglo-French co-operation, see N. H. Gibbs, Grand 
Strategy, vol. i, Rearmament Policy (HMSO, 1976) , Chapters XVI and XVII, pp. 607-88. 
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When the blow fell on 10 May, within a few days, or, as some 
would claim, a few hours, the worst fears of the Air Staff were 
realised. For example, in the words of Wood and Dempster, 'the 
French Air Force was a hollow shell which shattered into a 
thousand pieces at the first blow', a judgement far more of an 
organisation than of individual pilots, many of whom fought with 
great courage. (110) This was a catalyst as predictions and fears 
were turned to an unwelcome reality over the succeeding weeks. 
Events moved at a rapid, even bewildering pace, as the Luftwaffe 
marked its superiority over the battlefield not so much by 
numbers as by tactical application. 
On 10 May the Royal Air Force possessed 45 fighter squadrons 
ready for operations in the United Kingdom, and six in France. 
As soon as the German offensive opened, losses in Allied 
fighters, euphemistically called 'wastage!, were heavy and 
requests for reinforcements arrived without respite. Some were 
put by the French, who could not comprehend why Britain was 
unwilling to invest an underemployed resource; (111) others came 
110. Wood and Dempster, p. 186. See also Norne, pp. 195-96, who 
comments, 'Overcome by impatience at the lethargy of the French 
Air Force, Air Marshal Barratt finally took matters into his own 
hands'. Air Chief-Marshal Sir Arthur Barratt was Commander-in- 
Chief, British Air Forces in France (BAFF). 
111. For a full examination of the problems of Anglo-French co- 
operation, see John C. Cairns, 'Great Britain and the Fall of 
France: A Study in Allied Disunity,, JMH, 27,4 (1955), pp. 365- 
410. The question of aircraft is examined particularly on 
pp. 378-79. ""History will then doubtless record, " Reynaud 
commented over and over again, "that the Battle of France was 
lost for want of aeroplanes"". 
73 
from the Army in France, (112) and others again from Air/ Vice- 
Marshal C. Blount, Air Officer Commanding, the RAF Component. Air 
Marshal Sir Victor Goddard, then a staff officer with Blount, 
later recalled the struggle to obtain assistance from the United 
Kingdom. 'Officially, Dowding, as C-in-C, Fighter Command, was 
interested in only two limited aspects of the air battle in 
France; first as a means of getting his squadrons experienced in 
the skills and tactics of air fighting; second, as a means of 
studying the methods and mentality of the enemy in the air'. He 
added that Dowding's single concern was to safeguard Great 
Britain. 'Indeed it was his destiny to ensure it'. (113) 
The assistance demanded was not only for replacements of aircraft 
lost, but also for the change in strategic policy that certain 
members of the Air Staff had favoured, yet Dowding feared most, 
namely, a greater 'battlefield presence,, with an acceptance that 
probably the battle to save Britain was being fought in the skies 
over France and Belgium. 
For him, the persistent demands on Fighter Command to send 
additional aircraft to France, combined with the rate of 
112. The feeling of troops is shown in Anon., The Diary of a 
Staff Officer (London, 1941), p. 18. See also Lord Avon, The Eden 
Memoirs: The Reckoning (London, 1969), pp. 104-05. Later, in June 
and July, a few clashes occurred between soldiers and RAF 
personnel. Sir Brian Horrocks, A Full Life (London, 1960), p. 96, 
comments, 'At this stage of the war unless the soldier actually 
saw our planes over his head he would not believe that they were 
operating at all', partly proof of the aeroplane's new importance, which he acknowledged by adding that 'without the 
R. A. F. we should never have got back from France at all'. 
113. V. Goddard, Skies to Dunkirk (London, 1982), pp. 135-36. 
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wastage of squadrons in action, promised doom both for the RAF 
and the nation. (114) This period has offered, for some, signal 
proof of Dowding's greatness in retaining Fighter Command for 
what he saw as its prime purpose. (115) Others, nevertheless, 
felt the severity of Dowding's strictures; they thought of him 
increasingly as tetchy and unco-operative, narrow in 
outlook. (116) 
*** 
Dowding's response to pleas for help was a novel exercise in 
strategical thinking. He suggested that oil targets in Germany 
should be bombed for the prime reason that such attacks would 
bring retaliatory raids on mainland Britain, where Fighter 
Command was equipped to meet them; his fighters would be used, 
but over his territory and under his control. His worst alarms 
were soon transmitted to paper. 'The Hurricane tap is now turned 
full on', he wrote to the Vice-Chief of the Air Staff (VCAS) on 
14 May 'and you will not be able to resist the pressure to send 
Hurricanes to France until I have been bled white'. (117) 
114. See AIR 41/14, ADGB, i, Appendix 16, Dowding to Under- 
Secretary of State for Air, 24 May 1940. In France, the RAF had 
lost 250 Hurricanes in ten days; this was a loss rate of 25%. 
115. See, for example, Wright, p. 123; Deighton, pp. 61-64; 
Terraine, pp. 173-74 and Taylor, English History, p. 497. 
116. In the view of Lord Ironside, Commander-in-Chief, Home 
forces, Dowding 'does not understand that the men we are 
extricating are very valuable, even if we did not take the 
sentimental side of abandoning the H. E. F. into account'. Five 
days later, Ironside noted 'He is very much inclined to regard 
himself as completely outside the operations in France, which is 
quite impossible'. The Sronside Diaries, 1937-1940, edited by 
R. Macleod and D. Kelly (London, 1962), pp. 346 and 351; entries for 
30 May and 4 June, 1940. 
117. AIR 41/14, ADGB, i, Appendix 10, Dowding to Vice-Chief of 
the Air Staff (VCAS), 14 May 1940. 
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It was easy to criticise Dowding, the Air Staff and the Cabinet, 
all of whom appreciated only too well the two-edged sword of 
responsibility here. In spite of the need for further assistance 
to France, a corporate unease was growing that the Germans would 
be victorious - and within weeks - and then there would be little 
left of Fighter Command to defend the Home Base. 
Dowding was therefore present, for the first two items only, at 
a Cabinet meeting on 15 May when the question of fighters for 
France was raised again, although he did not speak. What 
actually went on became a matter of confused recollection for 
some of those involved, but is made clearer by reference to the 
Minutes. (118) Afterwards the flow of fighters was staunched, 
118. The confusion has ensnared several of the eminent, 
beginning with Beaverbrook, of whom Terraine says, pp. 137-38, 'He 
was never one to let mere facts spoil a good story'. Next to 
slip was Taylor, English History, p. 485, followed by Wright, 
pp. 101-07, in which Dowding himself mistook the date on which he 
presented a graph of fighter losses to the Cabinet. Among others 
at fault are B. Collier, The Defence of the United Kingdom (HMSO, 
1957), p. 109 and P. Townsend, Duel of Eagles (London, 1974), 
pp. 251-53. 
In fact, Dowding attended two meetings on 15 May: 
1. Chiefs of Staff Committee no. 133 at 10 a. m., and 
2. War Cabinet no. 123 at 11 a. m.. He spoke in far more detail 
at the first meeting but some of those words have been attributed 
to the second meeting where Newall, as CAS, put the RAF's case. 
Nevertheless, the gist of Dowding's sentiments is plain to all. 
See M. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, vol. vi, Finest Hour, 1939- 
1941 (London, 1983), pp. 340-43, who quotes CAB 79/4, COS (40), 
133rd meeting, 15 May 1940,10 a. m.; CAB 65/7, W. M. 123 (40), 
123rd meeting, 15 May 1940,11 a. m. Compare CAB 65/13, W. M. 153 
(40), confidential Annex, 3 June 1940. 
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although not stopped before several changes of policy were made, 
much to Dowding's chagrin. (119) It is important to explore the 
reality of what happened at these meetings, because exaggeration 
of the role played by Dowding has helped to create the myth that 
he alone saved the nation by struggling to retain his squadrons 
in Britain. In this, Dowding played his part, but the efforts 
of others, particularly Newall, should not be disregarded. 
Next day he wrote what is generally regarded as his most 
influential document, a letter comprising ten points, to the Air 
Ministry. Two of them explain his position clearly. Also, they 
119. In Douglas, Years of Command, pp. 79-80, the author suggests 
that the question of fighters for France was complicated by a 
misunderstanding. Churchill, in Second World War, vol. ii, Their 
Finest Hour (London, 1949), p. 38, claims that Dowding had 
declared to him that Britain could be defended against the whole 
might of the German Air Force' with 25 squadrons of fighters. 
Such a figure resting in the Prime Minister's mind, could explain 
his readiness in requesting the despatch of six more squadrons 
to France on 16 May, when he was in Paris. Dowding strongly 
denied ever having offered that figure. Writing years later to 
Douglas, he spoke of a 'desperate battle to be allowed 36 
squadrons, which, anyway, were far fewer than the 52 squadrons 
given in the Air Staff estimate of requirement. Is it reasonable 
to suppose that I then told Mr. Churchill personally that 25 
would suffice? The suggestion is ridiculous'; Douglas, Years of 
Command, p. 79. In another letter to Douglas, Dowding stated, 'It 
seems probable that Churchill, who never admits that he was 
wrong, dreamed up the absurd statement that had told him that 
the Country cd. be successfully defended by 25 Squadrons'. 
Douglas papers, File 2, Dowding to Douglas, 28 March 1964. 
The figure 25 is a transposition of the numerals making 52. 
There could have been an error in the proof-reading of 
Churchill's script. Yet Dowding never questioned the figure 
between the publication, firstly, of the Prime Minister's memoirs 
in 1949 and, secondly, of Douglas's autobiography seventeen years 
later. Taking all factors into account, the error appears to 
have been Churchill's. If he genuinely believed that the number 
required was 25 it is a salutary reminder of how the course of 
history may be changed by misunderstandings. See also Joubert, 
p. 135, which further complicates the mystery. See also Wright, 
pp. 118-20. 
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demonstrate the state of mind in which he approached the 
forthcoming battle over Britain and illustrate his need to be 
sparing with what forces lay at his disposal for fighting a 
defensive campaign: 
5. I would remind the Air Council that the last estimate 
which they made as to the force necessary to defend this 
country was fifty-two squadrons, and my strength has now 
been reduced to the equivalent of thirty-six squadrons. 
10. I believe that if an adequate fighter force is kept in 
this country, and if the Fleet remains in being, and if the 
Home Forces are suitably organised to resist invasion, we 
should be able to carry on the war single-handed for some 
time, if not indefinitely. But, if the Home Defence Force 
is drained away in desperate attempts to remedy the 
situation in France, defeat in France will involve the 
final, complete and irremediable defeat of this 
country. (120) 
Fighter Command was widely employed in the crucial week covering 
the main evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force from 
Dunkirk. The RAF Component had returned to Britain on 21 May and 
the aerial defence of forces on or near the French coast was then 
provided by squadrons under the command of No. 11 Group, flying 
from airfields in Kent. (121) At one and the same time Dowding 
enjoyed the satisfaction of having aircraft back under his 
control, but carried the burden of protecting an army facing 
disaster and a navy valiantly attempting to save them. 
120. AIR 41/14, ADGB, i, Appendix 11. See also Dowding Papers, 
HCTD/ S. 305, 'Fighters to France#, 16 May 1940. 
121. Orange, p. 26, shows that on 26 May Park explained to his 
staff the system he intended to use. Details are given in AIR 
16/216, Employment of Fighter Aircraft - Policy, October 1939 - 
December 1941. 
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Demands on Fighter command were exacting and by 3 June almost 
every squadron had been engaged in sorties over the area of 
battle. Casualties were extremely heavy, with the Command losing 
432 Hurricanes and Spitfires in three weeks following the opening 
of the German offensive; 106 of these were suffered during a week 
of evacuation from Dunkirk. By 1 June, Dowding had at his 
disposal 331 Hurricanes and Spitfires ready to fight - and the 
battle for France was not then over. (122) 
On 3 June he again attended a Cabinet meeting. This time he did 
speak. (123) In a factual and unemotional manner he pointed out 
the bleak future facing Home Defence if more fighter squadrons 
were sent abroad in answer to pleas, now that the French Army was 
in a parlous state. 'Our fighter operations must be regulated', 
he believed, 'by the rate of output in such a manner as to ensure 
that we were not squandering the capital of our fighter 
aircraft'. Dowding produced a graph to demonstrate the 'wastage' 
122. See AIR 20/2307, Hurricane and Spitfire aircraft - 
strength, production and wastage, January-December 1940. Hough 
and Richards, p. 100, use the AHB Narrative, 'The Campaign in 
France' , pp. 474-75, to state, 'Among these destroyed or abandoned 
aircraft 386 were Hurricanes and sixty-seven Spitfires - the very 
types Dowding so sorely needed for home defence. Fighter Command 
itself had lost no fewer than 219 Hurricanes, Spitfires, Defiants 
and Blenheims'. orange, -p. 89, adds, 'More than a quarter of 
Britain's fighter force had been lost over France even before the 
evacuation began'. He also says that 453 fighters were destroyed 
or abandoned during the whole French campaign. A. Deere, Nine 
Lives (London, 1974), p. 71, gives the figure of 229 aircraft, 
approximately 50% of front-line strength, lost by Fighter command 
over Dunkirk. Bowyer, p. 53, notes, 'From May 10th until the end 
of Dynamo, a total of 432 Hurricanes (mainly) and Spitfires had 
been 'expended' - the rough equivalent of at least 20 squadrons'. 
Townsend, Duel of Eagles, p. 279, offers the figure of 331 
Spitfires and Hurricanes and adds, 'Beside the three hundred odd 
Hurricanes and Spitfires, another one hundred and fifty obsolete 
fighters were shown on the order'of battle, but Dowding had no 
illusions about them'. 
123. See above, Note 118. 
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of Hurricanes between 8 and 18 May, a period when 250 had been 
lost, a rate of 25 each day, while only four a day were being 
received from production. At that rate, we should have expended 
all our Hurricanes by the end of May'. The facts were 
irrefutable and overcame all contrary arguments. (124) 
By the end of the Western campaign the RAF had lost over 900 
aircraft in six weeks; of these, the Hurricanes and Spitfires, 
numbering 453 if the figure given in the Air Historical Branch 
(AHB) Narrative is accepted, were pearls without price in 
Dowding's eyes. It is small wonder that he showed relief at the 
French surrender on 22 June. 'I don't mind telling you' , Dowding 
said to Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, with deep emotion, 
'that when I heard of the French collapse I went on my knees and 
thanked God'. (125) 
The proving ground of battle had resolved several questions and, 
inevitably, some were to the detriment of the Royal Air Force. 
The Luftwaffe was a formidable adversary, shrewdly used as an 
integral component of Blitzkrieg and their fighter tactics were 
more flexible and effective than those of Fighter Command; they 
124. What Dowding said on 3 June is shown in CAB 65/13, W. M. 150 
(40), 153rd Meeting, 3 June 1940,11.30 a. m.; CAB 65/7 and 
Confidential Annex, Minute 10: CAB 65/13, folios 235-40. See 
Gilbert, vi, pp. 455-58. 
125. Halifax Diary, 8 February 1941, Halifax Papers, A. 7.8.19, 
quoted in The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, edited by D. Dilks 
(London, 1971), p. 299. Dowding was not alone in these 
sentiments. Of Britain's relationship with the Third Republic, 
Foot has written, 'The British ruling class had mistrusted it 
ever since the mutinies of 1917 and were delighted to see it go' . M. R. D. Foot, S. O. E. in France: An Account of the Work of the 
British Special Operations Executive in France, 1940-1944 (HMSO, 
1966), p. 140. However, this view must be tempered by Britain's 
realisation that the collapse of the Third Republic brought 
German forces to within twenty-two miles of southern England. 
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had again proved decisively that employing unescorted bombers in 
daylight raids verged on the suicidal; (126) Bomber Command's 
attempts at intervention by making night attacks on German 
industry were barely noticed; (127) the Me. 109 was an excellent 
aircraft, especially in the dive and climb. (128) 
on the other hand, British fighter pilots had gained rapid and 
valuable, though costly, experience in air battles, flying 
against opponents, some of whom had learned their craft in Spain 
and Poland. Hurricanes and Spitfires had shown the ability to 
126. For example, of 71 unescorted Battles and Blenheims 
despatched to attack German ground targets on 14 May 1940,40 
were lost. See Terraine, p. 134. For a German view of these and 
similar attacks, see C. Bekker, The Luftwaffe War Diaries (London, 
1969), pp. 150-55. 
127. By mid-June, 430 night attacks were made by Bomber Command 
on German oil targets. 'However, industrial damage was 
negligible ... not a single German fighter or anti-aircraft gun 
was withdrawn from the Western Front to protect the Reich'. 
Richards and Saunders, i, p. 124. 
128. See A. Galland, The First and the Last (London 1955), pp. 64- 
65, who compares favourably the virtues of the Me. 109 with those 
of the Hurricanes and the Spitfire. For a contrary view, see 
Deere, p. 52. See also AIR 41/15, ADGB, ii, The Battle of 
Britain, p. 100, quoting the experience of Squadron-Leader Malan, 
No. 74 Squadron, who found that the Me. 109 had a better 
performance over 25,000 feet than either the Spitfire or the 
Hurricane. 
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shoot down every type of enemy bomber they met; pilots were able 
to engage the Me. 109 with confidence, being able to turn inside 
the German plane. (129) 
Few people appreciated at the time that, in spite of Germany's 
overall success in the Western campaign, the Luftwaffe had 
received a particular setback in its first failure of the war and 
had suffered heavily. (130) On 23 May, Goering had telephoned 
Hitler with the offer that the Luftwaffe, single-handed, would 
destroy British resistance at Dunkirk. 'We have done it! ' he 
told Milch, the Inspector-General of the German Air Force, at 
headquarters. 'The Luftwaffe is to wipe out the British on the 
beaches. I have managed to talk the Fuhrer round to halting the 
army'. (131) Such reasons as poor weather and a lack of forward 
129. Broadhurst interview, 10 November 1989. For a contemporary 
view, given by a British pilot, of the manoeuvrability of the 
Hurricane in combat with Me. 109s, see P. Richey, Fighter Pilot 
(London, 1941) , pp. 105-08. An American airman who had flown both 
Me. 109s and spitfires, wrote, 'I was able to find that the 
Spitfire is the best fighter aeroplane in service'. However, he 
pointed out the weakness of the carburettor which dogged RAF 
fighters throughout much of the battle. 'In inverted flight the 
Rolls-Royce engine cuts out. The Messerschmitt, on the contrary, 
remains perfect in any flying position'. Major A. de Seversky, 
'Some Ideas on the War', Flight, 20 June 1940. The weakness was 
overcome by the remarkable Miss Beatrice Shilling, of the Royal 
Aircraft Establishment, Farnborough, who designed a simple 
device, known in the Service as 'Miss Shilling's Orifice, '. Royal 
Aeronautical Society lecture, 'Rolls Royce and the Merlin', 
A. H. Bailey, Bournemouth, 24 September 1990. 
130. See L. F. Ellis, The War in France and Flanders, 1939-1940 
(HMSO, 1953), p. 314. The RAF 'took a good toll of German 
aircraft and pilots and to that extent weakened the blow which 
the enemy delivered subsequently in the Battle of Britain'. 
131. For an account from the Luftwaffe Chief of Intelligence, 
who overheard the conversation, see Schmid, interview, 22 June 
1954, quoted in R. Suchenwirth, Command and Leadership in the 
German Air Force (New York, 1970), p. 160.. Schmid said, 'Hitler, 
stopping no longer to think'than Goering had before making his 
suggestion, agreed to the proposal'. 
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bases have been advanced to explain the Luftwaffe's subsequent 
inability to support the confidence of their Commander-in-Chief, 
but the courage and skill of RAF pilots, flying excellent 
machines, must not be overlooked among the prime reasons for the 
German failure. (132) 
Dowding's sorest blow was from the number of pilots lost in the 
French campaign, many of whom were experienced airmen, the cream 
of the pre-war Fighter Command, with long flying hours to their 
credit. Had they survived, they would have commanded flights and 
squadrons in which their skill would have been invaluable. Their 
loss threw a heavy burden on to the Command, especially for those 
formations which came to be led by new commanders, lacking the 
knowledge of their predecessors. The Commander-in-Chief felt the 
greatest sympathy for all of his pilots and on 2 June wrote a 
general letter of thanks to the squadrons, showing again his care 
for his men. (133) 
132. D. Irving, The Rise and Fall of the Luftwaffe (London, 
1974), pp. 90-91, comments on 'the local daylight air superiority 
achieved over the Me. 109 by the British Spitfire fighter 
operating at short range over Dunkirk. All German calculations 
had assumed that Professor Messerschmitt's plane would prove the 
better of the two, but now the Spitfire wrought havoc on the 
German fighter squadrons'. Some British and many German pilots 
would have rated the two aircraft as approximately equal 
adversaries. See, however, Deere, p. 52, who agrees with Irving's 
judgement. See also, for example, Bekker, pp. 158-59. 
133. As an example of pilot losses in Fighter Command, on 30 
May, No. 11 Group had only 362 pilots; during the Western campaign 
they lost 128. See AIR 16/352, No. 11 Group: operations over 
France, May- June 1940, p. 8, Appendix B and Appendix D which 
shows the pressure exerted on the Group. See also AIR 19/162, 
Sir Archibald Sinclair: Private Office Papers, 1940. Shortage 
of pilots. This gives some reactions to the shortage. AIR 41/15 
ADGB, ii, p. 9, shows Fighter Command's pilot casualties in May 
and June as 284 killed, prisoner or missing; 63 wounded or injured. 
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PART FIVE: CONCLUSION - WHY RETAIN DOWDING? 
Hence on 10 July, as the Luftwaffe opened its main attacks on the 
United Kingdom, Dowding's hold on his position as Commander-in- 
Chief, Fighter Command was far less firm than most people 
appreciated. Bearing in mind the background to his many 
disagreements with the Air Staff, and the weakened state of his 
command after the end of the French campaign, a question suggests 
itself. Why was it that, in spite of what appear to be radical 
and enduring differences between Dowding and his masters, he had 
lasted so long in office? There are three main reasons for the 
anomaly. 
Firstly, no other senior officer in the RAF had managed to 
acquire such a deep and detailed knowledge of the basic workings 
of a fighter defence over the years leading down to the Second 
World War. In part, this was due to his length of service which 
included, between 1926 and 1929 the position of Director of 
Training at the Air Ministry and, more especially from 1930 to 
1936, the position of Air Member for Supply and Development 
(AMSD). With this width and depth of experience behind him, 
Dowding was able, on taking over Fighter Command in 1936, to play 
a full part in promoting the rapid changes that took place. 
For example, he took a considerable role in the development of 
metal monoplane fighters - Hurricanes and Spitfires - together 
with their powerful Rolls-Royce engines, eight-gun armament and 
radio control. The Commander-in-Chief was a pioneer of 
sf 
Operational Research (OR). Much of the credit for the promotion 
of Radio Direction Finding into a defensive system of high merit 
can be awarded to him, especially for the manner in which his 
Department supported experiments during 1935-6. Under his 
guidance, the system of transmitting information to operations 
Rooms, from which action could be controlled, was developed. The 
integration of a carefully planned and co-ordinated system of 
defence owed much to his understanding of the technology 
involved. (134) 
Secondly, in spite of the wish of the Air Staff to replace 
Dowding, a series of emergencies and accidents had occurred which 
made change either undesirable or impracticable. In August 1938 
the Air Ministry's letter informing Dowding that his services 
would not be required after the following June was followed in 
the next month by the Munich Crisis. Subsequently, the 
significance of Fighter Command increased in the plans for 
overall defence of Great Britain and the role of its Commander- 
in-Chief grew in importance. The rush to expand the Command 
demanded a continuity of leadership and Dowding was not replaced. 
From then until the outbreak of war the political situation in 
134. For details of Dowding's earlier career, see Wright, 
especially Chapters 1-3, and Collier, Leader of the Few, 
especially Chapters 1-14. See also Squadron-Leader B. Ogilvie's 
notes, 'Dowding Memorial Project', 1987. It must be borne in 
mind that Dowding's position at Fighter Command, strengthened by 
his width of knowledge of the changes required, was further 
reinforced by the speed of events. See C. Grey, A History of the 
Air Ministry (London, 1940), p. 302, who quotes Dowding's 
broadcast of 12 August 1939. 'The rapidity with which Air 
Ministry scientists produce one invention on top of another is 
almost embarrassing at times'. His presence at Fighter Command 
ensured continuity during these changes. 
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Europe was increasingly unstable, especially after the German 
occupation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia in the Spring of 
1939, providing further reason for the maintenance of the status 
quo. 
Nevertheless, in August 1938 the Air Ministry had informed Air 
Vice-Marshal C. L. Courtney, then Air Officer Commanding, Reserve 
Command, that he was to succeed Dowding on 1 July 1939. The 
change of command would probably have taken place had not 
Courtney been involved in an air crash on 28 June 1939. He 
suffered serious leg injuries which kept him out of action for 
some time - and left Dowding at his post at Bentley Priory. (135) 
The force of events, more than any measured and distinctive 
planning by the Air Council, ensured that, in spite of a not 
inconsiderable degree of mutual animosity, Dowding was at the 
head of Fighter Command when war started. More particularly, he 
was still in control as the Battle of Britain opened on 10 July 
1940. 
A third reason for the retention of his command is one often 
overlooked. Through the nature of his dedication to fighter 
defence and the undoubted skill he had demonstrated in preparing 
for it, he had gained the approbation and support of two eminent 
politicians. Each had come to believe him to be the commander 
best equipped to lead the forces of Fighter Command against the 
impending German attack. 
135. See Douglas, Years of Command, pp. 40-42, for a description 
of the crash in which he was involved. See also Grey, p. 302. 
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The first was Lord Beaverbrook with whom, in spite of their 
totally differing personalities, Dowding had already formed a 
satisfactory working relationship. Almost from the moment of 
taking office as Minister of Aircraft Production, Beaverbrook 
found himself at odds with the Air Staff on matters related to 
the building of machines and, more importantly, to the lines of 
future development for the RAF. Finding that Dowding, also, had 
reservations about the abilities of the inhabitants of the Air 
Ministry, Beaverbrook was able to feel and share sympathy with 
an ally. (136) 
Writing of the relationship between Dowding and Beaverbrook, 
A. J. P. Taylor made an assessment which is partially revealing. 
'The association plunged Beaverbrook headlong into controversy 
with the Air Ministry', he stated, ignoring such factors as 
Beaverbrook's personal ambition and abrasive style. His support 
of Dowding was a secondary, not primary cause of controversy, a 
point made unwittingly by Taylor on the previous page, when he 
wrote of Beaverbrook, 'He did not run the ministry as a trained 
administrator or a politician would have done. He ran it as he 
136. Beaverbrook's keenness and gratitude at becoming Minister 
of Aircraft Production on-14 May, then, later, a member of the 
Cabinet were noted by 'Chips' Channon, a Conservative M. P. His 
diary entry for 12 June 1940 quoted Beverley Baxter's mordant wit 
in describing Beaverbrook as acting like 'the town tart who has 
finally married the Mayor'. The Diaries of Sir Henry Channon, 
edited by R. R. James (London, 1967), p. 257. Beaverbrook often 
referred to the occupants of the Air Ministry as $the bloody Air 
Marshals', which Slessor translated as #a generic term applied 
by Lord Beaverbrook to the senior officers of His Majesty's Air 
Force'; Slessor, p. 308. 
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ran his newspapers, as he had run his financial undertakings, and 
as he ran his private life. He ran it as a drama, working 
through individuals, not through committees, and ready to fight 
every rival'. (137) 
An example of Dowding's more cordial relationship with 
Beaverbrook was demonstrated on 5 July, when he was asked by the 
Minister to provide Spitfires for photographic work. 'Of course 
I grudge every spitfire which is taken from the Fighter Command 
until the supply situation has improved', Dowding replied, then 
added with a note of charity seldom displayed to the Air Staff, 
'but I must take a broad view of the question'. (138) Dowding's 
respect for Beaverbrook was shown later in a letter to The Times. 
'Lord Beaverbrook gave us those machines (i. e., fighters)', he 
pointed out, 'and I do not believe that I exaggerate when I say 
that no other man in England could have done so'. Their mutual 
consideration lasted until Beaverbrook's death. (139) 
137. A. J. P. Taylor, Beaverbrook (London, 1972), pp. 415-17. See 
also H. Dalton, The Fateful Years, Memoirs, 1931-45 (London, 
1957), p. 300. Dalton refers to Beaverbrook's 'immense energy', 
his 'utter disregard of all rules or orders except his own' and 
his 'totally unprincipled initiative'. His value to Dowding was 
that he rapidly built up the strength of Fighter Command, 
inheriting the legacy of expansion left by Sir Wilfred Freeman. 
According to Dalton, Beaverbrook's Whitehall nickname was 'the 
great disorganiser'. 
138. AIR 16/659, A. O. C. Fighter Command correspondence, May- 
November 1940. Dowding to Beaverbrook, 5 July 1940. 
139. Lord Dowding, The Times, 1 June 1945, p. 5. See also 
Beaverbrook - Dowding correspondence, House of Lords Record 
Office (HLRO), Historical Collection 184, Beaverbrook Papers, BBK 
C/120, Dowding, Lord Hugh and family, 1914-1964, passim. 
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The second politician was Churchill himself, who had for some 
time harboured certain doubts over the running of the Air 
Ministry. (140) He approved of Dowding's organisation of Home 
Defence and respected the manner in which the Commander-in-Chief 
had fought, with others, to retain squadrons in England at the 
time of the French catastrophe, even when the Prime Minister 
himself was under pressure from other agencies to send them. As 
the spotlight turned more brightly on to Fighter Command after 
Dunkirk, and as an awareness of the demands arriving on its 
pilots became more obvious, Churchill warmed towards the efforts 
made by those young men and, pari passu, their Commander-in- 
Chief. (141) 
The importance of such political support was paramount under the 
British system of governmental control of the Armed Services. 
In matters of policy, Parliament was the final arbiter; in the 
application of policy, the Services, in spite of their tremendous 
individual power were servants of the Crown, through Parliament. 
To retain his command, an officer of Dowding's rank and 
140. According to J. M. Lee, The Churchill Coalition, 1940-1945 
(London, 1980), p. 83, Churchill created the Ministry of Aircraft 
Production in 1940 'for his friend, Beaverbrook, in order to take 
responsibility from the Air Ministry'. Churchill's interest in 
the RAF was of long standing with a knowledge probably unequalled 
by any other politician. He had been appointed Secretary of 
State for War and Air as early as January 1919. See Dean, pp. 33- 
37. For the period 1922-39, see M. Gilbert, Winston $. Churchill, 
vol. v, Prophet of Truth (London, 1976), p. 1163, Index of 
references to the RAF. 
141. See above, Note 3. See also Gilbert, vi, pp. 662,729,735, 
736,741-42,765-66,767-68,783-86 and 791. 
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responsibilities, which could affect immediately the lives of 
ordinary people, found it necessary to enjoy the confidence of 
his ultimate masters, the politicians. At the commencement of 
the aerial battle over the United Kingdom, the Commander-in- 
Chief, Fighter Command had certainly gained that. (142) 
Nonetheless, neither the serving officers in the Air Ministry, 
nor Dowding, knew at that time the extent to which the Prime 
Minister's support for him was based on the needs of the moment. 
Churchill's immediate sight approved the requirement for fighter 
defence and thus for Dowding to be retained. 'In the fierce 
light of the present emergency', he wrote to Beaverbrook on 8 
July, 'the fighter is the need, and the output of fighters must 
be the prime consideration till we have broken the enemy's 
attack'. Then the Prime Minister's distant vision looked to the 
shape of policies to come. 'But when I look round to see how we 
can win the war I can see there is only one sure path'. He 
showed a sage appreciation of the current military position and 
an estimate of the future. 'We have no Continental Army which 
can defeat the military power'. The blockade, he thought, was 
broken and Hitler could find resources in Asia and Africa. 
Churchill believed that if he were repulsed from Britain, or even 
did not attempt to invade, the will recoil Eastward and we will 
have nothing to stop him'. But, continued the Prime Minister, 
142. In Churchill's opinion, Dowding was the best man for the immediate task of holding the Luftwaffe at bay and thereby 
denying the Germans the opportunity of early seaborne invasion. 
For the Prime Minister's growing confidence by early July, see 
Gilbert, vi, Chapter 32, 'The great invasion scare'. For 
Dowding's own appreciation of his burden, see AIR 8/863, p. 4543, 
paragraphs 1-6. 
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'there is one thing that will bring him back and bring him down 
and this is an absolutely devastating, exterminating attack by 
very heavy bombers from this country upon the Nazi homeland'. 
In this expression of opinion, Churchill had nailed his colours 
to the mast. He shared the belief of the Bomber Lobby within the 
Air Ministry in the power of aerial attack against the Germans' 
economy and their morale. 'We must be able to overwhelm them by 
this means', he continued, adding significantly, 'without which 
I do not see a way through'. His final words were, 'We cannot 
accept any lower aim than air mastery. When can it be 
obtained? '(143) 
As a result, Churchill, while suggesting the immediate importance 
of Fighter Command, and even recommending in his letter to 
Sinclair on 10 July that Dowding should be retained 'while the 
war lasts', (144) recognised that fighters would not bring final 
victory. His words would have brought solace to the strong 
current of determination within the Air Ministry to have him 
replaced, preferably by the end of October at the latest. 
143. Beaverbrook Papers, BBK D/414, vol. 1, Special 
Correspondence, 1940-45, Churchill to Beaverbrook, 8 July 1940. 
Churchill's constant search for possibilities of taking the 
offensive was noticed time and again. The attitude was 
summarised by his words to a general in 1942. 'Trouble with you 
generals is that you are defensive minded. Why don't you attack? 
That's the way to win battles, not by sitting down in defence'; 
Horrocks, p. 119. See also The Memoirs of Lord Ismay (London, 
1960), p. 161. However, for a contrary view on which factor would 
settle the outcome of the war, see J. M. Spaight, 'The War in the 
Air: First Phase', Foreign Affairs, 18,2 (1940), pp. 357-67. It 
'will be decided by sea power ... air power cannot prevail 
against sea power'; (p. 365). 
144. See above, Note 3. 
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As the contest with the Luftwaffe developed over subsequent 
weeks, further reasons to have Dowding removed were discovered, 
or developed, by his chief critics, who came to appreciate the 
value of political patronage in support of their case. 
Gradually, moves were instituted to bring about changes in the 
leadership, strategy and tactics of Fighter Command. 
Consequently, it may be seen that Dowding's differences with the 
Air Staff were'of no sudden appearance, but had developed before 
the war and especially after Newall, a younger and junior 
officer, was preferred as chief of the Air Staff in 1937. The 
reputation for controversy and argument which Dowding had gained 
was one based not only on the tenacity with which he fought for 
his Command, but also on his unyielding opposition to the claims 
of others on the resources of the Air Ministry. There were 
occasions when tact and co-operation with fellow officers would 
have brought greater mutual benefit. 
The impression gained that Dowding was a lonely prophet 
struggling against the incompetence and ignorance of the leaders 
of the RAF is no fair assessment of what either he or they had 
achieved before the opening of the Battle of Britain. Their 
judgement that he had served four years in his Command and should 
be replaced by a younger, and undoubtedly more co-operative 
officer, was understandable. 
9Z 
The value of political support for him then has been under- 
estimated. Sinclair, new to the Air Ministry, (145) was unready 
to resolve the difficulties faced by his predecessors. 
Beaverbrook and Churchill backed Dowding as the best, or only, 
Royal Air Force officer who was capable of leading Fighter 
Command into battle. However, within two months they were to see 
that the commander who had shown such clarity and ability in 
strategic preparation had a less sure touch in its tactical 
application. 
145. Sinclair was one of the first ministers appointed to 
Churchill's all-Party Coalition on 10 May 1940. He was leader 
of the Liberal Party. The other two Service ministries were led 
by Anthony Eden, Conservative, War Office, and A. V. Alexander, 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE OTHER SIDE OF THE HILL 
PART ONE: THE LUFTWAFFE'S ANTICIPATED ROLE 
The fear of German aerial attack which had existed in the United 
Kingdom throughout the later 1930s was overestimated. In view 
of the predictions of what would happen in the earliest stages 
of a war, great benefit would have accrued to Sinclair, Dowding 
and Newall in July 1940 had they enjoyed the luxury of examining 
the actual motives and power of their enemy. By looking at "the 
other side of the hill", which in this case meant no more than 
the short distance across the Dover Strait, they would have 
discovered an opponent whose intentions and current capabilities 
were somewhat different from those that they had come to believe. 
As these misconceptions affected the attitudes towards 
leadership, strategy and tactics shown by the RAF, it is 
necessary to examine similar factors in the Luftwaffe. (1) 
The perception of people in Britain was that the disaster which 
had befallen them and their allies on the Continent was part of 
a clearly defined plan of action laid by the Germans ever since 
the arrival to power of the Nazis in 1933. They invested Hitler 
with a reputation for instituting and carrying through calculated 
schemes aimed first at dominating the whole of Europe, then as 
1. F. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, 4 
vols., (HMSO, 1979), i, pp. 61,78-79 and 299-300, shows variations 
in Intelligence estimates of the size of the German Air Force. 
See also AIR 40/2321, Summary of Minutes of DD13. 
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much of the remainder of the world as he could either conquer or 
influence. The bloodless victories of the Rhineland, the 
Anschluss and Czechoslovakia, followed by the successful 
campaigns against Poland, Norway and France were seen as 
inexorable steps in his timetable. For them, the signing of the 
Russo-German pact of August 1939 demonstrated the Fuhrer's 
cynical approach to the morality of international politics - and 
was a further step in his calculated planning towards German 
success. (2) 
In all of this, the Luftwaffe had played a prominent part and 
gained an awesome reputation. The overwhelming success enjoyed 
by the German Air Force, first against Poland, Norway, then in 
the Low Countries and finally over the French Army was a fearful 
novelty in war. Stories and rumours of the effect of dive- 
bombing on ground troops and installations were magnified, with 
vivid descriptions of the noise of screaming aircraft and siren 
bombs. (3) For many people in Britain, the proof of Germany's 
infallible might was offered by the sight of a returning, 
exhausted British Expeditionary Force (BEF), rescued from 
2. See W. Churchill, History of the Second World War, The 
Gathering Storm, 6 vols. (London, 1948-58), i (1948), p. 212. On 
14 March 1938 Churchill warned the House of Commons that Germany 
had 'a programme of aggression, nicely calculated and timed, 
unfolding stage by stage'. While disagreeing with Churchill's 
assessment and believing that Hitler was more of an opportunist, 
Taylor, English History, p. 404, note 1, admits that 'the 
contemporary estimates of German armaments and of Hitler's 
supposed plans shaped British policy'. 
3. For the effect of dive-bombing on French infantry, see 
M. Bloch, Strange Defeat, translated by G. Hopkins (oxford, 1949), 
pp. 54-55. Also see Horne, pp. 247-49. 
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Dunkirk, but having suffered a military defeat of ominous 
magnitude. Little imagination was demanded to transfer what had 
happened across the Channel to the surroundings of southern 
England, in a furor Teutonicus. 
In spite of the RAF's magnificent effort during the French 
Campaign, especially in the later stages of the evacuation, there 
was no small amount of trepidation over the power of the 
Luftwaffe, even before enemy aircraft opened their main attacks 
on Britain. Such an ordeal was seen as the inevitable next stage 
in the German plan. (4) 
The reality was that the Luftwaffe had not been over-equipped for 
the type of Continental land war it was called upon to fight from 
10 May and that many of its successes in the Low Countries and 
France were achieved as much through weaknesses of opponents as 
by its own organisation. (5) Then, when the next frontier was 
presented, in the form of the English Channel, the German Air 
Force was faced with goals which lay beyond its capabilities. 
it was well for British leaders who did not appreciate this point 
that their ignorance was shared by their opponents. 
4. Air Ministry, The Battle of Britain (HMSO, 1941), p. 9, spoke 
of the German mind being 'very methodical and immensely 
painstaking. Schemes are worked out to the last detail; the 
organisation is superb and, provided the calculations are 
correct, the plan goes without a hitch'. General Sir Edmund 
Ironside wrote of the Germans that they 'daren't not do 
something. They will begin with some three or four days' 
intensive bombing and then air landings with parachutists, 
followed by sea landings'. Ironside Diaries; diary for 13 July 
1940, p. 385. 
5. See above Chapter 1, part 4, 'The French Connection'. 
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A radical and crucial difference between Fighter Command and the 
Luftwaffe was now demonstrated. At this stage, the former was 
being called on to fulfil the role for which it had long 
prepared, namely the aerial defence of the United Kingdom. The 
latter, however, was charged with achieving an objective for 
which it had neither adequate resources nor ability - the defeat 
of Britain without help from either the German Army'or Navy-(6) 
Before 1938 the Germans had given little thought to the 
possibility of a war with Great Britain. As Hitler turned his 
attentions towards countries of Central and Eastern Europe, there 
was a widespread belief that the British Government, though not 
always agreeing with his actions, would take no firm steps to 
intervene. It was expected that the diplomacy exercised by the 
Fuhrer would always prevent relations deteriorating into 
conflict. (7) 
6. Compared with the RAF, the Luftwaffe was a young force, 
having existed unofficially since 15 May 1933 and officially 
since 1 March 1935; the Luftwaffe in 1940 was generally. 
unprepared for war with Britain. In the view of MRAF Lord 
Tedder, a German air offensive against the United Kingdom 'was 
not a considered operation'. See H. Schliephake, The Birth of the 
Luftwaffe (London, 1971), p. 31 and Lord Tedder, Air Power in War 
(London, 1947), p. 94. See also W. Murray, The Luftwaffe (London, 
1985), p. 47, who summarises the position. 'In retrospect, the 
task facing the Germans was beyond their capabilities'. See also 
R. J. Overy, The Air War, 1939-1945 (London, 1980), pp. 23-25. 
7. According to D. Irving, Goering (London, 1989), p. 190, in 
November 1937 Goering told Sir Neville Henderson, the British 
Ambassador in Berlin, 'It is inconceivable that there should ever 
be war between men who get on so well together and respect each 
other so much as the British and German airmen'. 
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Even the cooling of friendship between the two nations during 
1938 failed to quench the fires of hope. When Ernst Udet, head 
of the Luftwaffe's technical department, was discussing the 
proposed Heinkel He. 177 heavy bomber with Dr Ernst Heinkel, he 
spoke against its development, suggesting that four-engined 
aircraft would not be needed. 'It's possible that Jeschonnek 
(Chief of Operations Staff) and the General Staff may not even 
have a use for it. None of them think that we'll be going to war 
with England'. * His faith in the nation's leader expanded. 'A war 
against England is completely out of the question. If anything 
happens at all, it will be a conflict with Poland or 
Czechoslovakia. The Fuhrer will never let us in for a conflict 
which might take us beyond the confines of the Continent'. (8) 
In essence, the abandonment of the development of a heavy bomber 
was an error of the greatest magnitude in German planning. Its 
potential had been foreseen by General Walther Wever, the first 
Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, whose width of vision in 
strategy encompassed the value of a bomber which could reach 
targets far distant from Germany. However, after Wever's 
untimely death in a flying accident in 1936, the work was 
gradually discontinued. , Then, after the experiences of the 
Luftwaffe in the Spanish Civil War had shown the possibilities 
of tactical co-operation between air and ground forces, great 
store was set on producing bombers capable of making dive-bombing 
attacks on targets. 
8. Quoted in Suchenwirth, Command and Leadership, p. 82, from 
E. Heinkel, Stormy Life (Stuttgart, 1953), pp. 411-13. Suchenwirth 
adds, p. 83, that Udet, Goering and Jesschonnek 'accepted Hitler's 
erroneous belief that there would be no war with Britain for the 
simple reason that Germany did not want it'. 
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it is not without profit to speculate about what different 
policies would have been adopted by the Luftwaffe had Wever 
lived. His influence was great and he would undoubtedly have 
pressed for a strategic air force equipped with heavy bombers. 
What is less certain is the extent to which he would have been 
able to influence Hitler and Goering, when the Luftwaffe proved 
its value as a tactical force in Spain. (9) 
In reality, an-important change of attitude between Britain and 
Germany occurred in February 1938, when reports of the proposed 
occupation of Austria became known. According to Irving, 
Goering's reaction to the general outcry in the British Press was 
to complain to Sir Nevile Henderson, the British Ambassador, on 
16 February about constant British interference in what the 
Germans saw as a domestic matter. 'Two days later, Field-Marshal 
Goering ordered his Luftwaffe to investigate the feasibility of 
conducting air operations against London and southern England 
after all'. (10) 
9. See, for example, Luftwaffe, edited by H. Faber (London, 
1979), Chapter XII, 'Bomber Decisions', especially pp. 160-64, 
where a report from General Deichmann, Chief of Branch 1 
(Operations) of the Luftwaffe General Staff, shows the extent to 
which Goering and Milch overruled the development of a four- 
engined bomber after Wever's death. See also R. J. Overy, Goering, 
'The Iron Man' (London, 1984), pp. 102-04. 
10. Irving, Rise and Fall, p. 205. Henderson himself does not 
mention this conversation, but refers to a meeting with Hitler 
on 12 February, when the Fuhrer uttered complaints in the same 
vein. 'Nothing, he said, could be done until the Press campaign 
against him in England ceased. (He never failed to harp on this 
subject in every conversation which I had with him) '. Sir Nevile 
Henderson, Failure of a Mission (London, 1940), p. 115. 
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The instruction was passed to General Felmy, commander of 
Luftflotte II by General Stumpff, Chief of the Air Staff, 
charging him to examine possible targets 'in Britain-(11) 
However, the first, and smaller, crisis of 1938 passed without 
a direct confrontation between Britain and Germany and both air 
forces continued to expand as rapidly as their governments would 
allow. 
With the approach of the next wave of crisis in 1938, namely the 
confrontation with'Czechoslovakia, the thoughts of German leaders 
were once again channelled towards a possibility that they were 
unwilling to face. That was that there might be war with 
Britain. Therefore, on 23 August General Felmy was ordered by 
Goering to gather further information on possible targets which 
could be attacked in the United Kingdom. These included armament 
factories and docks in London, at that time Britain's largest 
industrial centre and seaport. The Channel ports and airfields 
in eastern England were also included, the latter showing the 
planning within the Luftwaffe then that raids on the United 
Kingdom would be made by unescorted bombers flying across the 
North Sea from aerodromes in north-western Germany. (12) 
11. Irving, Rise and Fall, p. 64. See also Telford Taylor, The 
Breaking Wave (London, 1967), p. 105. Taylor's source was an 
account, prepared in 1955 by Karl Klee, 'Operation "Sea Lion" and 
the Role Planned for the Luftwaffe', and now kept at Maxwell 
Airforce Base, Alabama, USA. According to Taylor, the order was 
passed to Felmy on 18 February; the targets included ports in 
southern-England and factories in and around London. 
12. See Suchenwirth, Command and Leadership, p. 230, referring 
to D/11/1, Karlsruhe Documents, interview with General Felmy, 22 
November 1954. See also T. Taylor, Breaking Wave, pp. 105-06. 
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On 17 September Felmy was appointed to lead Sonderstab (Special 
Unit) England and five days later produced his report. He 
offered small comfort to his readers. 'With the means available 
we cannot expect to achieve anything more than a disruptive 
effect', he wrote. 'Whether this will lead to an erosion of the 
British will to fight is something that depends on imponderable 
and certainly unpredictable factors'. He summarised by claiming 
that 'a war against England with the means at present available 
appears fruitless' , then added a point not lost on those planning 
future attacks against the United Kingdom, when he explained that 
for Luftwaffe aircraft to undertake such raids, airfields would 
be needed in Belgium and Holland. (13) 
The Munich Crisis was a watershed for the Luftwaffe as much as 
for the Royal Air Force. In mid-October Hitler ordered a five- 
fold expansion of the German Air Force and plans were laid for 
an air armament programme lasting until the autumn of 1942. On 
15 October, Goering discussed the possibility of an air war 
against Britain with Erhard Milch, Chief Inspector of the 
Luftwaffe, while on the 26th a full conference was held at 
Karinhall, his country estate, to lay plans. (14) 
13. Second Air Group Study on 'Planning Case, Green', 22 
September 1938, quoted in Irving, Rise and Fall, p. 64. See also 
Wood and Dempster, pp. 224-25. See also Schliephake, pp. 48-49. 
T. Taylor, Breaking Wave, pp. 105-06 notes that Goering was angry 
with Felmy's pessimistic memorandum. Felmy pointed out that bombers would have to fly from Germany and that with a bomb load 
of only 1,200 lb. their range was no more than 425 miles. 





These showed clearly that, at the time, German strategy envisaged 
attacking Britain in two particular ways. Firstly, the 
importance of the Royal Navy and sea-trade to the United Kingdom 
was acknowledged by the allocation of thirteen out of the planned 
58 Geschwader of bombers, to be employed against the British 
Fleet, using mines, torpedoes and bombs. These 
Seekampfgeschwader were enhanced with the buccaneering title of 
'Pirate Formations'. Secondly, of the remaining 45 bomber 
Geschwader, 30 were to be occupied in an offensive against the 
British mainland and here, He. 177s were requested as the best 
machines; at least 500 were required by 1942. It is remarkable 
that at this stage no more than fifteen Geschwader of medium 
bombers were set aside for an aerial campaign against France. 
Under the title of 'Concentrated Aircraft Procurement Programme', 
the document was signed by Jeschonnek on 7 November 1938. (15) 
The plan was most ambitious and much faith was being entrusted 
to two untried types of bomber, the He. 177 and the Ju. 88. In one 
sense, the succeeding arguments over the respective virtues of 
these aeroplanes brought relief subsequently to Britain, because 
of the Luftwaffe's division of responsibilities. On the one hand 
there was a need for an aircraft which could provide close 
support for ground forces, with bombing of extreme accuracy. 
Thus, early in 1938 both Udet and Jeschonnek supported with 
enthusiasm an order issued by the General Staff which stated 
that, 'The emphasis in offensive bombardment has clearly shifted 
from area to pinpoint bombardment. For this reason, the 
15. See Schliephake, pp. 48-50. 
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development of a bombsight suitable for use in dive-bombing 
aircraft is more important than the development of any other 
aiming device'. (16) 
Consequently, the expansion of the Luftwaffe's role as a force 
working in close co-operation with the Army was developed, but, 
in the long run, at the expense of a large bomber which could be 
used as a strategic weapon against distant enemy targets. The 
early enthusiasm felt for the Ju. 88 included the view that its 
range would encompass both the British Isles and the Western 
Approaches; therefore the need for a four-engined aircraft 
capable of carrying a heavy bomb load was set to one side. 
The decision to abandon the building of the large bomber was 
taken early in 1937, yet in the following year, especially after 
Felmy's report showed that the contemporary Luftwaffe bombers 
would have difficulty in making effective raids on Great Britain, 
attempts were made to press ahead with the He. 177. However, this 
work was bedevilled by the faith pinned in dive-bombing by both 
Udet and Jeschonnek, who were greatly impressed by the 
performance of the Kondor Legion's Ju. 87s in the Spanish Civil 
War. They now set the requirement that all bombers should have 
the capacity to be used in diving attacks. 
16. R. Suchenwirth, Historical Turning Points in the German Air 
Force War Effort (New York, 1968), p. 31, quoting Karlsruhe 
Documents, 'The Training carried out in Bomber Units in 
Bombardment and Bomb Detonation Techniques (exclusive of the 
Ju. 87 Units)' by Generalmajor Krause. It was hoped that the 
diving attacks would be far more accurate, and thereby more 
effective, than those made, in horizontal flight. 
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In the case of the Ju. 88, the changes necessary in design to meet 
this and other modifications led to an increase in the 
aeroplane's weight from seven to twelve tons and a resulting loss 
in speed. For the He. 177, the decision was even more disastrous. 
There were troubles in producing a suitable engine for this 
bomber and the additional demands of a role as a dive-bomber for 
the 32-ton aircraft seriously delayed its development. (17) 
Thus the muddled strategy shown by leaders of the Luftwaffe long 
before war began, especially in their mistaken expectation that 
there would be no conflict with the United Kingdom, proved to be 
a saving grace for the RAF when the Battle of Britain opened. 
In the opinion of Suchenwirth, who had the opportunity of 
discussions with many senior Luftwaffe officers soon after 1945, 
a long-range bomber would have made a crucial difference between 
July and October 1940. 'British anti-aircraft defences, 
admirably developed for use against the German medium-bombers, 
would have been so thoroughly dissipated by long-range bombers 
that defeat would have been inevitable'. He also believed that 
'its significance in naval warfare ... could have been enormous, 
especially during the early stages of the war'. (18) 
17. Ibid, pp. 36-38 shows the effects of the pressure to have 
dive-bombers; from Karlsruhe Documents, (Aircraft Technical Data, 
Branch 6, Luftwaffe General Staff'. See also Suchenwirth, 
Command and Leadership, pp. 75-77. However, this policy obviously 
restricted the Luftwaffe's ability to launch a strategic bombing 
offensive against an enemy such as Britain. 
18. Suchenwirth, Turning Points, p. 43. See also R. J. Overy, 
'German Air Strength 1933 to 1939: A Note', Historical Journal 
(HJ), 27,2 (1984), pp. 465-71, for weaknesses of the Luftwaffe 
as a threat to Britain. 'No realistic military assessment of 
German air strength before 1939 can support the conclusion that 
Britain was ever "at the mercy of foreign power"'; (p. 471). 
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Further steps towards waging a campaign against Great Britain had 
to be taken, albeit less than willingly, by the Luftwaffe during 
1939, as events moved irrevocably towards war. Nonetheless, 
there was still the hope that such a conflict would not occur 
until 1942, when the plans laid for the expansion of the German 
Air Force would be more advanced. (19) 
Early in the year, 'Beppo' Schmid, leader of the Intelligence 
Branch of the Operations Staff, reported with some optimism that 
'English and French air fleets are still much out of date. 
British air defence is still weak. In 1940 we may expect a 
monthly output of 300 English and 200 French front-line aircraft. 
In the next few years it is not to be anticipated that they can 
catch up with German capacity'. Here, the folly of British over- 
estimation of the power of the Luftwaffe, both in numbers and in 
ability to strike at the United Kingdom with a campaign of 
strategic bombing, was matched by a German under-estimation of 
Britain's industrial capacity to produce aircraft. Schmid added, 
'England will not be able to get out of a fight with the German 
Luftwaffe. German aircraft are superior in view of their 
advantage in armament, armoured petrol tanks and flying 
instruments. In Germany alone has an overall view of war in the 
air been taken'. Schmid's assumptions and predictions were 
19. See Overy, Goering, pp. 84-86, which shows how German 
preparations for war were unfinished by 1939. 'The conclusion is inescapable that the Nazi leadership sought to expand war 
preparations and production on a vast scale for a major conflict 
with some or all of the great powers in the mid-1940s'; (p. 86). 
l0C 
several times wide of the mark both before and during the Battle 
of Britain and were a contribution of no small importance to the 
failure of the Luftwaffe's daylight campaign in 1940 - and a 
great boon to Fighter Command. (20) 
During the Spring of 1939, senior officers of the German Air 
Force were told of the forthcoming attack on Poland (Fall Weiss) . 
Thus preparations were laid in detail for a campaign well suited 
to the Luftwaffe's abilities at that time, working closely with 
the Army in a 'Blitzkrieg' onslaught designed to gain a rapid 
victory. (21) 
Nonetheless, the spectre of a possible war with Britain lurked 
not far behind the shoulders of Luftwaffe leaders. Between 10 
and 13 May, General Felmy carried out a three-day exercise at 
Luftflotte II's headquarters in Brunswick, based on war with 
Great Britain in 1939. Milch flew there on the last day to hear 
a summary of the results. This was less than sanguine. In the 
subsequent report, 'Tactical Aims for the Luftwaffe in the event 
of war with Britain in 1939', it was asserted that 'the 
equipment, state of training and strength of the 2nd. Air Force 
20. Luftwaffe 8th Abteilung report on the strength of foreign 
air powers, May 1939, quoted in W. Baumbach, Broken Swastika 
(London, 1960), pp. 30-33. See also Wood and Dempster, pp. 101-02. 
For further weaknesses of Schmid's estimates, see below, notes 
93-104. 
21. According to Suchenwirth, Command and Leadership, p. 240, 
preparations for the Polish campaign began in April 1939, after 
Anglo-French guarantees were, given to Poland. On 3 April, 
General Keitel issued Directives to the Army, Navy and Air Force. 
However, Kesselring carefully avoids admitting an early 
foreknowledge of Hitler's intentions, although as Commander-in- 
Chief of Luftflotte I he must have known them. See Kesselring 
Memoirs, pp. 41-42. 
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cannot bring about a quick decision in any war with Britain in 
1939', a view of disquieting importance in the long run for Nazi 
leaders who were preparing to march. (22) 
Such pessimism was not shared by Hitler, especially after an 
event which buoyed his hopes with misguided confidence. On 3 
July he attended a special display of the Luftwaffe's latest 
weaponry at Rechlin, arranged to impress him. The Fuhrer was 
shown aircraft, weapons and equipment at the research stage, 
including the He. 176, the world's first rocket-propelled 
aeroplane. Nowhere did he see aircraft at the operational level 
and he gained an exaggerated view of the Luftwaffe's 
capabilities. Goering, who was present, and in a position to 
offer Hitler a balanced assessment of what he was witnessing, 
failed signally to do so. Three years later, he complained, 'The 
Fuhrer reached the most serious decisions as a result of that 
display. It was a miracle that things worked out as well as they 
did, and that the consequences were not far worse'. Goering 
conveniently overlooked his own responsibility for the results 
of that day. (23) 
22. Karlsruhe Documents, 'High Command of the Air Force, Chief 
of the General Staff, 1st (Operations) Branch, No. 5095 of 1939, 
Top Secret Command Matter, 22 May 1939, G/V/2a, quoted in 
Suchenwirth, Command and Leadership, pp. 230 and 325. See also 
T. Taylor, Breaking Wave, pp. 106-07. 
23. Eng. Gen. Gerbert Hubner, 'The engineer problem in the 
Luftwaffe, 1933-1945', p. 21, quoted in Irving, Rise and Fall, 
p. 74. See also Suchenwirth, Command and Leadership, pp. 232-33, 
who believes that if Hitler had been better informed of the 
Luftwaffe's inability to attack Britain effectively he would have 
been less ready to invade Poland. 
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Until the last moment, German leaders hoped that Britain and 
France, in spite of their protestations, would refrain from war 
over the Polish question, believing that the operation was no 
more than a reclamation of what belonged to Germany. In 
addition, the geographical position of Poland in eastern Europe 
appeared, in their eyes, to make a Franco-British intervention 
unlikely, bearing in mind Britain's traditional reluctance to 
become involved in the affairs of Eastern Europe. (24) 
While at that stage Hitler appreciated the value of a strategic 
bombing campaign against Britain if it were to be necessary, he 
was determined to exercise personal control of what was done. 
'Any favourable opportunity of an effective attack on 
concentrated units of the English Navy, particularly on 
battleships or aircraft-carriers, will be exploited', he ordered 
in 'Directive No. 1 for the Conduct of the War', dated 31 August. 
'The decision regarding attack on London is reserved to me. 
24. Britain's difficulty in rendering rapid help to the Poles 
was underlined by Lloyd George, speaking in Parliament after 
Chamberlain's guarantee to Poland. 'If war occurred tomorrow, 
you could not send a single battalion to Poland', he said. 'I 
cannot understand why before committing ourselves to this 
tremendous enterprise, we did not secure beforehand the adhesion 
of Russia'. He called the move 'a frightful gamble'. Such 
expressions of doubt from so eminent, a statesman were not lost 
on the Germans. See 345 H. C. Deb. 5s, c. 2505-11,3 April 1939. 
See also J. Douglas-Hamilton, 'Ribbentrop and War', JCH, 5,4 
(1970), pp. 45-63, which refers to conversations held between a 
London banker and Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, on 26 
and 27 July 1939. According to Ribbentrop, Hitler wanted to come 
to a firm understanding with Britain, whom he did not believe 
would enter a war on behalf of Poland. 
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Attacks on the English homeland are to be prepared; though it 
should be borne in mind that inconclusive results, due to the use 
of insufficient forces, are to be avoided in all 
circumstances'. (25) 
When hostilities against Poland began on 1 September, the 
Luftwaffe gained rapid and overwhelming success over an air force 
smaller in numbers and equipped with relatively outdated 
machines. (26) -After this, Hitler turned his attentions to the 
West and very soon identified the opponent posing, in his view, 
the greater danger to Germany. In 'Directive No. 6 for the 
Conduct of the War', issued on 9 October 1939, he spoke of an 
early offensive, moving through Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg. 
The purpose of the offensive was to defeat the French and any 
other armies standing in the path, 'and at the same time to win 
as much territory as possible in Holland, Belgium and northern 
France to serve as a base for the successful prosecution of the 
air and sea war against England and as a wide protective area for 
the economically vital Ruhr'. In this, his policy was not only 
to obtain bases from which Britain could be subjected to a 
strategical bombing campaign, but also to provide a protective 
belt of defences against RAF bombing of German industry. (27) 
25. ' Directive No. 1 for the Conduct of the War, 31 August 19391, 
quoted in Hitler's War Directives, edited by H. Trevor-Roper 
(London, 1964), pp. 3-5. 
26. For the equipment of the Polish Air Force, see Gunston, 
pp. 68-70. 
27. 'Directive No. 6 for the Conduct of the War, 9 October 1939 1, 
from Trevor-Roper, pp. 12-14. For an assessment of the 
Luftwaffe's capabilities and limitations at the start of the war, 
see Schliephake, p. 58. A summary of the German Air Force's role 
during the Polish campaign is given in Murray, pp. 31-33. See 
also AHB Translation, vol. 2, No. VII/132, 'German bombing of 
Warsaw and Rotterdam'; T. Taylor, Breaking Wave, pp. 108-09; Air 
Ministry, The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force, Pamphlet 
No. 248 (London, 1948), pp. 53-57. 
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On 22 November plans were produced by the Intelligence Operations 
Staff of the Luftwaffe and signed by Schmid, giving a panoramic 
description of Britain's importance and position in the war, 
allied to suggestions of the most effective methods of attack 
against her. (28) He began by claiming that as Britain had been 
forced into the war earlier than she had anticipated, 'It may be 
counted as a political victory for Germany that such an 
unfavourable moment for the opening of hostilities was in fact 
chosen'. His-second point showed a keen awareness of what had 
happened in 1918. The British aim in war, he stated, 'is to 
bring Germany to her knees by severing our entire foreign trade, 
both imports and exports'; and he continued by noting that 
British policy envisaged a long conflict. 
Schmid then assessed the two enemy states. 'From Germany's point 
of view', he claimed, perhaps not unnaturally agreeing with the 
Fuhrer's directive, 'Britain is the most dangerous of all 
possible enemies'. The war could not be won until she had been 
overcome. France received less praise, being relegated to 'the 
second class, for, unlike Britain, she would not be capable of 
carrying on the War without her Allies'. Therefore, Germany's 
war aim had to be 'to strike at Britain with all available 
weapons, particularly those of the Navy and the Air Force'. 
28. AHB Translation, vol. 2, No. VII/30, General Schmid, 'Proposal 
for the Conduct of Air Warfare against Britain', German Air Force 
Operations Staff (Intelligence), 22 November 1939. 
The strategy of attack was clear and one to which U-boats paid 
great attention for the remainder of the war, after the Battle 
of Britain. 'Britain may most effectively be weakened by attacks 
on her overseas trade routes'. The German aim had to be to 
reduce the import trade and this could be achieved only 'by the 
most ruthless use of all available possibilities'. (29) He added 
that although attacks would be made on ships in harbour, they 
would not be made on civilians. 'Should the British Government 
wish to protect the civilian populations of certain harbour 
towns, ample time for evacuation will be available before the 
coming into force of this order'. 
Schmid's statement of strategic intent was clear and would have 
proved a far greater burden to the RAF had formations of four- 
engined heavy bombers been available. A relative disadvantage 
of Britain's geographical position was underlined when he pointed 
out that the United Kingdom had between nine thousand and ten 
thousand kilometres of coastline to defend, compared with 
Germany's nine hundred to one thousand kilometres. The retention 
of the right to reprisal was upheld, if the RAF were to bomb 
towns in West Germany, and the report explained that Luftwaffe 
attacks would be more effective, 'due to the greater density of 
population and the big industrial centres'. 
29. This was a long-term view of strategy, shared by Admiral 
Doenitz of the German Navy, who had little faith in 'Operation 
Sealion'. He believed that Britain could be forced to surrender 
by 'war on her sea lanes of communication, which concerned her 
directly and vitally. On them directly depended the very life 
of the British nation'. See Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days, 
by Admiral Doenitz, translated by R. H. Stevens (London, 1959), 
p. 115. 
liz 
In view of what happened later in the Battle of Britain, one 
piece of advice was of particular interest. 'It would be an 
error to carry out any other air attacks', Schmid wrote, 'such 
as attacks on enemy airfields, for example, as this would be 
diverting our effort from the main target, - the paralysis of 
British overseas trade'. (30) 
The report, written in an optimistic vein, would have been the 
basis for an excellent strategic plan, had the Luftwaffe 
possessed adequate and suitable resources. However, the largest 
aircraft generally available both at this stage and also later 
in attacks on Britain in 1940 was the Heinkel He. 111K, which was 
no more than a medium bomber. (31) 
On the same day, a further document from Luftwaffe Intelligence, 
entitled (Plans for Air Warfare on England(, expanded on some of 
the points made. (32) It explained that, as Hitler's proposed 
30. An example of where Schmids thinking was detached from the 
reality of the subsequent Battle of Britain is shown in Galland, 
First and Last, p. 70, which points out that Luftwaffe attacks 
were 'of sheer necessity directed against the concentration of 
the British defence'. The length of Britain's coastline then 
became irrelevant. 
31. The bomb load of the Heinkel He. 111 B-2, used first in the 
Spanish Civil War, was 3,307 lb. Variants used during the Battle 
of Britain could carry 4,407 lb. of bombs. These weights 
compared unfavourably with those of Allied aircraft later in the 
strategic bombing campaign against Germany. For example, the 
Lancaster Mk. I carried 14,000 lb., the Halifax Mk. II 13,000 lb., 
and the B-17D Flying Fortress 10,500 lb. See Wood and Dempster, 
pp. 439-40 and Cooper, pp. 72,96,98,101 and 116-17. In 
addition, German bombers had a weak defensive armament. See 
Saward, pp. 103-04 for the effects of this on the later planning 
of 'Bomber' Harris. 
32. AHB Translation, vol. 2, No. VII/26, Luftwaffe 8th Abteilung 
report, 'The Course of the Air War against England , 22 November 1939. 
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Autumn attack in the West had been postponed, the German Air 
Force (GAF) had been presented with opportunities of attacking 
Britain. The plan required continuous attacks, by day and night, 
in widely separated areas. Thus, the Royal Air Force would need 
to keep units in the United Kingdom and 'even perhaps withdraw 
fighter units already sent to France', an assessment*with which 
Dowding would have agreed. 
Nevertheless, the weakness of a proposed German bombing onslaught 
on Britain, a campaign which its protagonists hoped would force 
her out of the war, was shown by the plan's last sentence. 'The 
attacks will be carried out by FLIEGERKORPS X with 2/K. G. 30, 
K. G. 26, K. G. 100 and K. G. 4 (based on Wever)'. (33) In the 
following Appendix 1, in which groups of targets were listed, the 
magnitude of the task facing a few formations of German medium 
bombers was made clear. They included warships, both in port and 
at sea; the naval dockyards of the Tyne, the Clyde, Birkenhead 
and Barrow-in-Furness; harbour installations at Liverpool 
('second largest milling centre'), the Manchester Ship Canal; 
Bristol Channel-Avonmouth ('large fuel installations'); Cardiff 
('Main port of reshipment for English coal - export to 
France -'); Swansea ('timber stocks'); the 'important military 
target' of Billingham ('90% of the British H. E. industry'). 
The thought that Britain's main industrial and trading capacity 
could be overwhelmed by the bombers then available to the 
Luftwaffe shows an over-weening confidence, or ignorance, on the 
part of Luftwaffe Intelligence, which made no mention of the 
33. A Kampfgeschwader consisted of 94 aircraft at that stage. 
See A. Price, Luftwaffe Handbook, 1939-1945 (London, 1977), p. 16. 
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possible effect of Fighter Command's interventions in defence of 
targets. Had Sir Hugh Dowding been able to see the report, his 
confidence in what his squadrons would have to face from daylight 
attacks would have remained undimmed. More ominous for the 
Dowding System of defence, though, would have been the German 
plan to launch night raids on the targets listed. At that stage, 
the Royal Air Force was most poorly equipped to deal with enemy 
aircraft flying in darkness which were 'lost' once they had 
crossed the coastline of the United Kingdom. (34) 
During the early months of 1940, the planned Luftwaffe offensive 
against Britain's ports and seaways never materialised. The 
'Phoney War' on land in Western Europe was matched by what 
appeared to be no more than a patchwork of aerial attacks on 
parts of the United Kingdom. These, in the main, were directed 
against targets on the eastern coastline and varied from a few 
daylight raids on units of the Royal Navy at Rosyth and Scapa 
Flow, to the sowing of magnetic mines at night in well-used 
coastal waters. (35) 
34. See AIR 41/17, ADGB, iii, 'Night Air Defence, June 1940- 
December 1941', Chapter 1. 
35. In the opinion of T. Taylor, Breaking Wave, p. 107, 'The 
Luftwaffe did not attack during these months because its leaders 
saw no prospect of decisive results'. This underlines the 
inability of the Luftwaffe to wage an effective campaign against 
Britain. The degree to which the predicted 'knock-out blow' fell 
short of expectation is shown in Ministry of Information, Front 
Line, 1940-41 (HMSO, 1942), p. 6. No bomb fell on mainland 
Britain until 9'May 1940. 'The first bombs on the London area 
hit plough-land at Addington in Surrey on 18th June'. 
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Part of the constraint laid on the activities of the German Air 
force stemmed from the lack of a suitably destructive bomber. 
As much, however, was the fact that to carry out the large-scale 
campaign, well trained and practised crews were required, fully 
conversant with the intricacies of night bombing and these were 
in short supply. A most important further cause was the 
requirement to use the Luftwaffe elsewhere. It was widely 
employed in the Norwegian campaign, then had to be prepared for 
the main offensive in the West in early May. (36) 
Therefore, before the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe had played 
an immense role in the gaining of German success and had been 
widely employed in close conjunction, mainly with the Army and, 
to a lesser extent, the Navy. However, it had enjoyed little 
opportunity of engagements against Britain, which had been 
identified as the chief enemy, yet whose people had been spared 
the apocalyptic bombing predicted by many leaders prior to 1939. 
Some writers have made the point that the Luftwaffe held a great 
advantage over the RAF, certainly at the start of the Battle of 
Britain, through the practical experience gained by German pilots 
36. The German invasion of Norway began on 9 April. The 
importance of the Luftwaffe's role there may be gauged from 
T. K. Derry, The Campaign in Norway (HMSO, 1952), passim. At the 
start, the Luftwaffe operated some 1,200 aircraft in southern 
Norway alone. See Irving, Rise and Fall, p. 87. However, Murray, 
p. 39 believes that the strategic results of the German victory 
were, in the long run, counter-productive. See also J. Scutts, 
Luftwaffe Bomber Units, 1939-41 (London, 1978), pp. 12-14 and 
J. Scutts, Luftwaffe Fighter Units, Europe, 1939-41 (London, 
1977), pp. 10-11. 
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in previous campaigns, especially the Spanish Civil War. On 
reflection, however, the results of this experience must be 
judged at two levels. It can then be argued that although 
service in action before July 1940 brought benefits to aircrew, 
particularly in the fighter arm, that same experience caused the 
strategic planning of the Luftwaffe to be concentrated later on 
a type of campaign which could not be used profitably against 
Britain. Therefore, a balanced assessment must weigh the results 
and estimate the importance of their effects during the period, 
July to November, 1940. (37) 
First, tactics for fighter and bombers were evolved during the 
Spanish Civil War and employed with great effect both then and 
later. Also, German airmen were able to evaluate different types 
of Luftwaffe aircraft used by the Kondor Legion, discovering 
their various strengths and weaknesses in action. In 
Schliephakes's opinion, 'The Luftwaffe gained combat experience 
in Spain which could never have been gained by theoretical 
instruction, however well devised, nor by tactical exercises, 
however well planned'. The contrast with the training of RAF 
pilots in the same period is very marked. (38) 
37. For example, see Deighton, pp. 43-45; H. Allen, Who Won the 
Battle of Britain? (London, 1974), pp. 71-73; E. Sims, Fighter 
Tactics and Strategy (London, 1972), pp. 87-88 and 92; Galland, 
First and Last, pp. 68-69. 
38. Schliephake, p. 44. Between 1918 and 1939 there was no 
occasion when RAF pilots flew in action against enemy aircraft, 
thereby practising tactics under conditions of war. The 
experience of many was limited to the RAF's role as a 'police- 
force' in parts of the British Empire, particularly Iraq, 
Transjordan and Aden. See Dr Philip Towle's lecture,, 'The RAF 
and Air Control between the Wars', given at The Royal 
Aeronautical Society, London, 5 March 1990, and printed in the 
Royal Air Force Historical Society, Proceedings, No. 8, September 
1990, pp. 7-24. 
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A major cause of the development of German fighter tactics, which 
soon became the most effective used by any of the world's air 
forces came, ironically, through the shortage of aircraft 
available to the Kondor Legion. When the first few Me. 109s were 
sent to Spain in Spring, 1937, Oberleutnant Gunther Lutzow, 
commanding the 2nd Staffel of Jadgruppe 88, and his successor, 
Oberleutnant Joachim Schlichling, had to devise an economic 
method of employing them. Previously, fighters had been flown 
in vics, or echelons of three aircraft. However, according to 
Spick, they were now flown in pairs. 'Through experiment it 
gradually became apparent that the best way to use a pair was to 
fly them in-line abreast about 200 yards apart'. (39) 
This brought three benefits, which were realised immediately by 
German airmen. First, each pilot had a clear field of vision 
inwards, watching the blind spots behind and below his companion. 
Secondly, any attacker of one of the pair would be followed by 
the second aircraft and thus become a potential victim. Thirdly, 
the leader of the pair was always reassured, in making an attack, 
that his own tail was covered by his wingman. 
When larger numbers of Messerschmitts were employed, they were 
flown in fours, either line-astern or line-abreast, the 
incomparable 'Finger Four' formation. The problem of changing 
course with a Staffel of twelve aircraft was overcome by the then 
Leutnant Werner Molders, who suggested the crossover turn, which 
maintained the formation's efficiency in action. (40) 
39. M. Spick, Fighter Pilot Tactics (Cambridge, 1983), p. 43. 
40. Ibid, pp. 38 and-43-44. Some disadvantages of the 'finger- 
four' for wingmen are shown in M. G. Burns, Bader: The Man and His 
Men (London, 1990), pp. 152-59. 
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With customary thoroughness, the Luftwaffe ensured that many 
promising pilots were posted to Spain to gain experience. As 
soon as this had been achieved, they were sent back to Germany 
as instructors at training establishments. (41) However, long- 
term disadvantages to the Luftwaffe's operations as a strategic 
air force also resulted from the Spanish campaign. 
Wolfram von Richthof en, cousin of the famous fighter ace, served 
there as a colonel. Through force of circumstances he was 
compelled to use Luftwaffe fighters and bombers in the role of 
artillery for attacking ground positions. With this experience, 
he became an advocate of developing co-operation with the army 
by a tactical employment of aircraft in land battles. On his 
return to Germany he was placed in charge of a headquarters staff 
section 'for special duties', which were, according to 
Schliephake, to evaluate 'guide-lines for the organization, 
training and operation of ground attack formations on the basis 
of the experience gained in Spain'. (42) 
In this way, the Luftwaffe pressed ahead with developing its role 
as a tactical air force, well suited to the role of co-operation 
with ground forces and became a crucial component of German 
blitzkrieg tactics aimed at smashing an enemy. Ideas of air- 
ground warfare, developed in theory before September, 1939, and 
then in practice with devastating effect over the following ten 
months, brought great satisfaction to the German airmen' involved 
and gave them a feeling of invincibility over the battlefield. 
41. Pamphlet No. 248, p. 14. For personal recollections of a 
German fighter pilot in the Kondor Legion, see Galland, First and 
Last, Chapter VI, 'Ground-strafing the Rojos'. 
42. Schliephake, p. 44. See also Pamphlet No. 248, pp'. 14-17. 
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What the Germans failed to appreciate, however, was that the 
effects of experience in the Spanish Civil War brought the 
Luftwaffe little benefit when confronted by an enemy who was 
protected by a sea-barrier never less than twenty-two miles in 
width. As an example, the role of dive-bombers as a form of 
artillery running just ahead of advancing troops was of no avail 
if the Army could not be landed to follow up the destruction of 
strong-points. Also, in general throughout that war the 
Luftwaffe had enjoyed considerable air superiority, so that 
bombing attacks had been carried out with precision, often 
uninterrupted by the intervention of fighters. Therefore, German 
planning, for example, of what could be achieved by unescorted 
bombers, such as the He. lll, was unrelated to the reality of what 
would be experienced in British skies, defended by fighters. (43) 
Consequently the claim often advanced that the Luftwaffe obtained 
great benefit from the Spanish Civil War needs to be qualified. 
The fighter arm of the German Air Force profited more than the 
bombers; and Luftwaffe strategists drew some false conclusions 
which worked to Britain's advantage during the Battle of 
Britain-(44) 
43. Among the mistaken conclusions drawn by Luftwaffe 
strategists was one shared with some planners of the RAF, namely 
the superiority of bombers over fighters at that time. 'It was 
believed then and for some time afterwards that in daylight 
attacks, bombers would be able to master enemy fighters and thus 
would not need to be escorted'. AHB Translation, vol. 9, 
No. VII/1211 A. Galland, 'The Battle of Britain', February 1953, 
p. 6. 
44. See Galland, First and Last, pp. 37-38, who claimed that the 
strategists 'refused to lower themselves to the knowledge of air 
warfare gained in the Legion, considering it to be purely 
tactical'. See also Overy, Air War, p. 14. 
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PART TWO: THE WESTERN CAMPAIGN AND ITS EFFECTS 
Another factor to be taken into account when assessing the actual 
power of the Luftwaffe at the start of the Battle of Britain was 
that victories won in Poland, Norway, the Low Countries and 
France had been bought at heavy cost. While accepting that 
Germany had the world's most powerful air force both in numbers 
and experience in September 1939, the losses suffered in these 
early campaigns were far from light. Much has been made of the 
demolition of opposing air forces before July 1940 and, rightly, 
of the heavy casualties taken by the Royal Air Force, especially 
Fighter Command, during the Battle for France. (45) What is often 
overlooked is that the Luftwaffe, also, was affected in the same 
manner, though not to the same extent, through the loss of 
machines and experienced crews. 
A study of the records of the German Air Ministry's 
Quartermaster-General's Department proves that losses in May were 
heavy. They show that in the month, 1,044 Luftwaffe aircraft 
were destroyed on operations, 229 of them fighters. Single- 
engined fighters, that is, Me. 109s, totalled 147, while twin- 
engined Me. 110s numbered 82; twelve other fighters were lost, not 
45. See above, Chapter 1, Note 122. 
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on operations. During June, wastage was smaller, yet 
significant, comprising, from all causes, 100 Me. 109s and 26 
Me. 110s. The total figures for bombers lost from all causes 
during the same two months was 643. (46) 
What brings these figures into sharper focus was the comparative 
paucity of German aircraft production from the start of the war, 
a factor of great importance. There were fewer replacements than 
needed and opportunities for expansion were limited. This point, 
is reinforced by studying the respective figures of fighter 
production by both sides for the whole of 1940. Luftwaffe 
records show a total of 3,382 single-engined and twin-engined 
aircraft; the British figure was 4,283, all single-engined. 
Overall, Britain trebled production during the year while in 
Germany it was doubled. Considering the importance of single- 
engined fighters as the battle progressed, and the shortcomings 
of Me. 110s in action against Spitfires and Hurricanes, the 
weaknesses of the German position were underlined by the fact 
that the figure for production of Me. 109s was only 2,268. 
46. AHB Translation, vol. 4, No. VII/83, 'German Air Losses (in 
the West only), September 1939 - December 1940', records of VI 
Abteilung Quartermaster-General's Department of the German Air 
Ministry. Galland, First and Last, p. 52, has a more optimistic 
memory, claiming that 'losses in men and material had been 
small'. Pamphlet No. 248, p. 76, however, explains that many 
Luftwaffe units had to rest and refit with dive-bombers, 'having 
suffered heavy losses'. Murray, p. 42, quotes 'Einsatz des II 
Fliegerkorps' (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, USA), K113,306- 
3, v. 3, to show how Fliegerkorps II lost more aircraft in one day 
over Dunkirk than during the previous ten. From pp. 42-45 he 
shows that Me. 109 pilot casualties for May and June were 169, 
over 15% of the total available. When, in 1945, Kesselring was 
questioned about losses in. the campaign, he said that low-level 
attacks had been costly. 'Flak was strong in that campaign'. 
U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, APO 413, Interview No. 61,28 June 
1945. 
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The difference in building, repair and replacement was 
accentuated later in the year, but was an important influence 
even before the first main attacks were launched against the 
United Kingdom. (47) 
Much of the blame for the Luftwaffe's failure to produce 
sufficient aircraft has been laid at the door of Udet. He, 
however, in common with many other German leaders, had the 
feeling that the successes gained during the Western campaign 
would bring a rapid end to the war and that plans for new 
building and expansion would not be needed. One general 
remembered Udet's triumph at the end of the French Campaign when 
he heard him claim, regarding the programme for building 
aircraft, that the 'war is over. Our plans are not worth a damn 
... We don't need 
them any longer'(48) 
This failure to maintain production, combined with a lack of 
appreciation of the different mode of a strategic warfare needed 
against Britain, led to weaknesses in the Luftwaffe after the 
defeat of France. This was a carelessness, stemming from over- 
confidence, destined to prove expensive to the German Air Force. 
*** 
47. See Suchenwirth, Turning Points, pp. 66-67. See also 
Terrains, pp. 188-94, who shows, p. 191, production figures. See 
also Beaverbrook's three reports on the Ministry of Aircraft 
Production, made to the War Cabinet. First Report, W. P. (40) 211, 
19 June 1940; Second Report, W. P. (40) 427,27 October 1940, 
especially p. 2; Third Report, W. P. (40) 489,24 December 1940. 
All in Beaverbrook Papers, BBK D/362, papers presented to the 
Cabinet by Lord Beaverbrook as Minister of Aircraft Production, 
19 May 1940 -6 June 1941. 
48. Suchenwirth, Turning Points, p. 86. 
113 
At the end of the French Campaign, only Britain stood between 
Germany and total victory in the West. Hitler, enjoying the 
euphoria of a triumph not only over France, but also over the 
pessimistic predictions of some of his own generals, (49) was 
prepared to wait for Britain, believing that sooner or later she 
would have to accept the reality of her position and sue for 
peace. Lord Bullock suggests that, in the Fuhrer's reckoning, 
there was no reason for the British Government to adhere to 
former policy, * as their allies had been subjugated and their Army 
beaten. 'They must now surely accept the impossibility of 
preventing a German hegemony in Europe, and, like sensible 
people, come to terms'(50) 
Yet in some ways it was already too late for the Germans, because 
the three weeks between the evacuation from Dunkirk and the 
surrender of France gave Britain the opportunity of taking stock 
and cementing a resolve to continue the war. Winston Churchill, 
in a series of memorable speeches and wireless broadcasts made 
during May and June had already reflected the mood of most 
British people. (51) His approach, 'rhetorical and cheeky at the 
49. For some of Hitler's differences with his generals at the 
start of the war, see Telford Taylor, The March of Conquest (New 
York, 1958), pp. 41-64. 
50. A. Bullock, Hitler, a Study in Tyranny (London, 1962), 
pp. 588-89. The great optimism felt by many Germans was typified 
by Lieutenant Baron Tassilo von Bogenhardt who wrote, after the 
French surrender, 'We really did feel that the war was over now. 
It looked as if we should not even have to land in England'. The 
British 'hadn't a dog's chance' and would have 'to throw up the 
sponge, '. All that was needed was for 'the Luftwaffe to help them 
make up their minds'. L. Hagen, Follow My Leader- (London, 1951), 
p. 123- 
51. Gilbert, vi, p. 1283, lists Churchill's House of commons 
speeches in those months as-13 May (pp. 332-33), 28 May (pp. 416- 
17), 4 June (pp. 463-68), 17 June (p. 566), 18 June (pp. 569-71), 
20 June (pp. 577-80) and 25 June (pp. 599-600). Broadcasts were 
made on 19 May (pp. 363-65) and 17 June (p. 566). 
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same time, Macaulay and contemporary slang mixed together', 
succeeded in cementing a general public determination to combat 
Hitler and bring a halt to his run of victories. (52) 
'What General Weygand called the Battle of France is over. I 
expect the Battle of Britain is about to begin', he told the 
Commons on 18 June. (53) Two days later, in Secret Session, he 
showed traces of a droll humour, combined with a prophetic view 
of the near future of the war in the air, as his nine pages of 
typed notes disclose: 
Goering. How do we class him ? 
He was an airman turned politician 
I like him better as an airman. 
Not very much anyway ..... We have had a couple of nights of bombing ..... Folly underrate gravity attack impending ..... Learn to get used to it. 
Eels get used to skinning 
Steady continuous bombing, 
probably rising to great intensity occasionally, 
must be regular condition of our life. 
Looking further ahead, Churchill offered an uncannily shrewd 
analysis of the course the war would run. Dowding, with his 
belief in the need for a secure Home Base, would have agreed 
entirely with this vision, believing Fighter Command to be the 
main agent of its implementation. 
52. Taylor, English History, p. 473. Taylor makes Churchill's 
achievement shine more brightly by showing how he lacked support from some of his own Party, who mistrusted him and did not share his voracious appetite for the struggle. See also, for example, Channon Diaries, p. 258, diary entry for 20 June 1940. For the 
King's reservations towards Churchill, see S. Bradford, George VI (London, 1989), pp. 312-13. A detailed account of Churchill's 
relationship with Halifax, considered by many as his chief rival, is given in A. Roberts, 'The Holy Fox', A Biography of Lord Halifax, (London, 1991), pp. 186-271. 
53. Churchill, ii, pp. 197-99. 
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If Hitler fails to invade 
or destroy Britain 
he has lost the war. 
I do not consider only the severities 
of the winter in Europe 
I look to superiority in Air power 
in the future 
Transatlantic reinforcements 
If get through next three months 
get through next three years. 
It may well be our fine Armies 
have not said goodbye to the continent 
of Europe. 
The importance of this speech has often been overlooked. It 
helps. to explain what some pessimistic observers regarded as an 
insupportable policy. Churchill, while acknowledging the 
forthcoming burden of bombing, foresaw the relief from attack 
that would be brought later in the year. Then, bearing in mind 
the faith he shared with the Air Staff in a strategic campaign 
to be launched against Germany by heavy bombers, the Prime 
Minister also stressed his hopes for American help, in the 
reference to 'Transatlantic reinforcements'. The speech was 
therefore not a show of bravado from a Prime Minister whistling 
in the dark while facing imminent national disaster. It was, 
rather, a very shrewd assessment made by a leader whose 
appreciation of Britain's defensive capabilities by sea and air 
brought him confidence in the future. Nor should it be forgotten 
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that the shadow of land war had not fallen on the British 
homeland, so the nation was unlikely to submit, in boxing terms, 
'on the stool'. (54) 
Yet his words might not have been spoken, nor their faith been 
offered to a nation in dire straits, had a recommendation made 
on the day after the end of the Dunkirk Evacuation been put into 
practice. on 5 June, Milch, the Inspector of the Luftwaffe, 
reported to Goering after flying over the beaches. Asked to 
suggest steps to for bringing the war in the West to a rapid 
conclusion, Milch made a typically forthright reply. 'I would 
recommend that this very day all our air units - of both the 
Second and Third Air Force - should be moved up to the Channel 
54. Secret Session Speeches, compiled by C. Eade (London, 1946), 
pp. 9-10. N. Frankland, The Bombing Offensive Against Germany 
(London, 1965), p. 48, aptly summarises the raison d'etre of 
British policy by pointing out that if the Germans were to win, 
victory would have to be achieved quickly. If they did not, 
'time, together with the pressure of blockade and bombing, would 
test the durability of a corrupt and totalitarian regime'. For 
a further example of British optimism, see W. N. Medlicott, The 
Economic Blockade, vol. i, 1939-41 (HMSO, 1952), p. 411, who refers 
to 'the opportunity of total economic war opened up by the new 
reality of total danger'. See also Doenitz Memoirs, pp. 113-14, 
where Doenitz referred to Britain's decision to fight on. 'It 
was in keeping with the British character. The British never 
give up the struggle half way through; they fight on to the end'. 
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coast and that Britain should be invaded immediately'. Then he 
added in a voice of prophecy, 'If we leave the British in peace 
for four weeks it will be too late'. (55) 
In retrospect, this time of comparative inaction, which was to 
contribute in no small measure to Fighter Command's success 
in 
holding off the Luftwaffe, requires explanation. Three reasons 
must be stressed. 
To a disinterested observer it would have appeared that German 
hesitation at this point was a choice for a nation which was in 
a position to exercise any option it pleased. However, that 
argument overlooks the result of one important option open to 
Britain - namely, a refusal to seek terms -a policy which many 
outsiders found difficult to comprehend at the time. Certainly 
55. See Irving, Rise and Fall, pp. 91-92. Milch's view was 
shared by Kesselring. Under interrogation he claimed that 'the 
most opportune time would have been immediately following 
Dunkirk, but the preparations were not ready at that time. I 
personally regretted very much that the attack was called off'; 
Bombing Survey, Interview, 28 June 1945. These feelings were 
shared by many troops. General von Lossberg wrote of German 
soldiers at Calais, viewing the white cliffs of Dover. 'In the 
exultation of past success these German soldiers and their 
leaders came to believe themselves capable of things that no one 
even dared to think of before the Western Offensive'. Quoted in 
W. Ansel, Hitler Confronts England (New York, 1964), p. 115, from 
General B. von Lossberg, Im Wehrmach tfuhrungss tab (Hamburg, 1950), 
p. 89. A British pilot supported Milch's contention. A German 
invasion 'on the heels of the evacuating British' would have 
prevented the expansion of Fighter command which helped to 
redress the imbalance of numbers between the two air forces from 
July to October and thereby had an important effect on the 
outcome of battle. See Deere, p. 71. However, AIR 41/15, ADGB, 
ii, p. 24, asserts that a German invasion at that stage 'would 
have run counter to all that the Germans believed about the 
concentrated use of air power'. 
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the decision was a positive, not a negative, diplomatic choice 
which placed the onus of response on to Hitler, and thus earned 
time for the hard-pressed British forces to reorganise and take 
stock of defences. (56) 
In the case of Fighter Command, the period of grace thereby 
gained was invaluable. The Commander-in-Chief was able to repair 
squadrons, some of which had been shattered by the French 
Campaign, the Dowding System was brought to a state of readiness 
and airfield defences were prepared. (57) 
Secondly, the Germans were victims of their own success. At the 
outbreak of war few had dreamed that inside nine months the 
Luftwaffe would sit on airfields within short-range fighter 
distance of England. The suddenness and completeness of victory 
was overshadowed by a lack of detailed planning for taking 
advantage of such success. (58) 
56. The effects on Hitler of British stubbornness are shown, for 
example, in B. H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War 
(London, 1970), pp. 141-43 and G. A. Craig, Germany, 1866-1945 
(Oxford, 1978), p. 721. See Churchill, ii, pp. 225-31, who refers 
to them and quotes from the papers and diaries of Count Ciano, 
Mussolini's son-in-law, who was closely involved with German 
leaders at that time. 
57. For examples of the value of this period for rebuilding 
squadrons see the reminiscences of two pilots, Townsend, Duel of 
Eagles, pp. 277-61 and Deere, Chapter VI. Also see, for example, 
AIR 20/3457, May 1940 - May 1941, R. A. F. organisation for air 
action against invasion of Great Britain. 
58. See Kesselring Memoirs, p. 65, who claimed that 'the omission 
to make the necessary preparations was and remains a grave 
mistake'. 
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Thirdly, not the least of the causes of Britain's subsequent 
salvation was Hitler's relaxation of his own efforts in the West. 
In his mind rested the constant hope that the British would seek 
terms, enabling him to turn all attention to his cardinal 
ambition - the overthrow of Bolshevik Russia. (59) 
Therefore, when on 21 May Admiral Raeder placed before Hitler a 
Naval Operations Staff study of the possibilities of invading 
Britain, the Ftihrer showed little interest. As late as 17 June, 
an Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) report to the Navy stated 
that he had not expressed an intention to invade. (60) 
Hitler's change of direction in the employment of the Luftwaffe 
can be deduced from his Directive No. 13, dated 24 May. No longer 
was he envisaging the use of bombing solely as a strategic weapon 
to be employed against Britain's trade routes and ports. The 
German Air Force was now 'authorised to attack the English 
homeland in the fullest manner'. Its tactical employment was to 
start with 'an annihilating reprisal for English attacks on the 
Ruhr'. (61) 
59. See Pamphlet No. 248, p. 161, which suggests that the 
knowledge of the forthcoming attack on Russia was given 'to the 
Army and Luftwaffe staffs soon after the fall of France in June 
1940'. 
60. E. P. von der Porten, The German Navy in World War Two 
(London, 1972), p. 95. 
61. 'Directive No. 13 for the Conduct of the War, 24 May 19401, 
in Trevor-Roper, p. 29. 
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The Fuhrer's lack of drive and purpose towards the overthrow of 
Britain, in spite of what he had written in Directive No. 9 the 
previous November - 'the defeat of England is essential to final 
victory' - was demonstrated at the end of June and in the first 
week of July, when he spent time nostalgically touring the French 
battlefields, then visiting Paris before retiring to the Black 
Forest. It was not until the beginning of July that the 
realisation of Britain's determination to fight on really began 
to concentrate' his mind and he issued orders for preparations to 
be made. (62) 
These orders hardly suggested an urgency of purpose. The Fuhrer 
Directive of 2 July asked for details 'on the basis that the 
invasion is still only a plan and has not yet been decided on'. 
Two days earlier, General Jodl's report stated that the ultimate 
German victory over Britain was only a matter of time. 'First 
of all must come the fight against the British air force... In 
conjunction with propaganda and terror-raids from time to time - 
announced as 'reprisals' -a cumulative depletion of Britain's 
food stocks will paralyse the will of the people to resist, and 
then break altogether, forcing the capitulation of their 
government'. His report was clear on the essential precondition 
for invasion. 'A landing in England can be taken into view only 
if the command of the air has been gained by the German Air 
Force'. (63) 
62. Bullock, p. 591. 
63. See T. Taylor, Breaking Wave, pp. 44-46, citing General Jodl, 
'The Continuation of War against England', 30 June 1940. 
Nuremberg document, 1776-ps. 
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The turning point in proving Britain's resolve to fight on was 
the bombardment of the French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir (Oran), 
ordered by the Cabinet on 1 July and carried into effect two days 
later. The grave decision to attack the forces of so recent an 
ally was reached only after the deepest deliberation, but, in 
Hinsley's opinion, 'was taken in the conviction that the 
acquisition of them by Germany or Italy would determine the whole 
course of the war'. The effect was widely felt, not least in the 
U. S. A., and those who had harboured reservations over British 
intentions were left in no doubt that there would be no surrender 
before battle. (64) 
In spite of their apparent invincibility, Germany's armed forces 
were confronted with greater problems than they had anticipated 
once Britain's unwillingness to capitulate became obvious. The 
Army could do nothing unless put ashore; the Navy, after 
crippling losses in the Norwegian campaign, could neither carry 
64. For Intelligence reports leading to the action at Oran, see 
Hinsley, i, pp. 149-54. For decisions taken by Churchill and the 
Cabinet, and their consequences, see Gilbert, vi, Chapter 31, 
'Oran: no weakening of resolve $. Von der Porten, pp. 117-19, 
considers that Hitler missed an opportunity of winning over the 
French at that stage by 'dramatic German political moves'. 
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nor protect them. (65) Hence, pressure was exerted on the 
Luftwaffe, the only Service capable of making swift and easy 
contact with the enemy. Basically, the German. war machine was 
attempting to work on one cylinder out of three. (66) 
On 30 June, Goering issued a directive to the Luftwaffe, an order 
which was a strange mixture of hope and ambition. At the end, 
the intention of the campaign was clearly set out. 'As long as 
the enemy air force is not defeated the prime requirement for the 
air war is to attack the enemy air force on every possible 
opportunity by day or by night, in the air or on the ground, 
65. German naval losses in the Norwegian campaign were: 
sunk: one heavy cruiser, two light cruisers, ten destroyers, 
four submarines. 
damaged: two battlecruisers, one heavy cruiser, various smaller 
ships. 
Proportionally, the Kriegsmarine suffered more heavily than the 
Royal Navy; see von der Porten, p. 92. See also D. Grinnell-Milne, 
The Silent Victory (London, 1976), Chapters 4 and 5. Tables It 
2,3 and 4 show clearly the weaknesses not only of German naval 
forces, but also of German merchant tonnage. The estimate was 
that the first wave divisions required a shipping tonnage of 2.1 
million; actually available was . 75 million. Another view is 
offered by R. Wheatley, Operation Sea Lion, (Oxford, 1958) , p. 112, 
'The trend of the evidence certainly suggests that, while Sea 
Lion could not have been launched at the full strength planned, 
a transport fleet of sufficient numbers had been assembled for 
the purpose. All the essential naval preparations were thus 
completed for a landing on the 24th'. For Churchill's view of 
the power of the Royal Navy, see Gilbert, vi, p. 674. 
66. This view was supported in a lecture, 'German Air Force 
operations against Great Britain. Tactics and Lessons learnt, 
1940-1941', given by Hauptmann Otto Bechtle, Operations Officer 
of KG 2, at Berlin-Gatow, 2 February 1944. See Section 1, 
paragraphs 2 and 3, from Air Ministry News Service Document. 
A. M. D. No. 25187, Department of Documents, Imperial War Museum. 
Even before the war, warnings had been given of the Luftwaffe's 
limitations. See Fritz Sternberg, Germany and a Lightning War 
(London, 1938), p. 294. 'Today the air arm plays a much bigger 
role than it did in the World War, though a word of warning must 
be uttered against the exaggerated idea that it will prove 
decisive on its own. Enemy territory cannot be occupied by 
aeroplanes'. 
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without consideration of other tasks'. However, the earlier 
section of the document showed less optimism and called for a 
tentative approach, less in keeping with the Luftwaffe style of 
aggressive Blitzkrieg. It spoke of 'the well developed defence 
forces of the enemy' and ordered that air attacks were to be 
restricted to 'industry and air force targets which have weak 
defensive forces'. Every effort was to be made 'to avoid 
unnecessary loss of life amongst the civilian population'. There 
would be dislocation of supplies by 'attacking ports and harbour 
installations, ships bringing supplies into the country and 
warships escorting them'. (67) 
There was no mention of the Luftwaffe's effort being a preamble 
to, or major constituent of, a seaborne invasion of the United 
Kingdom. Although the Germans definitely intended such an 
operation and detailed preparations were made, rifts between the 
Army and the Navy were already appearing. The basic weaknesses 
of attempting to move thousands of troops in small ships across 
treacherous waters without naval superiority caused both generals 
and admirals to be highly critical of each other's plans. Both 
hoped that their problem would be solved by a British surrender, 
67. Goering's Directive, from Ob. d. L. Fust la. No. 5835/40 q. K. 
(Op. 1) chefs, 30 June 1940, quoted in Karl Klee, 'The Battle of 
Britain', in Decisive Battles of World War II, edited by 
H. Jacobsen and J. Rohwer (London, 1965), pp. 79-80. 
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but in the meantime the German Air Force alone would have to bear 
the burden. Thus Goering, whose light seldom saw the cover of 
a bushel, was not displeased that his Luftwaffe was being drawn 
to the centre of the stage. (68) 
There are mixed views on the difficulties of preparation for this 
task. Werner Kreipe, who served in KG 2 until June 1940, then 
went on to become Chief Operations Officer of Luftflotte III, 
later wrote, , 
'the Air Force was ordered to make good its 
relatively light casualties in crews and machines and to prepare 
for the next battles which must be fought over the Channel and 
in the English skies. Within a few days the German Air Force was 
ready'. (69) Such optimism disregards two factors. One was that 
68. Differences between the German Army and Navy were 
considerable, especially over the proposed extent of the landing 
area. For flexibility of attack the Army wanted a wide front; 
faced with a shortage of vessels, the Navy preferred a narrow 
sector. Both plans presumed a close involvement of the 
Luftwaffe. See B. H. Liddell Hart, The German Generals Talk 
(London, 1948), pp. 148-52. General Siewart, who served with von 
Runstedt at the time, told Liddell Hart, 'The Navy's heart was 
not in it, and it was not strong enough to protect the flanks'. 
The Navy's view was later summarised by Admiral Ruge, who 
commented that 'The Wehrmacht would never have crossed the 
Channel; the German soldier is sick if he crosses the Rhine'; 
Probert and Cox, p. 84. 
69. W. Kreipe, 'The Battle of Britain', in The Fatal Decisions, 
edited by W. Richardson and S. Freidin (London, 1956), p. 10. 
However, Kreipe contradicts himself on the next page, when he 
refers to a period of almost three weeks during which ground 
staff and construction units were 'exceptionally active' in 
making captured airfields serviceable and in building new ones. 
This could not have been achieved 'within a few days'. The 
period of remission was crucial to Fighter Command. See also AIR 
41/17, ADGB, iii, p. 24, on airfields built in France and Belgium. 
'Up to the autumn of 1940, these runways, with concrete surfaces, 
measured 1500 yards in length and 40 yards in width'. 
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Luftwaffe casualties in the French Campaign had been greater than 
he admits, (70) while the second was his failure to mention the 
inadequacies of the force at his command to fight the type of air 
war now required. 
In addition, time was needed to prepare aerodromes in France and 
the Low Countries to house the hundreds of aircraft that would 
use them. According to Kesselring, the task took several weeks. 
'The Area commands with the Labour Service battalions attached 
to them had every airfield ready for occupation by the beginning 
of August and ammunition and fuel ready for the great offensive' . 
He added that the 'squadrons themselves only just had time to 
settle in on their airfields before the first operational 
sortie'. (71) 
Cajus Bekker, who had wide access to German documents and later 
interviewed a number of Luftwaffe staff, pointed out that, after 
'the wear and tear of the "blitz" campaign against the West', 
units needed rest and considerable re-organisation before the 
prospect of assaulting Britain could be considered. He was also 
convinced that the Luftwaffe was never thoroughly equipped for 
the unexpected conflict against the United Kingdom. 
Nevertheless, he underlined the sense of frustration natural 
among some front-line aircrew: 'We sat about with little to do, 
and failed to understand why we could not get cracking'. (72) 
70. See above, Note 46. 
71. Kesselring Memoirs, p. 63. 
72. Bekker, p. 173. 
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By early July the Luftwaffe had a considerable numerical 
advantage in aircraft over the RAF and much has been made of this 
point, often as a background to showing how a small force of 
British fighters overcame a much larger enemy. What is often 
ignored, however, is that Fighter Command was, at that time, 
stronger comparatively than generally recognised and that the 
strategic placing of Luftwaffe units left that force in a 
relatively weak position. (73) 
Goering and his staff decided that the main attack on Britain was 
to be made by Luftflotte II, stationed in eastern France and the 
Low Countries, and Luftflotte III, flying from western France. 
An additional, though smaller, force, Luftflotte V, was to take 
up the attack from Norway. Luftflotten I and IV were kept back 
to defend the German homeland. (74) 
73. In the opinion of Dr. Horst Boog, historian of the 
Luftwaffe, 'It was fighter strength which decided the Battle of 
Britain'; Probert and Cox, p. 32. As the crux of the forthcoming 
battle was a struggle between two sets of single-seater fighters, 
it is enlightening to compare the respective figures. Hough and 
Richards, p. 113, support this view; 'The air fighting was thus 
likely to turn on how well the 700 Hurricanes and Spitfires 
performed against the nearly 1,100 Me 109s and 110s -a different 
way of computing the odds and one less daunting for the British 
side'. German QMG's figures for 13 July give the total of 
single-engined fighters as 1,077, with 899 serviceable. In the 
view of Suchenwirth, Turning Points, p. 64, allowing for aircrew 
available, there were probably 760 Me. 109s and 240 Me-110s. 
Against them on 10 July were 58 fighter squadrons, comprising 
Hurricanes, Spitfires, Blenheims and Defiants; (See AIR 16/116). 
if the latter two types on the British side and the Me. 110s of 
the Luftwaffe are subtracted, the balance becomes some 760 German 
matched against some 710 British aircraft. 'Wood and Dempster, 
Appendix 6, give these figures for RAF "Initially Equipped 
Operationally Fit Squadrons': 29 June, 814; 6 July, 871; 13 July, 
901. However, according to Terraine, p. 725, Group-Captain Tom 
Gleave, of the Battle of Britain Fighter Association, believes 
that there were only some 500 fighters ready for operations with 
the RAF. See also A. Robinson, R. A. F. Fighter Squadrons in the 
Battle of Britain (London, 1987), p. 15. 
74. See T. Taylor, Breaking Wave, pp. 120-24, "Deployment and 
Order of Battle'. 
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Accounts of the number of aircraft available to Luftflotten II, 
III and V at that time vary, but the generally accepted figure 
appears to be about 2,800. (75) Of these, some 200 were in Norway 
and, although the point was not appreciated by either side at the 
time, they had little chance of playing an active part in the 
forthcoming battle. However, they served the Germans well in one 
respect, causing the ever cautious Dowding to retain squadrons 
in the north against attacks which, in the event, came on one day 
only during the battle. (76) 
At the disposal of the German Air Force was a bomber strike-force 
estimates of whose strength varies. The figure shown in the 
Luftwaffe Quartermaster-General's returns for 13 July 1940 was 
1,347 bombers on strength, with 943 serviceable. These figures 
referred in the main to He. llls, Do. 17s and Ju. 88s; figures for 
dive-bombers, the Ju. 87s, on the same day were 436 and 340 
respectively. This was to be the prime, indeed, apart from 
submarine and motor torpedo boat (MTB) activity, the only power 
of an offensive designed to force Britain into an act of 
surrender, or to prepare the way for a successful seaborne 
invasion. The majority of these aircraft were dispersed to the 
areas covered by Luftflotten II and III, yet it was a 
75. See Suchenwirth, Turning Points, pp. 64-65, where he uses 
German QMG's figures. Also see Boog's figures, given in Probert 
and Cox, p. 24. 
76. Nevertheless, Luftflotte V's geographical placement 
precluded their wide involvement in attacks. Had they been moved 
earlier to support the effort from French bases, or had they, 
from July, made diversionary raids on the areas covered by Nos. 12 
and 13 Groups, they could have contributed more to the campaign. 
iss 
significant weakness of strategic planning by the German air 
staff that insufficient forces were placed from the start as 
close as possible to the narrowest part of the Channel crossing, 
where the Schwerpunkt of an aerial attack would have to take 
place. This lack of concentration of resources in the main 
battle area was to cost the Luftwaffe dearly in the long run. (77) 
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A major contributory factor to weaknesses in the Luftwaffe in 
July 1940 stemmed from leadership. For this, blame must be 
placed first at the top. 
It is not sufficient to state that Hitler took little interest 
in the aerial campaign against Britain, although there is small 
evidence to prove his close involvement. What is more important 
is that the Fuhrer had little understanding of a strategic plan 
by which Britain could be forced to sue for peace by the 
employment of air power. He never demonstrated wide awareness 
77. AHB Translation, vol. 7, No. VII/107, 'Luftwaffe Quartermaster 
General's Returns'. In Terraine's view, the Luftwaffe's success 
in the French campaign stemmed directly from the application of 
fighter strength above the battlefield, in a case of 'saturation 
of a battle area by air power'. In reality, the Germans were 
never able to achieve that state above southern Britain. See 
Terraine in Probert and Cox, p. 16. 
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of the value of either air fleets or navies; subsequently the 
waters of the Channel proved too great an obstacle for his land- 
based, military thinking. (78) The crossing of an unpredictable 
and boisterous sea was too much for his vision, which therefore 
travelled elsewhere across the map-table and the impetus of 
attack on Britain was lost. 
In spite of the traditional German fear of war on two fronts, his 
greatest ambition was to attack Russia and, in a sense, the 
defeat of Britain was a sideshow which, ideally but not 
necessarily, required completion before the Drang nach Osten 
could begin. At this stage his mind was divided between the two 
objectives, and settling with Britain never held the monopoly of 
attention required for the success of such a venture. The 
position became even more uncertain as Hitler vacillated, with 
78. H. Guderian, Panzer Leader (London, 1979), pp. 136-38, fails 
to blame Hitler sufficiently for the lack of German preparations 
for sea and air war against Britain. He claims, with a strange 
logic, that these weaknesses proved 'Germany had neither intended 
nor made any preparations for a war against the Western Powers'. 
However, Kesselring Memoirs, pp. 65-66, are more critical of 
Hitler, noting that 'the utter neglect of the invasion idea, 
obvious to every soldier is incomprehensible'. For Hitler's lack 
of understanding of air power, see R. J. Overy, 'Hitler and Air 
Strategy', JCH, 15,3 (1980), pp. 405-22. 
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a blend of hope and conviction, until late July that the British 
Government would come to the conference table. He also 
appreciated the difficulties of launching and sustaining a 
successful invasion. (79) 
Through the nature of his position in the Nazi state, the Fuhrer 
could be dictatorial in decision making in a way that, for 
example, Churchill never was in Britain. The Prime Minister was 
far more open to the advice of his Chiefs of Staff and to various 
committees which studied, then reported back in depth on problems 
to be faced. In Germany, however, Hitler held a type of power 
against which few men were brave enough to offer an honest 
opinion and preferment was often shown to sycophants. Without 
79. For recollections by some of his generals of Hitler's mood 
at that time, see Liddell Hart, Generals Talk, pp. 145-47. See 
especially Ciano's Diary, 1939-1943, edited by M. Muggeridge 
(London, 1947), pp. 277-78: entries for 19 and 20 July 1940. 
Supporting views are given in R. Gehlen, The Gehlen Memoirs 
(London, 1972), p. 38. Gehlen then served as a junior staff 
officer. See also The Goebbels Diaries, 1939-1941, edited and 
translated by F. Taylor (London, 1982), p. 123: his main aim was 
to attack Russia. 'Everything I undertake is aimed at Russia', 
he claimed. If necessary, he would 'be forced to come to an 
understanding with the Russians', before defeating the Western 
powers, then turning against the arch-enemy. 'I need the Ukraine 
so that they cannot starve us out, as they did in the last war'. 
A. Hillgruber, 'England's place in Hitler's plans for world 
dominion', JCH, 9,1 (1974), pp. 5-22. 
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the generation of interest that stemmed from Hitler's own 
involvement in any venture, schemes had little hope of sustained 
progress. (80) 
Undoubtedly the Fuhrer hoped that the air war against Britain 
would be carried on successfully under the leadership of Goering, 
whose claim on behalf of the Luftwaffe had been constant and, 
until the setback at Dunkirk, well-substantiated. Never was 
faith more misplaced. The basic weaknesses of Goering's 
character as a leader soon became apparent to those who did not 
already know them. 
In this respect, it is instructive to compare the 
Reichsmarschall's approach to his duties with those, for example, 
of Sinclair, Newall and Dowding. These leaders of the RAF were 
hardly charismatic characters, nor noted for frequent appearances 
among, or widespread popularity with, subordinates. Yet at a 
political or Service level they were constantly close to the 
action, seldom far from London and always available as the battle 
unfolded. 
80. The width of Hitler's power within the German State is shown 
in the League of Nations, Armaments Year Book (Geneva, 1938), 
p. 387.. 'The Fuhrer and Chancellor of the Reich is the supreme 
head of the National Defence Forces. He commands directly and 
personally all the land, sea and air forces. The High Command 
of National Defence, which serves as military general staff is 
placed directly under his orders'. F. L. Carsten, 'The German 
Generals and Hitler', History Today, 8,8 (1958), pp. 556-64, 
points out (p. 564), that although a number of generals were 
opposed to Hitler, they lacked political sense. ' Others 'were not 
the opponents of Hitler, but his tools'. Some recollect Keitel's 
nickname, 'Lakeitel' (lackey). For a comparison with Churchill's 
relationship with Service advisers, see Ismay Memoirs, Chapter 
XIII, in which he notes, pp. 164-65, 'Not once during the whole 
war did he overrule his military advisers on a purely military 
question'. This comment is relevant to Dowding's removal from 
Fighter Command in November 1940. 
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Unlike the Reichsmarschall, they were innocent of neglecting 
duties while in pursuit of luxurious living, hunting deer on 
their own vast estates hundreds of miles from front-line 
aerodromes or acquiring art treasures from the conquered 
territories. Whatever the weaknesses of their leadership, they 
were, at a professional level, striving their best for the 
Service. In the British State they were more readily answerable 
for decisions taken and, through their example, encouraged from 
their immediate subordinates a loyalty stemming from respect. 
Few showed this quality to Goering. 
The extra burdens thrown on to Luftwaffe commanders, even before 
the battle opened, by the Reichsmarschall's absence from the main 
fighting area were crucial. During the Western Campaign his war 
train, Asia, was moved forward to western Germany in mid-May, 
then briefly to France. After a recall to Berlin he returned to 
France on 5 June and stayed till the 29th. By that stage the air 
battle over Britain had not commenced and the Commander-in-Chief 
might have been expected to be present in an organising and 
inspiring role. Instead, apart from brief interventions, he did 
not reappear in the front line until 7 September, when, with the 
tide of battle not running for the Luftwaffe, he arrived in 
France to take personal charge. (81) 
81. For Goering's activities and movements from June to 
September 1940, see Asher Lee, Goering: Air Leader (London, 
1972); L. Moseley, The Reich Marshal (London, 1974); Irving, 
Goering; Overy, Goering. All passim. 
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Thus the weaknesses of the Luftwaffe chain of command stemmed 
from the Commander-in-Chief himself. Murray mentions Goering's 
"mental framework" not exceeding that of an ordinary fighter 
pilot, which he once had been and goes on to refer to his 
ignorance of 'logistics, strategy, aircraft capabilities, 
technology and engineering - in other words, just about 
everything to do with airpower'. (82) The veneer of bonhomie, 
charm and camaraderie produced socially acceptable graces 
unmatched by other Nazi leaders and made 'The Iron Man' a most 
popular figure at all levels. Yet it concealed flaws of 
character which were, in the long run, to cost the Luftwaffe 
heavily. The results of this lack of ability and control from 
a man who often referred to the air force as if it were his 
personal possession, were felt by senior officers. Milch, Udet 
and Jeschonnek carried out their duties without the necessary 
close support of their Commander-in-Chief. 
According to some authorities, several of these leaders were not 
entirely suited to their responsibilities. For example, it is 
suggested that Udet, a brilliant pilot, lacked the ability and 
temperament to serve as chief technical officer, a task involving 
much desk-work. (83) Possibly, Jeschonnek, an administrator of 
great potential, was too young and inexperienced to carry the 
burdens as chief of the Operational Staff. (84) It is known 
82. Murray, p. 6. 
83. See Galland, First and Last, p. 127 and Bekker, p. 292. 
84. See Suchenwirth, Command and Leadership, pp. 215-19, which 
points out the difficulties faced by Jesschonnek in dealing with 
Kesselring, Sperrle and Richthofen, who were his seniors in age, 
rank and length of service. 
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that Milch, the Reich's State Secretary for Aviation, was 
disliked by some Air Force officers who contrasted the slimness 
of his Service background with his overbearing style and width 
of ambition. (85) 
Kesselring and Sperrle, commanding the two Luftflotten closest 
to action, were not drawn into a carefully planned and co- 
ordinated campaign. The former, in his memoirs, reflected 
bitterly on the aimlessness of his position just before the 
Battle of Britain opened. 'In contrast to our previous 
campaigns', he wrote, 'there was not one conference within the 
Luftwaffe at which details were discussed with group commanders 
and other services, let alone with the High Command or Hitler 
himself'. Kesselring continued by claiming that he had no more 
than informal talks with Goering, rather than 'binding 
discussions'. He had been given no instructions for tactical 
assignments nor co-operation with either the army or the 
navy. (86) 
85. Ibid, pp. 31-32, which shows that a number of Luftwaffe 
leaders disliked his 'insolent manner'. 
86. Kesselring Memoirs, p. 67. 
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On 12 July an operational order, signed by Keitel and Jodl, 
offered some objectives for the Luftwaffe. These were prefaced 
by a strategic aim. 'England is in command of the seas. 
Therefore a landing will only be possible on the Southern Channel 
coast where we can substitute our lack of sea supremacy by air 
supremacy". (87) The Order was proof positive of the German faith 
in air power as a substitute for the shortage of ships and was 
obviously written by a High Command which was sadly lacking in 
an appreciation of the intricacies of strategic air power. For 
the Luftwaffe to obtain supremacy over the Channel coast, a 
campaign would have to be waged deep inland, encompassing RAF 
fighter and bomber airfields far from the coast. The German army 
leaders, grateful for the Luftwaffe's contribution to land 
victories on the continental mainland, appeared to overlook the 
new circumstances of defeating an enemy protected not only by the 
sea but also by the strongest air force yet encountered. 
By 16 July the three Services had reported to Hitler on the 
possibilities of invasion(88) and on that day the Fuhrer 
Directive No. 16 was issued. To set the lateness of decision by 
the leadership in context, it should be remembered that the main 
air battle over the Channel and the south coast of England had 
been in progress for six days. Yet the opening of the Directive 
was still couched in tentative terms. 'Since England, in spite 
87. AHB Translation, vol. 2, No. VIII/40, 'The Effects of Air 
Power', Document No. WC/87,12 July 1940. 
88. See T. Taylor, Breaking Wave, pp. 208-18 and von der Porten, 
pp. 96-97. 
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of her helpless military situation shows no sign of being ready 
to come to an understanding', Hitler started, 'I have decided to 
prepare a landing operation against England', followed by the 
hesitant addition, 'and, if necessary, to carry it out'. He then 
laid down that the RAF should be 'so reduced morally and 
physically' that it could not interfere with the Channel 
crossing. The Luftwaffe also was to operate against ground 
targets, such as coastal fortresses, reserves approaching the 
front, and ships of the Royal Navy. 
Even at that stage of the year, the Directive is still asking for 
plans, details, submissions and proposals 'as soon as possible'. 
considering that there were only eight or nine weeks remaining 
before weather changes would make invasion very difficult, the 
immensity of the task facing the Luftwaffe is thrown into sharper 
focus. (89) 
The following day, Luftwaffe units were placed on maximum 
readiness, while, on 19 July, Hitler played his final diplomatic 
card in a comparatively conciliatory speech made in Berlin. His 
invitation to the British Government to come to an agreement was 
clear. (90) When the offer was rejected by Lord Halifax, the 
89. 'Directive for the Conduct of the War, No. 16,16 July 1940', 
from Trevor-Roper, pp. 33-37. 
90. Hitler's speech, made at the Kroll Opera House, Berlin, 
included the words 'I consider myself in a position to make this 
appeal since I am not the vanquished begging favours, but the 
victor speaking in the name of reason. I can see no reason why 
this war must go on'. For an assessment of the speech, see 
T. Taylor, Breaking Wave, pp. 59-62, who suggests that the speech 
lacked 'diplomatic strategy'. For an eyewitness account, see 
W. Shirer, Berlin Diary (New York, 1941), pp. 452-57. 
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Foreign Secretary, three days later, the Germans at last - and 
too late - realised that action would have to follow. (91) 
It was not until this stage that Goering finally called a 
conference of his commanders to make detailed plans in unison. 
Needless to say it was held at Karinhall, hundreds of miles away 
from the action. The destruction of the RAP, especially Fighter 
command, was high on the agenda, together with attacks on the 
aircraft industry. Goering asked Kesselring and Sperrle to let 
him know how aerial supremacy could be achieved - hardly an 
inspiring opening to a battle which had already started. (92) 
**ý N 
When a number of features of German leadership, therefore, are 
taken into account, clues are offered for the reasons why the 
Luftwaffe entered the Battle of Britain at some disadvantage. 
This fact alone throws doubt on any view that it was in a 
position of overwhelming superiority in July 1940. 
91. Halifax broadcast, BBC Home Service, 22 July 1940. Halifax 
stated, 'His only appeal was to the base instinct of fear and his 
only arguments were threats'. Gilbert, vi, p. 672, refers to 
Colville Diaries for 24 July 1940, quoting Churchill's comment 
that he would not 'reply to Herr Hitler's speech, not being on 
speaking terms with him'. For reactions in Berlin, see Ciano 
Diary, pp. 277-78. See also Churchill, ii, pp. 229-30. 
92. Goering conference, 21 July 1940 BA/MA RL2 11/30 
'Besprechung Reichsmarschall am 21 July 19401, quoted in Irving, 
Rise and Fall, pp-96-97 and T. Taylor, Breaking Wave, pp, 127-28. 
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A most important cause of uncertainties in leadership at that 
time may be found in the faults of German Intelligence, a factor 
not to be overlooked. In some ways this may have been the most 
crucial factor, because no leader, however dictatorial, will set 
aims beyond possible achievement. It is therefore essential for 
advisers to offer truthful and independent opinions. 
However, unlike its British counterpart, the Intelligence Branch 
of the Luftwaffe lacked independence and was held in 
comparatively low esteem. Thus the Intelligence officer might 
be called on to deal with extra duties, such as propaganda and 
censorship. (93) Another vital difference from the practice of 
the RAF was that in 1940 no Intelligence representative was 
stationed at any unit below a Fliegerkorps. (94) 
There was a sharp rivalry between the various Intelligence 
agencies, which led to a lack of sharing of material gleaned. 
This was demonstrated particularly by the 5th Abteilung, the Air 
Intelligence Department of the Luftwaffe General Staff, under 
Schmid and the 3rd Abteilung, the Luftwaffe Signals and Cypher 
Intelligence Service, led by General W. Martini. Probably the 
main cause was that these Intelligence agencies were victims of 
93. The following section on Luftwaffe Intelligence owes much 
to an unpublished paper produced by Mr Sebastian Cox, of the Air 
Historical Branch, for the Carlisle Conference on Strategy and 
Intelligence, 1989. The paper is 'A Comparative Analysis of 
R. A. F. and Luftwaffe Intelligence in the Battle of Britain'. 
Here, see H. Boog, 'German Air Intelligence in World War II', 
Aerospace Historian, June 1986, 'p. 122. 
94. See Wood and Dempster, p. 120. 
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the German political system, where knowledge brought power, which 
had to be retained and withheld from rivals. The width of the 
struggle can be gauged when it is remembered that Intelligence 
on air matters was gathered by eight organisations and radar 
information by ten agencies. (95) 
Fearful of the traditional fate awarded to bearers of bad 
tidings, those working in Intelligence tended to tell' their 
superiors what they wanted to hear, rather than confront them 
with unpleasant realities. For example, Schmid had a reputation 
for failing to give unvarnished reports, both before and during 
the battle. (96) General Felmy, who did, was removed from his 
post. (97) Had the German leaders been confronted with a greater 
realisation of' the true power and potential of the RAF in the 
summer of 1940, or perhaps if they had listened more openly to 
criticisms made, there would have been a different approach to 
their strategy of trying to knock Britain out of the war. 
95. Cox, 'Intelligence', pp. 3-4. 
96. See ibid, p. 4. Schmid 'gained a reputation within the 
Luftwaffe for garnishing his reports to make them more palatable 
to Goering'. See also Wood and Dempster, p. 101, and Boog, 
Aerospace Historian, p. 122. 
97. H. Boog, 'German Air Intelligence in the Second World War', 
in Intelligence and Military Operations, edited by H. Handel 
(London, 1989), p. 193. T. Taylor, Breaking Wave, p. 106, claims 
that after Felmy's pessimistic report of September 1938 (see 
above, Note 13) , , his loss of favour with Goering was permanent". 
Felmy was dismissed in January 1940 after an aircraft from his 
Luftflotte II, carrying secret plans, force-landed in Belgium. 
See Irving, Rise and Fall, p. 84. 
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The German Intelligence branches served the Luftwaffe badly in 
three vital areas, which were to prove critical in the main 
battle. In retrospect it appears incredible that they were 
unable to offer the High Command sound advice on them. The first 
was the lack of appreciation of the width of British use of RDF 
in defence; the second was an apparent ignorance of Fighter 
Command's system of controlling squadrons; the third was an 
inaccurate assessment of the performance and production of 
British aircraft. 
The weakness was clearly shown on 16 July, when the 5th Abteilung 
produced a summary of the RAF. (98) At no point was Radio 
Direction Finding mentioned by Schmid, although Martini's 3rd 
Abteilung was aware of its existence and had attempted even 
before the war to uncover the frequencies used. (99) The cause 
of this oversight could have been either ignorance or rivalry, 
but the result was expensive for the Luftwaffe. 
Dowding's carefully planned system of fighter intervention was 
misunderstood. 'The command at high level (i. e., Command/Air 
Staff)', wrote Schmid, 'is inflexible in its organisation and 
strategy'. He went on, 'As formations are rigidly attached to 
their home bases, command at medium level (i. e., Group/station), 
suffers mainly from operations being controlled in most cases by 
98. See Cox, 'Intelligence', pp. 11-12 and Wood and Dempster, 
pp. 106-10. 
99. See J. Nissen, Winning the Radar War (London, 1989), pp. 33- 
37. 
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officers no longer accustomed to flying (station commanders)'. 
Possibly Schmid's conclusions were based on Signals interception 
of Fighter Command's radio telephone (R/T) messages, which he 
falsely believed would make the British defence system 
inflexible. (100) 
His estimates of British fighter performance and production were 
also awry. He said, for example, that the Me. 110 was superior 
to the Hurricane, no doubt to please Goering who had pinned great 
faith in that machine. This evasion of the truth proved very 
costly soon after the start of the battle, when the twin-engined 
fighter had to be protected by Me. 109s. (101) The figures given 
for British fighter production were equally wrong, estimating 
between 180 and 300 aircraft per month, a total likely, in his 
reckoning, to fall under the pressure of bombing and shortages 
of materials. In reality, the figure, which had grown steadily 
from April, averaged between 450 and 500 aeroplanes from July to 
September. (102) 
'The Luftwaffe is clearly superior to the RAF as regards 
strength, equipment, training, command and location of bases', 
the report claimed, going on to say that the German Air Force 
would be able 'to achieve a" decisive result this year', if 
100. See Wood and Dempster, p. 109. 
101. See AHB Translation, vo1.9, VII/121, pp. 7 and 18-19. See 
also Galland, First and Last, p. 75. 
102. See Overy, Air War, Table 3. See also M. M. Postan, British 
War Production (HMSO, 1952), p. 485. Figures are from AIR 
20/2307. 
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allowed to take advantage of the period of better weather from 
July to early October. (103) 
Such errors of judgement contributed strongly and crucially to 
the policy of German leaders at the time. Hitler was encouraged 
to believe that weaknesses in the RAF would force the British 
Government to the conference table. Goering anticipated that 
Fighter command would be crushed speedily and the remainder of 
the RAF within succeeding weeks. These misinterpretations of 
Britain's position help to explain why, at first, Hitler did not 
maintain the momentum of war after the defeat of France. Also 
they underline the value to British defences of the slow start 
to the Luftwaffe's campaign. (104) 
Dowding, his Group commanders and pilots, were in a stronger 
position than many believed when the main German attacks began 
on 10 July. The fact of the matter was that the Luftwaffe had 
never been prepared adequately from pre-war days to defeat the 
Royal Air Force and force Britain to sue for peace through a 
bombing campaign. Their best chance of success, immediately 
after the evacuation from Dunkirk, had been allowed to pass. In 
many respects they had lost the Battle of Britain even before it 
began and any assessment of the strategy, tactics and leadership 
of Fighter Command is incomplete unless this point is taken into 
account. 
103. OKL Intelligence Report, Operations Staff 1. C, 16 July 
1940. See F. K. Mason, Battle Over Britain (London 1969), Appendix 
K. 
104. See Overy, Goering, p. 170, who writes of 'Goering and 
Hitler's exaggerated opinion of the air force'. 
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PART ONE: INTRODUCTION 
The period from 10 July to 18 August marked the opening of the 
first stage of what is generally known as the Battle of Britain, 
but what should be called, in the opinion of some participants, 
the Battle for Britain. (1) This opening phase went far to 
disprove several impressions of the contest which have been 
widely held since and which, unfortunately, have clouded the 
issues of leadership during the battle. 
The first was that only a handful of young pilots of Fighter 
Command were available to stand between the Juggernaut of the 
Luftwaffe and total Nazi victory. The impression of 'The Few' 
as a small band of British fighter pilots engaging German 
formations of overwhelming strength was caused not so much by an 
overall shortage of RAF aircraft as by Dowding's strategy of 
defence. At this stage he chose to keep as many Spitfire and 
Hurricane squadrons outside the main battle area as were retained 
in No. 11 Group, where the main blows were bound to fall. (2). 
1. This point was made several times by Group-Captain H. S. 
Darley, who commanded No. 609 Squadron during the battle. In his 
view, the change of preposition underlines the importance of the 
battle to Britain's ability to stay in the war. Interviews, 
Group-Captain H. S. Darley, Southborough, 14 March 1991 and 8 
April 1991. 
2. See K. G. Wynn, Men of the Battle of Britain (Norwich, 1989), 
p. 2, who shows that the Battle of Britain clasp, awarded to those 
who flew in action with Fighter Command between 10 July and 31 
October 1940 was received by 2,927 airmen. 'Contrary to popular 
belief "The Few" are not so few as many people think. A widely- 
held misconception is that the Battle of Britain was won by a few 
hundred dashing Spitfire pilots'. Those eligible came from 67 
squadrons and two Flights. 
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Secondly, there were misconceptions over the resources available 
to Fighter Command. The reality was that while the German Air 
Force had more aircraft at its disposal than did the RAF, the 
advantage was considerably offset by the quality of the British 
defensive system. Fighter Command's squadrons fought a carefully 
prepared battle, using RDF and radio control, while the 
Luftflotten were engaged in bludgeoning attacks with no 
comprehensive strategy. Numbers alone gave the Germans little 
advantage. Even here, if the root of the battle is accepted as 
a contest between two sets of single-seater fighters, then the 
sides were almost evenly balanced. In addition, German lack of 
a heavy bomber seriously weakened the effects of attacks. (3) 
Thirdly, it is important to appreciate,, that, in this phase, 
Dowding received more support from the Air Ministry than he was 
later prepared to acknowledge. Officers there have been awarded 
less recognition than deserved for their efforts. (4) 
Fourthly, Fighter Command's tactics in action were patently 
inferior to those of the Luftwaffe. Although the recommendations 
made by pilots who had been in battle generally suggested the 
employment of larger, or differently arranged formations, the 
C-in-C was unprepared to approve. Subsequently, losses sustained 
in this period were unnecessarily high. 
3. See above, Chapter 2, note 9. In the opinion of the head of 
the RAF's Air Historical Branch, the British were 'better at 
battle management' than the Germans. Lecture, Group-Captain 
I. Madelin, 'The Battle of Britain', Royal Aeronautical Society, 
London, 20 November 1990. 
4. For an appreciation of the organisation, work and problems 
of the Air Ministry, see Dean, Chapter 14, 'The Air Ministry in 
Wartime and some of its Problems', pp. 180-202. 
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Fifthly, both sides suffered from poor Intelligence. However, 
this affected the German Air Force more than the RAF, especially 
because seaborne invasion plans were still vague and indefinite, 
bringing greater pressure on the Luftwaffe as the number of 
possible landing dates declined. 
The final factor during this period, and one whose importance 
should not be underestimated, was the value to Dowding of 
continuing political support. At the time, both Churchill and 
Beaverbrook, although not examining closely the tactics of 
battle, were content that Dowding's strategy was enabling Fighter 
Command to hold off German attacks. 
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PART TWO: DOWDING'S DEFENSIVE STRATEGY 
The inherent weaknesses of the Luftwaffe on 10 July were either 
unknown, or not fully appreciated in Britain. There the sense 
of foreboding was great, although tempered by a grim 
determination not to allow the enemy an easy passage to 
victory. (5) Nevertheless, the shield afforded by the sea, which 
had prevented the Germans from turning the land attack on to 
Britain immediately after the defeat of the French, had enabled 
British leaders to take stock on two vital issues over the 
preceding six weeks. These issues marked the outline of the 
Government's overall aims, which the strategy of the RAF, and in 
particular that of Fighter Command, had to attempt to implement. 
They were summarised by Air-Commodore Slessor, Director of Plans 
(D. Plans) at the Air Ministry, referring to a Joint Planning 
Committee (JPC) paper produced on 24 May. 'We had been asked', 
he recollected, 'whether Britain could hold out until help from 
the Empire and the United States became effective, and whether 
we had any chance of defeating Germany'. In his view, the crux 
of the answer to the first question was the capacity to replace 
fighter wastage, which would bring - or lose - air superiority. 
On the second point, he believed that Germany might be defeated 
by three factors - attack from the air, economic pressure, and 
revolt in the defeated countries. (6) 
5. See, for example, the broadcast made by Neville Chamberlain, 
then Lord President of the Council, on 30 June 1940. The Channel 
was a 'formidable anti-tank obstacle' and the Royal Navy 'vastly 
superior to the German'. Even if the German Army were to land, 
fit still has to be supplied, in the main at any rate by sea'. 
Keesings Contemporary Archive, vol. iv, p. 4127. 
6. Slessor, p. 298. 
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In reporting to the Prime Minister on 25 May the Chiefs of Staff, 
whose RAF representative was Sir Cyril Newall, reached a number 
of conclusions. The main one was that while the RAF was in 
existence, the Navy and Air Force in unison probably had the 
power to prevent seaborne invasion. If, however, the Germans 
gained air superiority, the Navy would not be able to stop 
landings 'for an indefinite period'. Then, German land forces 
would get ashore and the British Army would be 'insufficient to 
deal with a serious invasion'. (7) 
The next point underlined the burden laid on the RAF and 
especially on Fighter Command under Dowding's leadership. The 
crux of the problem, they suggested, was air superiority and if 
the Germans gained that, they could attempt to win by aerial 
attack alone. 
They then showed a resurgence of the fears that had lurked since 
pre-war days, namely that the morale of civilian populations 
could be broken by bombing. In their ninth paragraph they 
referred to the 'moral effect on the workpeople' of 'wholesale 
havoc and destruction', while in the tenth they mentioned 'moral 
damage within the industrial area' resulting from attacks on the 
aircraft industry. To underline the . 
belief that the fears of the 
working-class knew no national frontiers, the Chiefs of Staff 
stated that a British bomber force could attack German industrial 
centres and 'by moral and material effect' disrupt or destroy 
them. Their summary defined the real test-as being whether 
7. COS Paper No. 168 of 1940,27 May 1940, quoted in Churchill, 
ii, pp. 78-79. 
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Service and civilian morale would be able to withstand the 
advantages possessed by Germany. (8) 
The onus thrown on to the RAF was double-edged. Fighter Command 
was not only to hold off enemy attacks on service positions and 
establishments, but also was required to guard civilians whose 
will to continue the war might well be broken by aerial 
bombardment. In view of what had happened in Spain, Poland, the 
Low Countries and France, the view was understandable. (9) 
And yet, even at this crucial moment, with the strong possibility 
of German landings, the basic difference in strategic thought 
between, on the one side, the Air Staff and a number of 
politicians, and on the other, the Commander-in-Chief, Fighter 
Command, were demonstrated. For him, their earlier neglect of 
the importance of ensuring the safety of the Home Base through 
the agency of Fighter Command verged on the criminal. They, 
nevertheless, had a wider view of strategy, realising that attack 
is often the best method of defence. 
Prominent among the supporters of this latter view was Churchill 
himself. Writing to General Ismay on 4 June, with the disaster 
of Dunkirk hardly completed, he was already suggesting that 
raiding forces might be used to attack German occupied coasts. 
8. Churchill did not want the general public to be unduly 
alarmed. See Gilbert, vi, pp. 602-03, quoting Churchill papers 
20/13, Minute of 26 June 1940, to Duff Cooper. People should 
take raids 'as if they were no more than thunderstorms'. 
9. See below, Chapter 6, 'Night Air Defence', for the effect of bombardment on British civilians at the end of the year. 
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A 'defensive habit of mind', he announced, which had ruined the 
French, should not be allowed to have the same effect on 
Britain. (10) 
The thinking within the RAF was still at two levels. It was 
obvious by early July that Fighter Command held the key to 
Britain's immediate survival; therefore as many machines and 
pilots as possible were required to defend against Luftwaffe 
attacks. Nevertheless, there was still a strong caucus inside 
the Air Ministry dedicated to the Trenchard Doctrine of the 
offensive. Its members believed with a sincerity, sometimes 
later treated as stupidity, that attacks on German targets 
carried out by Bomber Command would make a significant 
contribution to Britain's defence. (11) 
Group-Captain Stevenson, Director of Home Operations (DfO), 
summarised the dilemma on 28 June, when he wrote, 'We cannot hope 
to win the war without hitting and hitting hard. Therefore 
increases in the Bomber Force are absolutely essential'. He was, 
nonetheless, well aware of the current need for fighters. 'We 
must at all times have sufficient fighters to give security to 
the base and moreover, to provide the necessary air supremacy 
over areas in which our Bombers require to operate', he wrote, 
10. Churchill, ii, p. 214. See also Gilbert, vi, p. 655, who 
quotes Churchill Minute to Herbert Morrison, Minister of Supply, 
7 July 1940. 'What is being done about designing and planning 
vessels to transport tanks across the sea for a British attack 
on enemy countries? ' 
11. See Terraine, pp. 141-44. 
141 
showing again the Air Staff's recognition of the importance of 
aggression as part of a defence strategy. (12) 
The seeds of the growing difference between the Air Ministry 
under Sinclair and the Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP) 
under Beaverbrook, can be felt here. The former believed that 
the development of the RAF required the building of as many 
bombers as possible, with the intention of striking at Germany. 
The latter saw as a prime need the construction of Spitfires and 
Hurricanes in large numbers to meet the immediate requirement of 
securing the Home Base. Those differences, compounded by 
Beaverbrook's highly individual approach to the achievement of 
aims and targets, made for a controversy which lingered on 
throughout the Battle of Britain. The uneasy relationship was 
a strong undercurrent in the story of Dowding's handling of 
resources during the battle, and played a not unimportant part 
in his subsequent dismissal. (13) 
The Government's conception of the immediate strategic need was 
summarised by the Chiefs of Staff on 19 June. Their words 
underlined an awareness that the future of Britain's chances in 
12. AIR 16/347, Expansion of the Home Defence Organisation, 
February-September, 1940, Note by Stevenson, DHO, 28 June 1940. 
see also Gilbert, vi, p. 656, referring to Churchill's Minute to 
Sinclair, 11 July 1940. _ 
"It is important to build up the numbers 
of the Bomber force, which is very. low at the present time'. 
13. For manifestations of the relationship, see Gilbert vi, 
pp. 759-60 and p. 811. See also Beaverbrook Papers, BBK D/21, 
which shows both ministries jockeying for power over Aircraft 
Storage Units. BBK C/311 has a conciliatory letter from Sinclair 
to Beaverbrook, 15 June 1940. BBK D/390 contains Cabinet 
Minutes, 23 July 1940, . 
'Division of responsibilities between the 
Secretary of State for Air and the. Minister of Aircraft 
Production'. See also Slessor, p. 305 on divergences over 
priorities. For an appreciation from within the Air Ministry, 
see Dean, pp. 137-38. 
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the conflict would be resolved in the short period between then 
and mid-September. 'The issue of the war', they stated, 'will 
almost certainly turn upon our ability to hold out during the 
next three months'. The importance of Fighter Command's part in 
the forthcoming action was demonstrated by their next words. 
'Our efforts must therefore be concentrated on taking all steps 
necessary to meet the imminent threat of attack with which we are 
now confronted'. (14) ' 
*** 
Such statements of policy focused attention on the importance of 
Dowding"s responsibilities. A factor magnifying his difficulties 
at the start of the battle was the increased number of directions 
from which the enemy could now launch attacks. Pre-war planning 
had anticipated raids by unescorted bombers, aimed from a 
generally easterly or north-easterly quarter. (15) On 10 July, 
however, Luftwaffe aircraft were dispersed on airfields 
stretching round Britain in a great arc from Norway to north-west 
France. The closest of these airfields were in the Pas de 
Calais, enabling fighter protection to be given to German 
formations attacking south-east England. (16) 
14. CAB 66/8, W. P. (40) 213,19 June 1940. 
15. See AIR 41/14, ADGB, i, Section 8, 'Fighter Policy, 
September 1939-May 1940'. In February 1939 Dowding's confidence 
in the ability of Fighter Command to meet unescorted bombers was 
shown when he wrote, 'It is my considered opinion that a bomber 
attack from Germany on this country would be brought to a 
standstill in a month or less'. He predicted 'terrible 
casualties' for them. See AIR 16/261, February 1939-July 1940, 
Correspondence with Chief of Air Staff, Dowding to Deputy Chief 
of the Air Staff, 24 February 1939. 
16. A map showing clearly the closeness of German fighter 
aerodromes to southern England is given in Taylor, Breaking Wave, 
pp. 80-81. 
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At this stage, one of Dowding's greatest problems was to decide 
on the disposition of his forces to meet responsibilities for the 
defence of targets varying from naval bases in northern Scotland, 
to London, and from convoys sailing in the Western Approaches, 
to East Anglian aerodromes. As he recollected less than a year 
after the battle, German objectives 'might be Convoys, Radio- 
Location Stations, Fighter Aerodromes, Seaports, Aircraft 
Factories, or London itself'. He went on to explain that their 
policy was to engage Fighter Command continuously, thus weakening 
it until the Luftwaffe had gained air supremacy. (17) 
Although the fall of France brought a form of respite for the 
RAF, this was no more than an interval. In particular, German 
occupation of western France provided opportunities of attack on 
lightly defended targets on the western side of Britain which had 
not, in pre-war planning, been considered especially vulnerable. 
The coastal area from Portsmouth round to Bristol was now at 
particular risk. There was also the thought that a German 
invasion of Eire, as a forerunner to landings on the British 
mainland, might be carried out. (18) 
17. AIR 8/863, p. 4543, paragraph 7. Nonetheless, at this stage 
Leigh-Mallory showed a shrewder appreciation of German intentions 
than Dowding. At a conference on 7 July he predicted that the 
Luftwaffe would concentrate on southern airfields for about a 
week before invasion. Dowding believed that such attacks would 
last for only one day. See AIR 41/15, ADGB, ii, pp. 33-34. 
18. However, an advantage for defenders of the western areas was 
that the short range of the Me. 109 precluded its use there as an 
escort fighter. Gilbert, vi, p. 577 refers to British fears 
regarding an invasion of Eire, discussed by, the War cabinet on 
20 June 1940. 
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These worries added to Dowding's burden, but all too often the 
impression has been given that he carried it alone. Certainly, 
his was the particular responsibility for the fighter defence of 
Great Britain, yet the support afforded by officers in the Air 
Ministry is overlooked, or at best neglected. They, in turn, 
were pressed by requirements from the Chiefs of Staff, who had 
a broad view of what was needed from each Service, taking their 
instructions from the Cabinet. (19) - 
Thus, Group-Captain Stevenson wrote several times to Dowding in 
June, stating the Air Council's policy and decisions. For 
example, on 11 June he sought information on Fighter Command's 
intentions for extending defences in the west of England. (20) 
Seventeen days later the DHO wrote a review of fighter 
organisation resulting from the German occupation of France, 
including the prediction that Britain would 'lose the war unless 
we are able. to secure our ocean convoys and our shipping in the 
Irish Sea'. (21) on the following day, Dowding was notified of 
Fighter Commands role in the event of an invasion. First, 
troop-carrying planes should be attacked, and then bombers. 
19. Ismay Memoirs, p. 159, shows the increasing importance of the 
role of the Chiefs of Staff who were, for the first time, 'in 
direct and continuous contact with the Head of the Government'. 
20. AIR 16/347, Stevenson to Dowding, 11 June 1940. See also 
AIR 16/659, Enclosure 11A, Dowding to Joubert, 3 July 1940. 
Dowding showed his continuing mistrust of the Air Ministry. 
Referring to weaknesses in the defences of the West Country, he 
claimed that he had written on 2 February *pointing out the new 
danger, but, in spite of repeated reminders, no decision was 
taken for three months. Furthermore, after resisting my 
recommendations for a year that runways should be built at 
Filton, they have now changed their mind and runways are being 
built, with the result that the aerodrome is out of action'. 
21. AIR 16/347, DHO 'Review of fighter requirements in strength 
and organisation consequent upon the German occupation of 
France', 28 June 1940. 
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Cover should be offered to RAF bombers attacking enemy ground 
targets. Diversionary raids made by the Luftwaffe should not be 
met by too great a strength because 'the main objective of the 
fighters is to assist in repelling the invasion'. (22) 
It was, nonetheless, a grim irony for Dowding that Stevenson's 
estimate of fighter numbers needed to meet the anticipated 
strength of the Luftwaffe and its potential now that the aircraft 
industries of 'several European nations had fallen under German 
control, was one hundred and twenty squadrons. These would 
constitute a first-line strength of 1,920 machines, between two 
and three times what was actually available to Fighter Command 
on that day. 
At the same time plans were being pressed forward to form three 
new fighter Groups. No-10 would cover the West Country, No. 14 
the north coast of Scotland, while No. 9 would defend the north- 
west of England. (23) , 
It is obvious that the Commander-in-Chief was greatly influenced 
by the width and variety of duties which had been pointed out to 
him by the Air Staff and whose onset, he would claim, they had 
failed to discern in good time. Also he had to bear in mind the 
22. AIR 20/2061, January-July 1940, Fighter Command 
miscellaneous papers, Stevenson to Dowding, 29 June 1940. 
23. See AIR 41/14, ADGB, i, pp. 1-22. 
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strategic advantages which lay with the Luftwaffe, in their 
position as an attacking force with many airfields at their 
disposal from Norway to France. (24) There was the possibility 
at this stage that a seaborne invasion might be launched from any 
one or more of three general directions. Firstly, ships might 
cross the North Sea from Norway or the Baltic, to land forces on 
the east coast. Secondly, the Germans could use French and 
Belgian ports as bases for an attack on the south coast of 
England. Thirdly, they might sail from Brittany to invade Eire 
or the south-west coast of England. (25) 
Therefore the disposition of the forces at Dowding's disposal at 
the start of the battle is of interest in demonstrating his 
anticipation of German intentions. An airman who flew at that 
time under his command pointed out that the Commander-in-Chief's 
freedom in this matter was extensive because 'no power on earth 
could have disputed his order without undermining his command 
responsibility, with all the implications inferred thereby'. (26) 
On 8 July Fighter Command had 58 squadrons, although eight at 
the time were non-operational, either forming or re-forming. The 
following table shows how they were dispersed: 
24. See, for example, ELMT 2/1, German Air Force Order of 
Battle, A. I. 3b, 1 August 1940, in Elmhirst Papers, Churchill 
College, Cambridge. Group-Captain Elmhirst, then head of the 
German Section of RAF Intelligence, listed aerodromes where 
German fighters were stationed. Nevertheless, his estimates of 
numbers, being based on figures for Establishment, were 
exaggerated. 
25. For thoughts, reports and worries of the time regarding 
invasion, see Hinsley, i, Chapter 5, especially pp. 168-71. Here, 
the value of the Air Ministry's Photographic Reconnaissance Unit 
(PRU) is underlined. 
26. Allen, Who Won? p. 110. 
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The dilemma facing Dowding at that stage is pointed out in the 
Air Historical Branch Narrative. Although the bulk of the German 
Air Force was stationed opposite to No. 11 Group - 'no less than 
one thousand bombers and 400 fighters directly threatened the 
No. 11 Group area' - the Luftwaffe could, by menacing other parts 
of Britain, cause the Commander-in-Chief to hold back forces from 
'the main zone of operations'. (28) 
Surprisingly, Dowding,. in his Battle of Britain Despatch, makes 
little mention of his deployment of squadrons, or the strategic 
reasons for his arrangement of forces. (29) Nevertheless it is 
28. AIR 41/15, ADGB, ii, p. 40. 
29. Dowding's Despatch, AIR 8/863, contains a number of thinly 
veiled criticisms of Air Ministry policy. This is almost 
certainly the reason why the Despatch, written in 1941, was not 
published until after the war. See Beaverbrook Papers, BBK 
D/440, note written for Beaverbrook, 4 February 1944, which 
referred to it as 'the record of a disappointed man'. 
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possible to delineate his restrictions of manoeuvre. He had to 
keep Fighter Command together as an organised fighting force, 
even if sometimes it would be unable to prevent enemy bombers 
from reaching targets. 'The destruction or paralysis of the 
Fighter Command', he wrote "was therefore an essential pre- 
requisite to the invasion of these Islands'. His prime task was 
to prevent that. (30) 
For Dowding, a great problem was the shortage of pilots. The 
production or repair of aircraft was advancing at a satisfactory 
and improving rate by July 1940, (31) but the training of men to 
fly them was a far slower process. In addition, the depredations 
of the French Campaign had reduced not only the total of pilots, 
but more especially the number of experienced airmen. 
on 1 July there were available, for all first-line squadrons, 
including those that were non-operational, a total of 1,103 
fighter pilots. Their allocations were: No. 11 Group- 553; No. 12 
Group- 228; No. 13 Group- 322. (32). At this stage, in Dowding's 
appreciation, the fate of the nation depended on the skill and 
courage of about one thousand men. He was not alone in 
regretting the tardiness of the Air Ministry in supplying 
sufficient aircrew. Churchill noted, in a Minute to Sinclair on 
27 June, 'the proved failure to provide a proper supply of 
30. AIR 8/863, p. 4543, paragraph 6. 
31. See Gilbert, vi, pp. 618-19, quoting PREM 3/38, folios 52-53, 
note from Beaverbrook, 30 June 1940. Beaverbrook claimed that 
1,040 operational aircraft were ready for service, compared with 
45 'when your Administration began $. 
32. Figures given in Bowyer, p. 56. 
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pilots when they have so long been crying out about a plethora 
of pilots". He hoped that Sinclair would bring reform to 'a most 
cumbersome and ill-working machine'. (33) 
Some help came from the Admiralty, who immediately searched units 
of the Fleet Air Arm for pilots. By July they were able to 
provide 58 airmen who then served under Dowding's command. (34) 
The Commander-in Chief, believing that deficiencies of men and 
materiel precluded him from an aggressive use of resources, 
deployed squadrons in a conservative manner. Obviously, he, as 
much as Jellicoe in the Great War, saw the importance of his 
Command to the nation's survival. Another naval analogy, seen 
from the German side, is that Dowding valued Fighter Command as 
a 'Fleet in Being'. He wished to avoid a Jutland which could 
demolish his strength in one blow. His aircraft were therefore 
arranged with a balance of types of machine maintained among all 
Groups. 
His strategy in this respect has been open to some, though 
generally muted criticism. Yet it led, in part, to the 
development of the Big Wing Controversy and to accusations that 
Dowding should have displayed more flair and aggression in 
opposing the Luftwaffe. He was implementing the policy of 
response planned before the war to meet raids from unescorted 
33, Minute, Churchill to Sinclair, 27 June 1940, given in 
Gilbert, vi, pp. 605-06. For background to the problem, see Wood 
and Dempster, Chapter 3, 'The Trenchard Air Force', pp. 210-11. 
34. Of these 58 Fleet Air Arm pilots, nine were killed in the 
battle; see Hough and Richards, p. 290. Wynn, p. 2, lists No. 804 
and No. 808 Squadrons of the Fleet Air Arm whose pilots were 
entitled to the Battle of Britain clasp. 
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bombers, although conditions were now crucially changed; German 
fighter bases were only thirty miles from southern England. 
The weakness of his position is underscored by examining the 
advantages stemming from the Germans' choice of areas to 
attack. (35) Most writers and authorities therefore accept that 
the Commander-in-Chief had little option in this matter and fail 
to question his strategy. However, his policy led to extreme 
pressure being laid on No. 11 Group even before the battle 
started. Park's twenty-two squadrons, comprising about 350 
aircraft, were faced by some 1,400 fighters and bombers. This 
strain, particularly in August, led to dissension over tacticso 
One of the chief criticisms of Dowding's strategy comes from a 
former Battle of Britain pilot, wing-Commander R. Allen. Allen, 
while allowing that the C-in-C was influenced in his decision by 
others, for example, the Chiefs of Staff Committee, says that the 
deployment of the fighter force 'was to invite disaster'. In his 
view, Blenheim squadrons should have been moved north from No-11 
Group and replaced by the eleven Spitfire squadrons available to 
Nos. 12 and 13 Groups. 'Every Spitfire squadron in Fighter 
Command should have been based in the 11 Group area', according 
to Allen, who believed that Dowding would then have been meeting 
the principle of concentration of force with his best 
fighters. (36) 
35. See AIR 41/15, ADGB, ii, p. 40. See also ibid, p. 565. 'The 
wide deployment of the German Air Force, threatening almost the 
whole of the United Kingdom meant that defending fighters had to 
be stationed in parts of the country remote` from the south-east'. 
The Narrative overlooks the fact that the crux of battle was 
bound to be in the south and-that more single-engined fighters 
could have been deployed there. 
36. Allen, Who Won? p. 111. 
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Rather than agree that Dowding had to retain forces in the north 
to meet a possible attack, Allen argued that this emphasis 'shows 
no military logic of any kind'. (37) In support of this view, it 
has to be remembered that no raids on the north could have been 
escorted by Me. 109s, so fighters other than Spitfires could have 
been deployed there. 
This leads to a salient point in the general criticism of 
Dowding's strategy and one which has grown in recent years. It 
is that the Commander-in-Chief failed to respond when the battle 
with which he was confronted proved not be the one for which he 
had planned and thus he allowed No. 11 Group to bear a heavier 
burden than needed. In the opinions of two eminent officers who 
flew in the battle, pilots who were trained to meet raids by 
unescorted bombers coming mainly from the east never anticipated 
having to compete with escorted bombers flying from the south. 
One of the officers believed that Dowding should certainly have 
appreciated this by September and taken appropriate steps; in his 
view, there was a place for Big Wings. (38) 
The point is summarised by a former Australian pilot. 'When the 
Low Countries and France fell, Fighter Command was outflanked ... 
If he had redrawn the Group boundaries to meet the new threat he 
could have had the attack spread between two Groups and taken the 
strain off 11 Group'(39) 
37. Ibid, p. 113. 
38. Interview, Air Marshal Sir Danis Crowley-Milling, Bader 
Foundation, Shell House, London, 14 December 1989. Also, 
Broadhurst interview, 10 November 1989. 
39. Hough and Richards, p. 287., 
, 
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The fact that authorities at the time, and many writers and 
commentators since, believed Fighter Command to be heavily 
outnumbered and no more than a thin blue line, clouds two 
important factors. The first is that Britain's defensive system 
was not composed exclusively of RAF fighters, but contained other 
forces, such as anti-aircraft guns and balloons. In the 
forthcoming battle they were to play a vital, and often 
underestimated part. The second is that, in spite of a 
comparative shortage of numbers, Fighter Command, through use of 
the planned response to attack, using such elements as Radio 
Direction Finding and the Observer Corps, was far more efficient 
in carrying out its role than the Luftwaffe was in trying to 
sustain an offensive. Largely through pre-war preparations, 
Fighter command had a singular purpose; the German Air Force, 
however, lacked clear-cut objectives and failed, particularly in 
bombing policy, to maintain a constant and undivided aim. (40) 
Taken together, these two factors go some way to redress the 
apparent imbalance between the two sides. They also show that 
if the David and Goliath analogy often made of the two sides is 
accepted, then the former was better and the latter less fearsome 
than customarily believed. 
The value of a well-equipped anti-aircraft arm had been 
demonstrated during the German campaign against France and the 
40. In Probert and Cox, p. 18, Dr H. Boog states that 'the air 
offensive had been improvised strategically and tactically 
against an air defence which had consistently been strengthened 
and refined over the preceding four years'. See also ibid, p. 97, 
where Air Chief-Marshal Sir Christopher Foxley-Norris, then, a 
fighter pilot, states that the Luftwaffe's role as a tactical air 
force was not appreciated. 'Fighter Command, by contrast had just one purpose in life, namely to defend this country', a 
factor which was 'one of the invisible assets of the R. A. F. ' 
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Low Countries. The Flak arm of the Luftwaffe was concerned to 
provide both defence of home targets and also of the Army in the 
field. Heavy casualties were caused to RAF bombers in the early 
days of the Western offensive, when attempts were made at low- 
level attacks. (41) 
In Britain, anti-aircraft defences were part of an Army Command, 
and a branch of the Royal Artillery, yet the need for a vital co- 
operation and co-ordination between them and Fighter Command had 
long been recognised. The ensuing relationship between General 
Sir Frederick Pile, G. O. C. -in-C., AA Command, and Dowding was 
both cordial and fruitful, lacking many of the elements of 
controversy which soured business between the Commander-in-Chief 
and several of his peers and superiors in the Air Ministry. In 
his Despatch, Dowding pointed out that theoretically his was the 
responsibility for guns employed in the Air Defence of Great 
Britain, but 'this was little more than a convenient fiction'. 
His work was greatly eased by Pile's 'tact, patience and 
loyalty'. (42) 
No one can deny the shortage of guns, a point later recalled by 
both Dowding and Pile in the manner used by many commanders to 
explain how their needs were ignored. However, such complaints 
41. The efficient organisation of the German anti-aircraft 
system is shown in Price, Luftwaffe Handbook, Chapter 7, $The 
Flak Arm'. 
42. AIR 8/863, p. 4546, paragraphs 47 and 48. See also Sir 
Frederick Pile, Ack-Ack (London, 1949), p. 116, quoting his own 
memo to the War Office. 'If A. A. Command were handed over to the 
Air Ministry the responsibility from top to bottom would remain 
with one Service ... and proper co-ordination would result'. 
175 
can give an impression that lack of resources led to 
ineffectiveness and this was certainly not true of AA Command at 
that time. (43) 
Pile recalled that in the Battle of Britain 'the R. A. F. played 
the predominant part', therefore it was to be expected that the 
lesser role taken by ground defences would fade from the public 
mind. Yet, he continued, without their help 'the Battle of 
Britain could not have been won by the fighter pilots, any more 
than the Battle of Alamein could have been won by the infantry 
and tanks without the gunners'. (44) 
Dowding summarised the value of anti-aircraft gunfire under four 
headings. First, it could destroy or disable enemy aircraft; 
second, bomber formations could be broken up, to the benefit of 
waiting RAF fighters; third, the accuracy of enemy bombing could 
be dislocated; and fourth, shellbursts were good indicators of 
the enemy position for patrolling fighters. (45) He might well 
have underlined the important factor that gunfire, regardless of 
accuracy, was a great boost to civilians, who felt that they were 
being defended. Considering the fears over public morale, the 
value of AA Command should not be overlooked. (46) 
43. AIR 41/15, ADGB, ii, p. 93, lists 'Holdings of heavy A. A. 
guns'. Contrast this with Pile, p. 131, showing the number of 
guns he believed necessary for defence. 
44. Pile. pp. 132-33. 
45. AIR 8/863, p. 4563, Appendix c, col. 1. 
46. Pile, p. 120. An example of the value to morale is in 
Ministry of Information, Roof over Britain (HMSO, 1943), p. 50, 
quoting a widely heard remark, 'I never slept so. peacefully in 
my life as when I heard those guns boomingi' 
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The seven AA Divisions employed were intended particularly to 
protect the aircraft industry. At the same time they were 
deployed to support the four Groups of Fighter Command and their 
success in shooting down enemy aircraft was acknowledged by 
Dowding. Whether or not the figures he gave for their success 
are accepted is immaterial; their contribution was immense and 
one which underscores the point that Britain's air defence was 
not so weak as often claimed. (47) 
A further, and often unmentioned defence was offered by Balloon 
Command. Under the leadership of Air Vice-Marshal O. T. Boyd, from 
headquarters at Stanmore, the Command controlled about 1,400 
balloons in July 1940; roughly 450 were placed to defend the 
capital. Their particular value as a deterrent to low-flying 
aircraft, especially to dive-bombers, will not appear from the 
number of enemy planes they destroyed, a negligible figure, but 
rather from the number of attacks which their very presence 
prevented. - In addition, they were a visible defence and thus a 
boost to civilian morale. (48) 
The second underestimated factor in favour of Fighter Command at 
the start of the battle was the planned efficiency of response 
to raids. Many books. note that the employment of RDF 
interception and Sector control of squadrons, together with the 
accuracy of reports from the observer Corps, came as a surprise 
to the Luftwaffe-(49) Few, however, Shave pointed out 
that 
47. AIR 8/863, pp. 4564-65, Section 7, co1s. 2 and 1, shows that 
No. 6 AA Division, with No. 11 Group, shot down 221 enemy aircraft 
between July and October 1940. These were Confirmed, Category 
1. 
48. See D. J. Smith, 'Balloon Barrages', in The Blitz: Then and 
Now, vol. 1, edited by_W. G. Ramsey (London, 1987), pp. 86-95. 
49. See above, Chapter 2, notes 99 and 100. 
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the 'Dowding System' went far to alleviate the imbalance of 
numbers between* the two sides. The British plans were worth the 
equivalent of many fighter squadrons to the RAF. (50) 
The system depended greatly on the acceptance and transfer of 
information by means of radio, telephone and telegraph. Although 
there were delays in obtaining equipment and some weaknesses 
in 
practice both before and during the battle, the pioneer work 
carried out over the previous fifteen years gave Fighter Command 
a considerable advantage over the German Air Force in 1940. This 
under-praised area of the organisation helped to give Britain 
then the world's best system of aerial defence. The Luftwaffe 
still had all the advantages of the attacker; they could choose 
the time and place to strike. However, this superiority was 
considerably offset by the speed and efficiency of the methods 
of communication available to Fighter Command. 
In essence, the system offered RAF fighters the greatest blessing 
they could have demanded - speed of response. This was of the 
highest importance to a defence unable to afford wasteful 
standing patrols; it was of particular assistance to No. 11 Group 
where there was usually very short warning of the enemy's 
approach. (51) 
50. For workings of the 'Dowding System', see AIR 8/863, 
pp. 4547-48, paragraphs 68-86, and also Wood and Dempster, chapter 
10, pp. 170-85. Also see A. Andrews, The Air Marshals (London, 
1970), pp. 107-08. Kreipe, the Chief operations officer of 
Luftflotte III later wrote, 'Radar at least doubled the efficacy 
of their own fighter force'; Richardson and Freidin, pp. 16-17. 
51. See Robinson, p. 24, who shows that 'well-established Kent 
radar stations' could give about twenty minutes warning of 
attacks. However, under the best conditions it would take that 
long for the'plot to be received and a Hurricane squadron to be 
scrambled to reach 20,000 feet. 
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consequently, a new assessment is needed of the relative strength 
of the two sides. It shows that, as so often in history, numbers 
alone were of no more extensive value than a prepared plan. The 
pilots of Fighter Command were generally well rehearsed and 
supported in their duties; those of the Luftwaffe were not. In 
Terraine's words, the British scheme was 'a delicately 
interlocking net of communications and responsibilities, 
comprising a carefully tuned instrument of war'. (52) Overy has 
pointed out that only massive German bombing attacks, carried out 
with vastly superior numbers, could have defeated 'the technical 
and organisational advantages enjoyed by the RAF. ' (53) Even 
before the main fighting began, such factors as the lack of heavy 
bombers, weaknesses in strategic leadership and deficiencies in 
controlling aircraft in action, ensured that the Luftwaffe was 
unable to match the criteria demanded for success. 
British strategy, no less than German, relied heavily on 
Intelligence reports and assessments. It is enlightening to 
explore briefly, in a manner avoided by most books about the 
Battle of Britain, what resources of knowledge of the enemy were 
open to the Air Ministry at that time. 
There was evidence available from four types of German signals 
traffic. First came high-grade cyphers, the Enigma; second were 
52. Terraine, p. 180. 
53. Overy, Air War, p. 32. 
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low grade Wireless Telegraphy (W/T) messages, usually from 
aircraft; the third consisted of low-grade R/T traffic; the last 
was more general traffic, or example navigational beacons. (54) 
The RAF's main interception station at Cheadle was well 
experienced by this stage, having listened to low-grade Luftwaffe 
W/T traffic, whose security was not strong, since 1935. The RAF 
radio intelligence service (the 'Y' service) was able to, build 
a composite picture of the strength of various Luftwaffe 
units. (55) 
However, Air Intelligence, a separate Directorate within the Air 
Ministry, (56) had from pre-war days overestimated the power of 
the German Air Force. They gave reports frankly, without the 
constraints experienced by their rivals in the Luftwaffe; yet 
although their figures and recommendations were sometimes treated 
with scepticism by some senior officers, their predictions helped 
to reinforce the Air Staff's belief that the Germans were capable 
of launching a 'knock-out blow' by means of a concentrated 
bombing campaign. This fear had also occupied Dowding's mind 
from his earliest days at Fighter Command and affected his 
prepared strategy of response. (57) 
54. See Cox, "Intelligence Analysis#, p. 6. 
55. The work of the 'Y' service is explained in A. Clayton, The 
Enemy is Listening (London, 1980). However, the work done at 
Cheadle is questioned by Edward Thomas in Probert and Cox, pp. 42- 
46, 'The Intelligence Aspect'. See also Hinsley, i, pp. 179-80. 
56. See Hinsley, i, pp. 11-12. 
57. AIR 40/2321, Summary of minutes and papers written by heads 
of German section of Directorate of Intelligence (A. I. 3) and 
Deputy Director of Department (D. D. I. 3), September 1939-December 
1940. Both Douglas and Slessor noted disbelief in some pre-war 
estimates. Wark, 'Intelligence 1933-391, HJ, 25,3 (1982), p. 648, 
suggests that British air intelligence officers 'failed to climb into the skulls of their German opponents'. 
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A crucial revision of their estimates was not made until a few 
days before the air battle opened. By the time the information 
reached Dowding, it was late for him to revise strategy, even if 
the unlikely assumption is accepted that he would have been 
prepared for last minute, radical alterations. 
During an investigation into technical matters, made from June, 
Professor Lindemann, the Prime Minister's close confidant and 
scientific adviser, had been suspicious of the Air Ministry's 
estimates of German bombing capabilities. (58) They had stated 
that the Germans could employ 2,500 bombers, delivering 4,800 
tons of bombs daily, a threatening danger to Britain's chances 
of survival. Lindemann's enquiries brought realism to the world 
of Air Intelligence's fantasy. He met Group-Captain T. Elmhirst, 
head of A13, the German section, on 5 July and received 
explanations that showed the slender hypotheses on which the 
figures were based. Having been compelled to examine their 
theories more vigorously, Air intelligence produced revisions 
which reduced the number of bombers to 1,250 and the daily load 
to 1,800 tons. (59) 
58. See Hinsley, i, p. 177. 
59. See AIR 40/2321, Minute 77, which shows that Elmhirst's 
predictions were based upon 80% of German bombers carrying a full 
load and on some making two sorties a day. He added four 
provisos. One effect of the predictions was that Dowding, on 27 
July, 'estimates that one mass raid of 3,000 machines could be 
launched against us'. Colville Diaries, p. 203. In reality, on 
10 August, according to German QMG documents, the Luftwaffe had 
a total of 2,550 of all types in action. AHB Translation, vol. 2 
No. VII/391 'The Battle of Britain', Appendix A. 
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It was little wonder that the new totals, emanating from Enigma 
interpretations, enabled the Air Staff to 'view the situation 
much more confidently than was possible a month ago'. (60) The 
great pity was that the exaggerated figures had remained, like 
a folklore, for so long. They had bolstered fears within the Air 
Ministry of the effects of Luftwaffe attacks; these, in turn, had 
affected Dowding's strategic arrangement of forces. 
Where Air Intelligence was closer to the mark was in two other 
fields which were of use to the thinking and planning of Fighter 
Command. First, there was a conviction that the Germans would 
attempt no landing before gaining air superiority, a belief that 
underlined the importance of Dowding's role. (61) The second, 
using Enigma decrypts, was the provision of good advance warning 
of the forthcoming battle. For example, a minute of 28 June 
warned that most German bombers would be refitted by 8 July and 
'the opening of the offensive on this country must be anticipated 
from 1 July onwards". (62) Such information helped the Commander- 
in-Chief plan his response. 
Nonetheless, it is vital in assessing Dowding's contribution to 
both strategy and tactics in his Command at this time to be clear 
on one issue incorrectly described in at least three books. The 
authority of the writers has magnified the error. Did Dowding 
receive direct information from Enigma? 
60. AIR 40/2321, Minute 77. See also Hinsley, i, p. 177, note 
6. This news may have prompted Churchill's letter to 
Beaverbrook, regarding the bombing of Germany. See above, 
Chapter 1, note 143. 
61. See Hinsley, i, p. 177. Also see AIR 40/2321, Minutes of 
11,14,15 and 30 May 1940. 
62. Ibid, Minute, 28 June 1940. 
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The truth is provided by Hinsley, who states, of Enigma, that 
'the deductions were of no operational value to the C-in-C, 
Fighter Command'. Later, he adds categorically that "for all his 
major decisions C-in-C, Fighter Command accordingly depended on 
his own strategic judgement, with no direct assistance from the 
Enigma'. (63) 
The fallacy, based first on Group-Captain F. Winterbotham's claim, 
was that a sound-proof cubicle was installed at Headquarters, 
Fighter Command and that Dowding received direct information from 
Enigma. According to Winterbotham, a senior-Air intelligence 
officer, both Dowding and Park were able to benefit from a 
foreknowledge of German actions. (64) The claim was supported by 
historians as eminent as Ronald Lewin(65) and John Terraine. (66) 
However, the record was set straight by Martin Gilbert, who 
showed that not until 16 October 1940 was the Commander-in-Chief 
added to the list of those who were privy to Enigma. (67) 
Wing-Commander H. Ironside, Dowding's Personal Assistant in 
October and November, cannot recollect a soundproof cubicle at 
Headquarters, Fighter Command. Although close to the C-in-C 
during day-to-day activities, he cannot remember Dowding 
receiving covert information from any source there. 
63. See Hinsley, i, p. 178. 
64. F. Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret (London, 1974), pp. 65-80. 
Even MRAF Sir John Slessor was taken in by Winterbotham's claim. 
See ibid, p. 15- 
65. R. Lewin, Ultra Goes to War (London, 1978), pp. 84-87. 
66. Terraine, pp. 178-79. 
67. Gilbert, vi, p. 849. 
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Lewin, relying on Winterbotham's fallible memory, claims that 
Dowding received advance warning from Enigma of German attacks 
on the north of England on 15 August. This was highly 
improbable. Sir Kenneth Cross, then on the staff of No. 12 Group, 
remembers that Leigh-Mallory that day was not at his 
headquarters, but visiting an aerodrome when the raids took 
place. It is difficult to believe that had Dowding received 
forewarning of those attacks he would not have advised his Group 
commander, who would then have stayed at his headquarters. 
Similarly, on 7 September Park was not at Headquarters, No. 11 
Group when the first heavy daylight raids were made on London, 
but in conference with Dowding. It is unlikely that, had they 
known the Luftwaffe's intentions, the meeting would have been 
held. Edward Thomas suggests that Winterbotham's fabrications 
stemmed from lack of access to papers, his poor memory when 
writing - the was over 70 years old' - and the fact that 'he made 
up a good deal'. (68) 
Therefore the importance of Air Intelligence's exaggerated 
predictions of German capabilities must be borne in mind when 
assessing Dowding's deployment of forces. Their effect on his 
caution as a 'counter-puncher' may then be recognised. This led 
to a conservation of resources destined to bring No. 11 Group 
under extreme pressure by late August. 
*** 
68. Ironside interview, 27 August 1989; Lewin, pp. 84-87; Cross 
interview, 25 September 1989; Probert and Cox, p. 64; Hinsley, i, 
pp. 178-79; P. Calvocoressi, Top Secret Ultra (London, 1980), 
pp. 71-72. 
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PART THREE: TACTICS IN BATTLE 
At the start of the Battle of Britain German tactics of fighter 
warfare were superior to those of the RAF. This point has been 
made by a number of Luftwaffe pilots and by many who served in 
Fighter Command. (69) As the responsibility for tactical 
preparation of airmen lay with the Air ministry, and particularly 
with Dowding,. it is revealing to examine the steps taken to 
provide pilots with the best advice. 
The tactics used by Fighter Command were written in its bible of 
warfare, the Training Manual. The lines for engaging in combat 
were laid down, yet some pilots found difficulty in allowing for 
rapid changes to the design and performance of machines during 
the later 1930s. This is not surprising. They had learned to 
fly on biplanes whose performance was inferior to those of the 
Hurricanes and Spitfires introduced just before the opening of 
war. Their conception of air tactics came from aircraft which 
took longer to climb and reach the enemy and then carried smaller 
fire-power when engaging. (70) Having no actual experience in 
action, unless they had taken part, for example, in operations 
against tribesmen in distant parts of the Empire, their approach 
was a parade-ground exercise, unrelated to the reality shortly 
awaiting them. 
As an example, the Royal Air Force Training Manual of 1933 set 
out a series of principles to which no aspiring pilot could take 
69. See above, Chapter 2, notes 38-40. 
70. See above, Chapter 1, note 57. 
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exception. Air superiority is gained 'by the pursuit of a policy 
of relentless and incessant offensive against the enemy's air 
forces in the air and on the ground', and, 'the importance of 
accurate marksmanship cannot be over-estimated'. Again, 
'Altitude confers a tactical advantage upon the attacker', and 
'an attack should be delivered with caution, but once attempted 
should be driven home with resolute determination to destroy the 
enemy'. (71) 
However, these instructions were provided for men whose aircraft 
were in design and performance little more than updated versions 
of First World War biplanes. The Demon, a two-seater version of 
the Hart bomber, went into service in April 1933. At a ceiling 
of 15,000 feet its maximum speed was 181 m. p. h., with an armament 
of three machine-guns. The Gladiator, best of the pre-war 
biplanes, which came to the RAF as late as 1937, by which time 
it was already obsolescent, could manage 250 m. p. h. and carried 
four machine-guns. (72) 
on such machines, the drill of flying close 'Vic-three' formation 
was an immutable law, with the two wing pilots giving undivided 
attention to holding their correct position in relation to the 
leader. Many airmen complained that such practice equipped them 
well for. the annual Hendon Air Display, while giving no 
conception of the tactics required in modern war. The writers 
71. Air Ministry, Royal Air Force Training Manual, Part II, 
Applied Flying, Air Publication 928 (February, 1933), notes 
2,25,85 and 104. For a visual presentation of the attacks, see 
R. T. Bickers, The Battle of Britain (; London, 1990), pp. 97-102. 
72. Gunston, pp. 51-63, gives an account of the development from 
biplane to monoplane fighters in all major air forces during the 
1930's. 
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of the Instructions, themselves without experience of air combat 
in fast monoplanes, were at a loss when the accepted wisdom of 
the Training Manual had to be updated. (73) 
There was little time before the outbreak of war either for 
tutors to compile a manual based on practical knowledge of the 
capabilities of the new monoplane fighters, or for squadrons to 
practise the suggested tactics, or even to evolve their own. The 
first Hurricane flight did not take place until 6 November 1935 
and these aircraft did not come into squadron service until 
December 1937. The Spitfire's introduction was even later. Its 
test flight was on 5 March 1936 and No. 19 Squadron received the 
first aircraft in August 1938. (74) 
The section on 'Air Fighting Tactics' in the 1938 Manual made 
several suggestions unproven by experience. 'Manoeuvre at high 
speeds in air fighting is not now practicable, because the effect 
of gravity on the human body during rapid changes of direction 
at high speed causes a temporary loss of consciousness'. The 
instruction stipulated that 'single-seater fighter attacks at 
high speed must be confined to a variety of attacks from the 
general direction of astern'. 
73. Allen, Who Won?, p. 72, points out that 'the Trooping of the 
Colour on Horse Guards Parade has little enough to do with the 
formations adopted by the Grenadier Guards in fighting such 
actions as the Battle of the Falaise Gap. Similarly, the 
formations adopted by the fighters over the Hendon aerodrome had 
nothing whatsoever to do with the tactical formations which 
should have been employed in action'.. 
74. See J. Quill, Spitfire (London, 1985), p. 122. 'On 4 August 
1938 ... I flew it [K9789] toDuxford and handed it over to 
Squadron-Leader H. I. Cozens, Co of19. (Fighter) Squadron. The two 
Duxford squadrons, 19 and... 66 then equipped, with. Gauntlets, were 
to become the first two, Spitfire squadrons'... 
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To carry out the suggested attacks, sections of three fighters 
were expected to maintain a 'vic' formation and, at the command 
of a leader, fly into action. As an example, Attack No-1 was 
planned for the interception of a single bomber by three 
fighters; Attack No. 2 presumed that an enemy bomber formation was 
intercepted by two sections of fighters. Both attacks, coming 
from dead astern, with no-deflection shots, were adequate for 
dealing with unescorted bombers; they were poor preparation for 
the reality of August 1940 when combat involved tackling enemy 
fighters protecting bombers in an aerial screen. (75) 
A further point lacking general recognition in subsequent 
controversies over leadership is that throughout the French 
campaign and over the following month, efforts were made by 
Headquarters, Fighter Command, to learn some lessons about 
tactics and to disseminate information received. Some was of 
great practical value and demonstrates that attempts were made 
to formulate the best methods of attack and defence. Dowding and 
park showed, in certain directions, more initiative than some of 
their adversaries later gave them credit for. What was 
disappointing was that some recommendations were not advocated 
strongly to squadrons. 
For example, a signal sent from Headquarters, Fighter Command to 
all Groups on 19 May advised 'Following hints received from a 
squadron just returned from France. Begins (1) Avoid close 
formation on way to rendez-vous or objective. (2) Aircraft in 
75. See Air Publication 928, Chapter 8, and AIR 16/74, Fighter 
Command attacks, 1938. Deere, p. 34, summarised a general belief. 
'These attacks provided wonderful training for formation drill 
but were worthless when related to effective shooting'. Spick, 
pp. 46-51, assesses the Attacks, of which there were five. 
Is 
formation or singly never fly straight but keep turning in order 
to watch behind and above. (3) If possible do not attack without 
above guard'. (76) 
Signals sent to Group Headquarters two days later advised that 
Wing-Commander Vasse would visit No. 11 Group stations and Wing- 
Commander Broadhurst those of Nos. 12 and 13 Groups 'within the 
next three days to discuss Fighter tactics with Sector and 
Squadron commanders based on experience to date of German 
methods'. (77) 
Responses to Vasse's visits are enlightening. Although they 
refer to combat over France at that time, basic principles of air 
tactics were raised, which would come up again when battles were 
being fought in British skies. On 25 May, Group-Captain 
Carnegie, G/C, Ops. 1 at Headquarters, Fighter Command, wrote a 
Minute for the Senior Air Staff Officer (SASO), who then passed 
it to Dowding. Carnegie reported 'the unanimous opinion that 
larger formations are essential' and recorded that War Tactics, 
at the Air ministry, had approached him on the matter. It was 
better 'to go over in large numbers less frequently than in small 
numbers more often', which would damage German morale and shoot 
down more bombers. He asked for comments and re-iterated 'the 
emphasis which was placed on the necessity for larger 
formations'. At the side, Dowding wrote 'Agree'. He well 
76. AIR 16/281, Fighter Tactics, part 1,; Febrüary-November 1940, 
Enclosure 14A, 19 May 1940. 
77. Ibid, Enclosures 17 and 18A, 21 May 1940. 
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realised the value of using Wings of fighters, when the 
circumstances were right, an opinion held by many pilots, as well 
as by officers in the Air Ministry. (78) 
Dowding's desire to spread information is shown by his 
handwritten note, translated into a Signal from Headquarters, to 
all Groups on 3 June. 'Three Groups. I want all pilots who have 
constructive ideas as to tactical methods arising out of recent 
fighting to have an opportunity of submitting them. Groups 
should filter the suggestions and send on the most promising for 
consideration at Command H. Q. '(79) 
In June, Fighter Command Tactical Memorandum No. 8 was issued. 
It was important as an attempt to provide guidance for squadrons 
now that German bombers could fly over parts of Britain with 
fighter escorts, a new dimension for RAF pilots, whose training 
was for specific attacks on unescorted bombers. The document 
started optimistically, claiming that 'under conditions of Home 
Defence, where a highly organized system exists, the task of our 
Air Force should be simplified'. This reinforced belief in the 
Dowding System, carefully prepared, calling for a disciplined 
riposte to attacks, a response made strictly under orders. 
78. Ibid, minute 28, G/C Ops. 1 to SASO, 25 May 1940. See also 
Beaverbrook Papers, BBK D/330, note from Harold Balfour, Under- 
Secretary of State for Air, to Beaverbrook, 29 May 1940. Balfour 
visited No. 601 Squadron on their return from France and reported 
their view that they could tackle anything if they had sufficient 
numbers. 'Pilots feel it unfair that they should have to go out 
in, say, a dozen, when they are liable to meet forty or fifty 
enemy fighters'. With anything approaching equality, however, 
they were confident of success. The report reveals Balfour's 
interest in tactics. Later, within the Air Ministry and, it must 
be suspected, through political pressure, he supported the 
protagonists of Big Wings and helped remove Dowding. See below, 
Chapter 7. 
79. AIR 16/281, Enclosure 43A, H. Q., Fighter Command, to H. Q., 
all Groups, 3 June 1940. 
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Under THE AIM, the Memorandum stated that Britain's ability to 
continue the war depended on the success of fighters in 
protecting 'vital centres, and especially those concerned with 
aircraft and food production'. Dowding crossed out those last 
two words. Then came his main aim. 'It must, therefore, be 
constantly borne in mind that our aim is THE DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY 
BOMBERS, and that action against fighters is only a means towards 
this end'. 
Further details laid down conditions of attack. Fighters should 
patrol higher than enemy planes and an upper squadron should draw 
off escorts while a' lower unit attacked the bombers. In 
protecting aerodromes it might be necessary not to engage enemy 
fighters 'who are in the nature of a decoy', but wait for the 
following bombers. 
The 'Summary' contained eight points, seven of which were 
excellent practical advice, such as keeping a constant watch 
behind, and conserving ammunition. The final point contained the 
overall policy. 'Always remember that your objective is the 
ENEMY BOMBER'. (80) 
Memorandum No. 8 was a useful document, within the limitations of 
the contemporary experience, laying down principles which 
enforced Fighter command's planning, and was not revised until 
November. However, it quoted ideal circumstances and when the 
battle developed, these did not-always obtain, as, for example, 
when Luftwaffe fighters flew close by their bombers. Some pilots 
then had to devise their, own tactics. 
80. Ibid, Document` 25A, 'Tactical Memorandum No. 8 - Air Fighting: Fighters v. Escorted Bombers', June 1940. 
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Throughout June and July, Dowding was determined that 
instructions passed on to squadrons should come only from his 
Headquarters. Carnegie was worried that each Group would produce 
its own paper on tactics and minuted that No. 11 Group had issued 
their own addition to 'Tactical Memorandum No. 8'. 'As this was 
mainly a matter of repetition, Units of course are liable to look 
upon all such Memoranda as just so much more paper and 
accordingly it is possible that they are not read'. (81) ' 
On 24 June Dowding minuted, 'S. A. S. O. Yes. Send copy to Air 
Ministry: and try to stop this Hints and Tips from going out 
except through us. D. '. (82) Two days after, a firm note to all 
four Groups stated that 'These Headquarters will, therefore, 
assume responsibility for issuing Tactical Memoranda as and when 
required'. They would consolidate reports sent in from Groups, 
who were ordered to 'refrain from issuing tactical instructions 
direct to Units'. (83) 
Dowding here appeared to be showing firm leadership in his 
Command, ensuring that a pattern was laid down for all to follow. 
However, the order may be seen as too rigid a centralisation of 
control, taking freedom from the commanders of Groups by whom, 
under Dowding's planning, the battle was directly fought. 
This point was made by Air Marshal Sir Kenneth Porter, then 
Deputy-Chief Signals officer (DCSO) at Headquarters, No 11 Group 
81. Ibid, Minute 60, G/C Ops. 1 to SASO, 24 June 1940. 
82. Ibid, Minuteý62, Dowding to'SASO, '24 June 1940; 
83. Ibid, Enclosure 64A, H. Q., Fighter Command to Nos. 10,11, 
12 and 13 Groups, 26 June 1940. 
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and is a matter that goes straight to the heart of the 
controversy over Dowding's leadership and tactics during the 
battle. In his view, the C-in-C at Stanmore did not influence 
the battle because he had no tactical command. Information was 
passed to him but he was in no position to use it. He watched 
while it was passed forward to his Group commanders, who bore the 
immediate responsibility for tackling the enemy. (84) 
It is important to note the date and content of the replies to 
the Memorandum of 3 June received from the three Groups involved, 
allowing for the fact that intensive German air activity built 
up from early July. 
The first response came from AVM R. Saul, AOC, No. 13 Group, on 7 
July. He passed on the recommendation from two sources that 
squadrons should be organised into three sections, each of four 
aircraft, rather than the RAF's traditional pattern of four 
sections of three. 'When this formation was adopted', he 
continued, 'it was found that these sections of four aircraft 
could split into pairs (Nos. 1 and 3, and Nos. 2 and 4) for 
attack against isolated bombers or fighters. In several combats 
against enemy fighters the second aircraft of the pair was 
instrumental in shooting down Messerschmitt 109s, which were on 
the tails of the first aircraft'. No finer advice could have 
been offered to the pilots of Fighter Command. In essence, the 
84. Interview, Air Marshal Sir Kenneth Porter, Bristol, 19 
August 1991. 
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Luftwaffe system of the Rotte (pair) was being advocated, with 
a wingman guarding the leader's tail. (85) 
Dowding, nonetheless, was slow to use the suggestion. In his 
Despatch, he stated that the 'organisation should allow for a 
break up into pairs, in which one pilot looks after the tail of 
his companion'. Yet this crucial point was never pressed 
strongly to squadrons. 'It was of course undesirable to make any 
sweeping change during the Battle', he wrote guardedly, although 
the change would have saved many lives. Writing of the 
suggestion that squadrons might have been split into two Flights 
of eight aircraft, each comprising two Sections of four, he 
commented unimaginatively, 'This latter suggestion would upset 
standard arrangements for accommodation'. (86) 
The value of the advice offered depended on the shrewdness of the 
squadron-leaders receiving it. Some changed tactical formation 
quickly, but others stuck to the traditional 'Vic-3' throughout 
the battle; the difference between those squadrons was, 
unfortunately, all too often reflected in their casualty rate. 
For example, Group-Captain H. Darley, then O. C. No. 609 Squadron, 
was a resilient leader who altered tactics. He introduced four 
Sections of three, all in line astern, with the fourth Section 
above and behind, preferably up-sun and a thousand feet above. 
As a pre-war instructor he believed that squadron discipline 
85. , AIR 16/281, Enclosure 68A, H. Q., No. 13 Group to H. Q., 
Fighter Command, 7 July 1940. See also N. Franks, The Air Battle 
of Dunkirk (London, 1983), p. 121, where the views of Squadron- 
Leader J. M. Thompson (No. 111 Squadron) are recorded. 
86. AIR 8/863, p. 4558, paragraph 220. 
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was essential; a collective force had to fight collectively. By 
early October his squadron's results vindicated his tactics and 
his men stayed in the front-line throughout the battle. (87) 
This should be compared with the experience of Pilot-Officer 
J. E. Storrar of No. 145 Squadron. 'We kept by the book, in Vics, 
right through Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain and in August, 
145 Squadron was virtually destroyed and had to be reformed at 
Drem'. (88) 
Park's reply to the Memorandum was sent on 12 July, making the 
same point of re-arranging formations and naming the squadrons 
from which the idea emanated. Both No. 54 and No. 74 Squadrons had 
suggested the use of six pairs which, in a dog-fight, could 
'operate as one offensive and one defensive aircraft'. (89) 
As no response had come from No. 12 Group by 17 July, 
Headquarters, Fighter Command sent an enquiry. The reason why 
Leigh-Mallory had failed to answer earlier is unclear, but a 
reply was sent on the following day. 'Your A. 394 of 17 July; 
suggestions will be forwarded by 23 July'. (90) 
87. Darley interviews, 14 March and 8 April 1991. 
88. Franks, p. 120. 
89. AIR 16/281, Enclosure 73A, H. Q., No. 11 Group to H. Q., 
Fighter Command, 12 July 1940. 
90. Ibid, Enclosure 76A, H. Q., Fighter Command to I!. Q., No. 12 
Group, 17 July 1940, and reply, 18 July 1940. 
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Their response arrived on 25 July and is remarkable in view of 
No. 12 Group's later advocacy of Big Wings. For example, the 
opinion of the O. C., No. 264 Squadron was enclosed, strongly 
opposing those formations. 'It is improbable that any three 
squadrons would be able to take off, form up and set off on a 
course in under twelve minutes. In which time an enemy formation 
would have covered 40 miles'. The slow speeds of the formation 
would give the enemy time to reach a target before being engaged. 
If new raids appeared, the Controller would have to split up the 
Wing to counter them. 'However good the ground direction and R/T 
may be I do not feel that such methods would give the best 
results'. (91) 
Another note, enclosed with No. 12 Group's reports, was a paper, 
'Single Seater Fighter Tactics t, submitted by the O. C., No. 19 
Squadron, Duxford on 22 June. He was a further convert to the 
use of pairs in combat. The pilots should maintain line astern, 
which had proved to be successful, and 'in point of fact, two 
pilots who adhered to this system throughout the patrols met with 
considerable success and were themselves unscathed'. (92) 
It is noteworthy that, at this stage, No. 12 Group were making no 
strong recommendations on the advisability of employing Wings of 
at least three squadrons to meet German attacks. However, over 
the following month, as German raids grew in intensity and the 
91. Ibid, Enclosure 88A, H. Q., No. 12 Group to H. Q., Fighter 
Command, 25 July 1940. 
92. Ibid. 
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pilots of No. 11 Group came under increasing strain, those on the 
fringes of battle examined the role of squadrons stationed in 
other Groups. 
One of the greatest ironies of the later controversy over the 
tactical use of fighters is that no commander at that time was 
more experienced in their employment than Air Vice-Marshal 
K. Park. A particular gain made by the RAF during the French 
Campaign was the opportunity of command in action presented to 
him. Through controlling squadrons under battle conditions he 
learned lessons that served him well over subsequent months. It 
has not been generally acknowledged or admitted that he 
appreciated the value of employing Wings of fighters when 
circumstances were considered appropriate. Indeed, that was his 
policy during the later stages of the Dunkirk evacuation. 
on 8 July he wrote No. 11 Group's report on action that had 
occurred during the French Campaign. A fortnight later, Dowding 
sent the report, with his own comments, to the Under-Secretary 
of State for Air. He wrote, 'The report is of interest, although 
I cannot endorse all the opinions expressed". (93) 
In paragraph 22, Park explained how his squadrons had been 
organised. While they were operating from bases in France, he 
pointed out, and were on escort duty or flying patrols, they 
93. The report, including Dowding's comments, is in AIR 2/7281, 
Fighter Command tactics against German'Nass Formations, 1940, 
Enclosure 12A, Dowding to Under-Secretary, of State for Air, 22 
July 1940. 
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'were employed singly or by flights'. Nonetheless, at the next 
stage, when the Allied armies were in retreat, the tactics of 
No. 11 Group were changed. 'At first squadrons were employed 
singly, but as soon as it was learned that the enemy was 
operating in large formations, pairs of squadrons were employed 
with good effect'. 
Park then underlined the dilemma of this policy, because'cover 
could not be maintained continuously over the Allied armies. 'It 
seriously reduced the number of hours that our fighters could be 
on patrol'. 
In the following paragraph he claimed that, at the start of the 
Dunkirk evacuation, 'the Air Ministry ordered continuous weak 
fighter patrols throughout the 18 hours of daylight', a comment 
beside which Dowding pencilled a cross on his copy of the report. 
Park added, 'As forecast, this resulted in our squadrons 
suffering heavy casualties for small casualties in combat'. He 
went on to express clearly the merits of Big Wings, when used 
under favourable circumstances. After representations had been 
made to what he termed 'Higher Authority', (94) 'the Group was 
permitted to employ offensive fighter patrols at 2-squadron 
strength, leaving a few hours of daylight in which there wore no 
patrols on the line'. Dowding made-a pencil mark in the margin 
by the last point. The report continued, 'This resulted in less 
casualties to our fighters, and a marked increase in the number 
94. 'Higher Authority" probably refers to Dowding. Orange, 
p. 87, notes, 'It was only after urgent and repeated requests that 
Park secured Dowding's permission to employ squadrons two at a 
time and abandon attempts at continuous coverage $. Nevertheless, 
Hough and Richards, p. 93, give the credit for using larger 
formations to the Air Staff, who suggested the idea to Dowding. 
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of successes in combat. When the enemy formations were from 
thirty to sixty bombers, closely escorted by formations of 
fifteen to thirty fighters, permission was obtained to employ 
offensive sweeps of four squadrons working in two pairs. 
Whenever possible, the upper pair of squadrons consisted of 
Spitfires and the lower pair of either Hurricanes, or Hurricanes 
and Defiants'. The paragraph finished by explaining that this 
policy led to more Luftwaffe, and fewer RAF aircraft, being shot 
down. (95) 
Under the heading 'Tactics of our Fighters', Park criticised the 
lack of pre-war training for Fighter Command in seven important 
items. In order, he listed them as fighter v. fighter tactics; 
fighting in squadron or Wing formations; fighting escorted 
bombers; fighting at high altitude; deflection shooting; firing 
of ball ammunition at ground and air targets; shooting in short 
bursts. Beside the fourth, fifth and sixth of those items 
Dowding pencilled in question marks, either because he did not 
comprehend the point, or, more likely, that he disagreed with 
Park's criticism. (96) 
95. Robinson, p. 68, mentions fighters from Nos. 41,19,222 and 
616 Squadrons flying together $in Wing strength' between 28 May 
and 4 June. Franks, p. 17, quoted a pilot of No. 17 Squadron. 
'The German Air Force were now employing large numbers of 
aircraft together and, therefore, the AOC No. 11 Group countered 
likewise. This rather dispels the myth that No. 12 Group was the 
first to join squadrons together'. See also AIR 27/252, 
Operations Record Book (ORB), No. 19 Squadron and AIR 27/424, ORB, 
No. 41 Squadron. 
96. However much Park criticised the training of pro-war 
squadrons and however well Dowding tried to avoid the criticism, 
the fact remains that this was a duty of Fighter Command for 
which they both had a special responsibility. 
z, 4 ýýý- 
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But the Commander-in-Chief marked each side of paragraph 46 in 
a double line of blue crayon, his standard procedure for 
reinforcing a strongly held belief. In this case he was probably 
applauding Park's blunt tilt at Dowding's own old adversaries on 
the Air Staff. 'The Air Ministry throughout the operations 
failed to appreciate the difficulties of operating large numbers 
of squadrons from forward aerodromes, resulting in frequent 
hasteners for patrol reports and advance combat reports', wrote 
Park in a style guaranteed to gain no friends on the Air Staff. 
'This continual flow of enquiries from Higher Authority was a 
great embarrassment throughout the operations and at times so 
blocked the landlines that urgent operations orders were 
seriously delayed between the Group Headquarters and Squadrons 
at forward aerodromes'. 
In the light of what was to follow, from late August, Park's 
report is an instructive document. He was the only senior 
commander involved to have real experience of using Big Wings in 
action. He, not Dowding, had immediate control of the tactical 
employment of the fighter force. Of the two main disciples of 
Big Wings, Douglas was at the Air Ministry, an interested and 
involved observer, but without direct command. Leigh-Mallory, 
even when the Duxford Wing flew in September, never controlled 
them to a set pattern over an area for which he had 
responsibility. From the point of view of practice, as opposed 
to theory, no one had a more legitimate right than Park to 
express opinions on the matter. 
In addition, a far-reaching consequence of the French Campaign 
for both Park and Dowding, and one that affected greatly their 
subsequent attitudes, especially the efficacy of employing Big 
Zoo 
Wings, was an appreciation of the threat posed by Fighter 
Command's losses on the other side of the Channel. To ensure the 
safety of the Home Base, neither man believed that he could 
afford profligacy with such a limited resource as the RAF's 
fighters. In their view, one ill-chosen foray over the homeland 
with fighters flying en masse could have incurred disastrous 
casualties at the level that the Germans were seeking to inflict. 




PART FOUR: LUFTWAFFE ATTACKS AND FIGHTER COMMAND'S RESPONSE 
Authorities differ over the particular dates of the various 
phases of the Battle of Britain. Nevertheless, there is a 
general broad concurrence on both sides of the main 
developments. (97) 
It is not the purpose of this study to make a detailed 
chronological examination of the events of the battle, but rather 
to explore some of the pressures, both technical and political, 
which affected commanders and pilots, bringing changes to the 
leadership, strategy and tactics employed. 
Nonetheless, the usual selection of 10 July as the opening day 
is capricious. It does less than justice to those airmen 
involved in action after the fall of France, yet before that day, 
who were shot down, killed or wounded, and thus regarded in some 
quarters as not having taken part. (98) Probably the view held 
by some German writers that the battle was an indivisible part 
of the general Western Campaign is a more accurate 
assessment. (99) Secondly, for the end of this opening phase the 
date of 18 August has been chosen, the reason being that on that 
97. Wood and Dempster give five phases; Hough and Richards give 
four; Robinson offers four; Galland, AHB Translation, vol. 9, 
VII/121, divides the battle into six stages; Dowding, AIR 8/863, 
chooses four. 
98. One example of many was the late Air Vice-Marshal G. Lott, 
O. C., No. 43 Squadron. After actions from the outbreak of war to 
Dunkirk, Lott was shot down on 9 July. II tangled with a 
Messerschmitt 110 as a result of which I subsequently lost my 
right eye'. He was not entitled'to the Battle of Britain clasp. 
Letter, AVM G. Lott, 8 August 1989. 
99. See, for example, {Kesselring-Hemoirs, Chapter 11. 
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day the Luftwaffe made an extensive effort to destroy what was 
believed, from its Intelligence reports, to be the small residue 
of fighters left in the RAF. The resulting aerial fighting led 
to heavier combined losses than those suffered by the Luftwaffe 
and the RAF on any other day of the battle. The Germans 
discovered that Fighter Command was stronger than they had been 
led to believe and at a conference called next day by Goering, 
commanders were told of a change in both strategy and tactics 
which, in the long run, was to help Fighter Command. (100) 
Additionally, the events of that day and the results of the 
conference led to a growth of the uneasy relationship between 
Nos. ll and 12 Groups, Fighter Command. Attitudes were sharpened 
in the Big Wing Controversy. 
From the end of the French Campaign the German Air Force held, 
as its first and main strategic aim, the destruction of the RAF 
and especially of British fighters. They intended to do this 
basically over southern England. 'First of all success is to be 
achieved in the target areas of Luftflotten 2 and 3', Goering 
ordered at a conference on 21 July. 'Only a complete victory 
over the R. A. F. in southern England can give us the possibility 
of further attacks on enemy forces stationed in the depth of the 
country'. (101) 
100. See Irving, Rise and Fall, pp. 100-01, quoting Milch 
Documents: 65, pp. 7251ff, Imperial War Museum. See also Collier 
Collection, Document 51, Goering conference, 19 August 1940. 
101. Collier Collection, Document 51, Goering conference, 21 
July 1940. See also U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, APO, 
Interview No. 61, Collier collection, Interview with Kesselring, 
20 June 1945. Questioned about the battle, Kesselring gave these 
objectives. 'In the first place, the enemy air force. Secondly, 
seaports, thirdly, the enemy war production, and in the fourth 
place the attacks on London, which had hostile vital installations as targets#. 
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Therefore, the first raids were made against channel shipping. 
Werner Kreipe, who took part in several of these attacks, 
recollected the Luftwaffe's double task. Hand in hand with the 
destruction of the RAF was to go 'the interdiction of the Channel 
to merchant shipping', which, he claimed, the British were still 
sending 'with characteristic imperturbability, '. (102) In this way 
the Germans hoped to clear the Straits of all British ships, both 
naval and merchant, to control the crossing area for their own 
forces, when the time came. 
The bombing of coastal shipping, and its protection, became, on 
the British side, a matter of understandable controversy, because 
of the commitment demanded from Fighter Command. On average, 
twelve convoys needed escorts every day and roughly one third of 
these received attacks. Consequently, great demand was placed, 
especially on No. 11 Group, at a time when they were facing 'the 
bulk of the German Air Force'. (103) 
The employment of convoys to carry supplies in the general area 
stretching from the Suffolk coast to Lyme Bay undid the value of 
using the sea as a protective screen for Britain. At that time 
far more goods could have been transported by railway, which 
102. W. Kreipe, in Richardson and Freidin, pp. 11-12. 
103. AIR 41/15 ADGB, ii, p. 78. Ibid, p. 71, points out that 
fighting conditions 'were nearly all unfavourable to the 
defenders'. 
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would have been better protected by fighters. Nearly all action 
over the Channel placed the defenders at a disadvantage, because 
RDF could give little advance warning of raids. (104) 
At a conference on 3 July Dowding asked for convoys to be 
redirected round the north of Scotland. He realised that not all 
could be adequately protected, yet on the 29th, after heavy 
German raids on Dover and the Straits, the Air Ministry 
instructed him to counter the enemy 'with superior forces and 
large formations'. (105) The shipping employed suffered regular 
losses, but by 9 August Churchill still wanted them as 'bait'. 
This led, however, to greater losses than Fighter Command should 
have been asked to bear. (106) This early phase receives scant 
attention in some accounts of the battle, (107) yet several 
deductions of its importance may be drawn. For both sides there 
were gains and losses. 
104. Ibid, p. 71. See also W. P. Crozier, off the Record, 
political Interviews, 1933-1943, edited by A. J. P. Taylor (London, 
1973), p. 182, Interview with A. V. Alexander of the Admiralty, 
10.30 p. m., 26 July 1940. 'It might be extremely difficult to 
carry on such traffic in the face of combined m. t. b. and 
aeroplane attack, and his view was that it ought to be stopped 
and the goods sent by rail. "I've begged, " he said, "that this 
should be done but so far without success. "" Nevertheless, 
C. I. Savage, Inland Transport (HMSO, 1957), pp. 214-21, shows the 
difficulties which would have resulted from transferring freight 
from coastal traffic to the railways. 
105. See AIR 41/15, ADGB, ii, pp. 71-72, quoting Fighter Command 
operations Record Book, 29 July 1940. 
106. By 9 August Churchill recognised that 'the surviving bait 
are getting a little fed up'. Colville Diaries, 9 August 1940. 
See Gilbert, vi, p. 718. 
107. Collier, Leader of the Few, Chapter 20, and Wright, Chapter 
10, give little detail or assessment. 
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The German effort at that time was undoubtedly hampered by cloudy 
weather, (108) yet a heavier burden for them was the indecision 
shown by their leaders. Not until 1 August did Hitler announce, 
in Directive No. 17, that he intended 'the final conquest of 
England' and that the RAF was to be defeated 'in the shortest 
possible time'. He ordered the Services to be ready to launch 
the invasion on 15 September. (109) Also hampering the Luftwaffe 
campaign was the slowness of Goering's plans. He did not issue 
the final directive of the operations Staff for Adlerangriff 
until 2 August. Its aim was to destroy the RAF in the same way 
that the Polish and French air forces had been removed. (110) 
In air fighting, German tactics proved to be superior. Not only 
did RAF fighters flying out to protect convoys often find the 
enemy at greater height and in larger numbers, but also the 
employment of the vic-formation and Fighter Command Attacks led 
to considerable casualties. (111) The Germans also discovered 
that the Me. 109, especially flown by an experienced pilot was a 
most competent fighter. (112) They proved finally the superiority 
108. From 10-31 July, the Channel weather was shown as 'Fine' 
on four days only - 25,28,29 and 31 July. See Hough and 
Richards, pp. 357-58; see also Wood and Dempster, pp. 239-56; see 
also AIR 41/15, ADGB, ii, p. 36. 
109. See Trevor-Roper, pp. 37-38. 
110. AHB Translation, vol. 2, No. VII/26, 'The Course of the Air 
War against England' , prepared by the 8th Abteilung, 7 July 1944. 
111. For a retrospective and highly critical revue of tactics, 
offered by six RAF pilots, see N. Gelb, Scramble (London, 1986), 
pp. 88-90. 
112. See A. Price, The Hardest Day (London, 1979), p. 23. Oblt. 
G. Schoepfel of JG 26 wrote, 'It was superior to the Hurricane 
and, above 6000 metres, faster than the Spitfire also ... our armament was the better, it was located more centrally, which 
made for more accurate shooting'. 
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of single-seater fighters over other types by taking heavy toll 
of the RAF's Defiants, especially on 19 July, when these machines 
were encountered in action near Folkestone and six were destroyed 
in a single battle. (113) 
Several results surprised the Luftwaffe and counted to their 
disadvantage. The quality of Spitfires and Hurricanes, flown by 
spirited pilots, reinforced the opinions formed of these fighters 
during the battle in France. Far from reassuring was the proof 
gained over the Channel that the Me. 110 and the Ju. 87 were 
extremely vulnerable in combat and would be able to play a 
smaller part in the fighting over Britain than had been 
anticipated. (114) 
Probably the greatest surprise for the Luftwaffe was the 
discovery that British aircraft were being controlled by a 
sophisticated system of communication, enabling fighters to be 
directed to targets. The RAF during this period were able to 
'work some bugs out of their radar systems' (115) and learn about 
113. Ramsey, Battle of Britain, pp. 326-27, gives six Defiants 
lost and one damaged. AIR 41/15, ADGB, ii, p. 62, apportions some 
blame to the Controller. In AIR 8/863, p. 4553, paragraph 154, 
Dowding comments on the Defiant's weaknesses. His reservations 
were also shown before the war. See AIR 2/2964,1938-39, 
Employment of two-seater and single-seater fighters in Home 
Defence, Dowding to Douglas (ACAS), 25 June 1938. 
114. For Ju. 87s in action, see AIR 50/22, No. 56 Squadron Combat 
Reports, 13 July 1940. Also see Collier Collection, Document 56, 
'Actions of VIII Fliegerkorps from 4 July 1940'. See also 
Galland, First and Last, pp. 71-73. For weaknesses of the Me. 110, 
see Townsend, Duel of Eagles, p. 297 and AIR 50/32, No. 74 Squadron 
Combat Reports, quoted in Robinson, pp. 146-47. 
115. Murray, p. 50. 
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Luftwaffe tactics, showing that German strategy was at fault. 
However, fighting over the Channel was not unexpected, as the 
general plan of attack on Britain had not been formulated in 
July, yet the Luftwaffe had to show itself capable of action. 
The surprising effect of British RDF on the Luftwaffe High 
Command was recollected by Galland, who flew Me. 109s during the 
early sorties. (116) The unpreparedness demonstrates the 
weaknesses of the Luftwaffe Intelligence services, previously 
mentioned. (117) As late as 7 August, 'Beppo' Schmid expressed 
the view that Fighter Command aircraft were 'tied to their 
respective ground stations and are thereby restricted in 
mobility'. (118) Consequently he believed that a mass attack on 
a target by German bombers would meet only 'light fighter 
opposition' and that there would be 'considerable confusion in 
the defensive networks'. (119) 
The slow start to preparations for a possible invasion, stemming 
particularly from Hitler's disinclination and lack of drive, made 
matters more difficult for the Luftwaffe, who were virtually the 
sole contributors to action from the German side. (120) Apart 
116. See AHB Translation, vol. 2, VII/121, pp. 13-14. In 
comparison, the Luftwaffe was unable to track British fighters. 
They lacked systems of ground control and efficient radio 
communication between bombers and fighters. 
117. See above, Chapter 2, notes 99 and 100. 
118. Pamphlet No. 248, p. 80. 
119. Ibid. 
120. Liddell Hart, German Generals Talk, p. 145, commented on the 
hesitancy of Hitler's Directive No. 16 of 16 July. 'The order, 
however, sounded very "iffy'11- Boog, in Probert and Cox, p. 18, 
gives the opening day of 'the battle for air superiority over 
England' as 13 August, showing further the pressure of time on 
the Luftwaffe's activities. 
los 
from other considerations, the number of days suitable for 
landings in Britain was limited, by such ungovernable factors as 
the weather and by the more predictable one of tides. As 
detailed plans for an offensive against the mainland were not 
laid before the end of the month, the possible dates for July 
were lost. The ideal form of invasion, by a combined operation 
of land, sea and air forces was limited to seven 'best days' in 
August, or fewer in September, by which time adverse conditions 
could be expected. Together with other difficulties facing 
German plans, this compression of opportunities for landings 
obviously affected the outlook of the Kriegsmarine and forced the 
Luftwaffe into a much narrower time-scale of operations than its 
commanders would have chosen. 
Various branches of British Intelligence, which appear to have 
recovered fully from their failures in the Norwegian Campaign, 
issued sets of wary predictions of invasion throughout the summer 
and early autumn. Other reports brought more hope and are proof 
of the pressure of time placed particularly on the Luftwaffe. 
on 1 August, Churchill told the War Cabinet that Britain's 
position 'was now considerably more secure than in May'. On 9 
August he said that Britain was winning the air battle. Three 
days later, a spy from within Germany Military Intelligence 
informed London that two or three weeks would elapse before 
invasion forces were ready. 
The RAF's role, and particularly'Fighter Command's part, must be 
viewed in relation to German capabilities. only September was 
{, ý. ýr 
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available realistically for ISealion', a late and hazardous time. 
The Luftwaffe's main offensive then appeared as little more than 
a forlorn hope. (121) 
To assess the effect of this period of German attacks, it is 
necessary to summarise the states of the two air forces in early 
August, before heavy raids moved to the mainland. The RAF had 
grown relatively stronger. On 10 July, Fighter Command had 52 
squadrons ready for operations; by 8 August this total had grown 
to 55 squadrons, with six others under training. Three 'foreign' 
squadrons, two Polish and one Czech, had been formed during the 
month and these contained some very experienced pilots. Overall, 
the total of pilots available to Dowding had risen by 175 between 
6 July and 3 August, in spite of the loss of 74, with 48 others 
wounded. (122) 
The Luftwaffe, according to figures issued by the Quartermaster- 
General, had, on 3 August, 878 single-engined and 320 twin- 
engined fighters listed as 'serviceable'. However, Suchenwirth 
estimates that on 8 August the figures of these categories which 
were 'combat-ready' were 760 and 230 respectively, (123) German 
Air Force losses for July were given as 53 Me. 109s and 22 
Me. 110s. (124) 
121. Gilbert, vi, p. 650, quotes a Churchill Memo of 1 July (CAB 
papers 120/144), seeking a list of dates offering the best 
conditions for invasion. There were only seven each for July and 
August. Also see Hinsley, i, Chapter 5; Gilbert, vi, p. 710, 
quoting CAB 66/10, War Cabinet No. 271 of 1940,1 August 1940; 
Colville Diaries, 9 August 1940. 
122. AIR 41/15, ADGB, ii, p. 81. 
123. Suchenwirth, Turning Points, pp. 65-65. 
124. See AHB Translation, vo1.2, . 
VII/83. However, Ramsey, 
Battle of Britain, p. 707, gives the combined losses of Me. 109s 
and Me. llOs for the period 10-31 July inclusive as 56 aircraft. 
__". w Ol F&ä'ýka`"Räý _ zudsa ssi=ä+swyffdre85: awNmevs,;. 
v M -s: e; xa.. , p. an . +- 2i0 
Additionally, British economic power, a factor on which a number 
of Service leaders and politicians had pinned their faith even 
before the war, was beginning to show in figures of aircraft 
production. (125) Fighter deliveries to the RAF in June, July and 
August were significantly greater than those of the Luftwaffe. 
In Postan's view they were 'more than enough to cover the 
losses'. The planned British figures for those three months, 
292,329 and 282, became, in reality, 446,496 and 476 
respectively. (126) In comparison, the German aircraft industry 
produced only 274 Me. 109s and Me. 110s in August. (127) Blame for 
this situation, later awarded to Udet and Jesschonnek, can also 
be laid at Hitler's door. He was already planning the campaign 
against Russia and placed air armament fifth in line for 
allocation of raw materials. (128) 
At the start of the second phase of the air assault, Goering was 
attempting to overcome Fighter Command squadrons in the south of 
England. Having achieved that, he hoped to extend the offensive 
northwards until the Luftwaffe controlled all skies over Britain. 
In grand fashion he intended to open, and virtually close, the 
campaign with a huge attack, Adlertag, which would demolish 
resistance in a few days. This phase actually lasted from the 
start of August until the 18th of the month. 
125. For example, see Taylor, English History, pp. 460-61. 
'Ministers shared the general delusion that economically Germany 
was at the end of her tether'. 
126. Postan, p. 116 and p. 484. 
127. Suchenwirth, Turning Points, p. 66. 
128. Suchenwirth, Command and Leadership, p. 87. 
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The period made extensive demands on both the Luftwaffe and 
Fighter Command and by its end, the strategy, tactics and 
leadership of both air forces were being closely and critically 
examined. Therefore, an assessment is needed of these factors; 
evidence shows that by mid-August, although No. 11 Group 
particularly was coming under greater pressure, the German Air 
Force had gone far to denying themselves victory. 
On the German side there was more than a little frustration over 
this stage, which had opened with a strong air of confidence 
among Luftwaffe leaders and pilots. (129) Goering held a 
conference at the Hague on 1 August and plans were formulated for 
attacks on the south and west of England, moving gradually closer 
to London, with the intention of forcing Fighter Command into a 
battle of attrition. (130) 
However, a combination of slow preparation, poor reconnaissance 
and unfavourable weather led to insignificant major action before 
8 August. In retrospect, such delays really made small 
difference in the long run to part of a general battle for which 
little strategic thought had been applied. Even before the main 
129. See T. Taylor, Breaking Wave, p. 133, which speaks of Goering 
and his staff as 'highly optimistic'. He quotes a German 
officer's comment from Halder's diary for 29 July 1940. 'Our Air 
Force on the whole feels that they have the edge on the British in equipment, leadership,, skill, and with respect to the 
geographic factors'. ' 
130. For a revealing account of Goering's methods in staff 
conferences, see ibid, pp. 130-32, quoting the recollections of 
Theo Osterkamp, commander of JG 51. See also Kesselring Memoirs, 
pp. 67-68. z 
. ý, 
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'Eagle' attacks opened, the German lack of a direct and 
concentrated aim was of enormous assistance to Dowding and, more 
particularly to Park, who carried the immediate responsibility 
for defending London and the south. 
Strategy demanded undivided purpose and there were three basic 
possibilities. First, Britain could be forced to surrender by 
the effects of blockade; second, victory could come from the 
power of air attack alone; third, the Luftwaffe could create 
conditions under which a seaborne invasion would be successfully 
launched. The weakness with Goering and the planning staff of 
the Luftwaffe at this time was the dissipation of effort among 
all three. (131) 
Basic faults in strategy led to tactical errors. Heavy attacks 
were launched on August 8,12,13 and 15 and Fighter Command, 
especially No. 11 Group, was greatly stretched. (132) However, 
no sustained and concentrated raids were launched on the Chain 
Home Link (CHL) radar stations, without which the Dowding system 
could barely operate. Temporary damage was done, but, once 
again, German Intelligence failed to recognise the importance of 
RDF to Fighter Command. Proof of this ignorance was displayed 
131. Dr. H. Boog, in Probert and Cox, pp. 22-23 and p. 26, asserted that the German campaign was destined to fail through the short 
range of Me. 109s which would 'determine the range of penetration 
of the bombers in daylight, leaving many of the fighter airfields 
and industrial installations farther inland out of reach'. Insufficient targets were hit 'whose destruction would help to 
paralyse the fighter defence system'. 
132. See AIR 2/7281, Enclosure 5B, H. Q.,. No. 11 Group to H. Q., 
Fighter command, 12 September 1940. See also P. Wykeham, Fighter 
Command (London, 1960), pp. 117-22. AIR 41/15, ADGB, ii, p. 82, 
calls 8 August 'the day popularly regarded as the beginning of the Battle of Britain', largely because, p. 92, that was 'the last day on which the Luftwaffe expended any great effort on attacking 
convoys'. 
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at Goering's Karinhall conference on the 15th, when the 
Reichsmarschall. announced that there was little point in 
maintaining attacks on RDF sites 'in view of the fact that not 
one of those attacked has so far been put out of action. (133) 
In this period, a serious scattering of effort resulted from 
several Luftwaffe attacks being made on airfields not vital to 
Fighter Command's defensive system. Eastchurch and Detling', both 
raided on the. 13th, were Coastal Command aerodromes. Great 
damage was done elsewhere, but the importance of Sector stations 
to No-11 Group went unrecognised and no prolonged bombing of 
these took place. (134) 
In a small, yet significant way, the comparative weakness of 
Luftwaffe communications was shown on the 15th. Dornier 17s from 
KG 2, escorted by Me. llOs, were already in flight when their 
operation was postponed. only the escorts received the radio 
message and had no means of communication with the bombers, which 
carried on in ignorance of the new order. (135) 
133. Quoted in Irving, Rise and Fall, p. 100, from Milch diary 
for 15 August 1940. See also Wood and Dempster, p. 285. See also 
Collier Collection Document No. 25, 'Goering Conferences with 
chiefs of Flotte 2 and 3,1st, 3rd, 15th and 19th August 1940', 
for Goering's growing worries, at the same conference, of 
insufficient fighter protection for bombers. 
134. Hough and Richards, pp-157 and 160-62. 
135. See R. Collier, Eagle Day (London, 1980), pp. 50-51, for the 
effects of poor communications that day. The confusion is also 
described in Bekker, pp. 194-95. A German fighter pilot wrote, 
There was no link between the bombers 'and the fighters. It 
wasn't just a question of frequency; the bombers used morse and 
we used a voice operated system, of RT - Radio Telephony'. 
U. Steinhilper and P. Osborne, Spitfire on my Tail (Bromley, 1989), 
p. 264. 
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The failure of wide-ranging attacks on the 15th, involving all 
three Luftflotten, has been well documented. (136) This has been 
quoted as an example of Dowding's wisdom in maintaining squadrons 
in the north to meet any German assault on that region and as a 
defeat for the German Air Force. (137) On the other hand, the 
Germans gained one benefit. Appreciating that there was little 
future in using Luftflotte V attacks across the North Sea, many 
of its aircraft were later moved south to reinforce the main area 
of combat. Fighter Command's strategic policy, nonetheless, was 
not changed. Partly from Intelligence fears that the Germans 
were holding back planes for further raids in the north, Dowding 
maintained about one half of his fighter strength outside the 
Nos-10 and 11 Group areas, a major factor in the developing 
controversy over tactics. (138) 
Further heavy onslaughts on the following day added to Fighter 
Command's burden. This was felt at all levels, from commanders, 
pilots and groundcrew, who worked virtually without respite 
136. See, for example, Richards and Saunders, i, pp. 172-74 and 
Terrains, pp. 186-87. 
137. See Churchill, ii, pp. 285-86. 
138. Fighter Command's Order of Battle for 8 August 1940 shows 
Dowding's cautious dispersal of forces. His opponents believed 
it to be an over-insurance. Of his best fighters, i. e., 
Hurricanes and Spitfires, 26 squadrons were in Nos. 10 and 11 
Groups; 21 squadrons were in Nos. 12 and 13 Groups. Nine out of 
his nineteen squadrons of Spitfires were stationed outside what 
obviously was, and would continue to be, the main battle zone. 
of all squadrons under his command, 29 were in that zone and 26 
outside it. See AIR 16/365, Orders of Battle and operational 
strength of Squadrons, June 1940-April 1942,8 August 1940. On 
18 August, when the German campaign in the south was building in intensity, there were 27 Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons in that 
area and 24 squadrons to the north. See Price, Hardest Day, 
Appendix C. 
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to maintain the defence. Assaults were made particularly on 
airfields to draw RAF fighters into battle and in this, bombers 
were used as bait. Such an offensive, naturally, also taxed the 
Luftwaffe. For example, on the 13th, 1,485 sorties were flown, 
while the total reached 1,786 on the 15th. (139) 
The climax of this period of battle was reached on Sunday 18 
August, when, with an optimistic determination, aircraft from 
Luftflotten II and III were sent over for what was hoped to be 
a final, crushing blow to Fighter Command. The result was a day 
on which the combined casualties of both sides in numbers of 
aircraft destroyed exceeded those of any day in the Battle of 
Britain. Luftwaffe pilots discovered that the RAF was still able 
to put up Hurricane and Spitfire squadrons to counter almost 
every move. (140) 
A prime reason was that, at the time, Goering and his commanders 
were suffering their heaviest casualty in the form of bad 
Intelligence. On the 17th, Schmid's survey of British losses 
over the previous fortnight was a flight of fancy, set out mainly 
139. T. Taylor, Breaking Wave, p. 137 and p. 140. 
140. See Price, Hardest Day, Appendices E and F. After a ten- 
year research, he believes that on the 18th, 69 Luftwaffe 
aircraft were destroyed or damaged beyond repair, at a cost of 
65 to the RAF. Of the latter figure, 32 were Hurricanes and 
seven Spitfires. It is important to note the loss, usually 
'hidden' in totals, of 25 British aircraft on the ground. 
Considering that the result of the battle hinged on the effort 
and performance of single-engined fighters, it should be noted that the Germans lost only eighteen Me. 109s on the day. 
Nonetheless, to show variations in claims, even after detailed 
research, Ramsey, Battle of Britain, pp. 581-90, lists 67 
Luftwaffe aircraft written off, sixteen of them Me. 109s; he 
offers the figure of 28 Hurricanes and five Spitfires as RAF losses. 
216 
in the form of a subtraction sum. The figure of 900 RAF fighters 
with squadrons was given for 1 July. Of these, 574 were claimed 
to have been shot down in the period, with 196 lost from other 
causes. Taking replacements as numbering 300, this gave an 
overall loss of 470. Of the remaining 430 fighters, 70% were 
reckoned to be serviceable, i. e., 300 first-line machines. 
Schmid estimated that 200 of these were in the south, 70 in 
'Central England' and 30 in the north and Scotland. I 
The Luftwaffe Intelligence Service's damage to the cause may also 
be noted from figures issued at the same time for aircraft losses 
on 8 August. The loss of fourteen German aircraft, five of them 
Me. 109s, was admitted; in reply, 42 Spitfires and Hurricanes were 
claimed to have been shot down 'over the Channel'. (141) 
On the British side, Nos. 10 and 11 Groups, especially the 
latter, bore the heaviest burden. (142) The Dowding System worked 
satisfactorily, although RDF did not always give accurate 
information. Allen recollected Dowding's predicament here, 
because 'massed formations would jam his radars through sheer 
numbers of airborne aircraft flying on converging courses'. (143) 
141. See AHB Translation, Vo1.9, No. VII/123, 'Situation Reports 
issued by Luftwaffe Fuhrungsstab 1C', 1-15 August 1940. 
According to Price, Hardest Day, Appendix C, on 18 August Fighter 
Command possessed 928 serviceable fighters, of which 802 were 
Hurricanes or Spitfires. According to Ramsey, Battle of Britain, 
pp. 556-57, the RAF lost nineteen aircraft; German losses are 
given as 24 aircraft, nine of them Me. 109s. 
142. Allen, Who Won?, p. 149, shows the extent of the burden. 
143. Ibid, p. 117. 
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on cloudy days, the Observer Corps had obvious difficulty in 
tracking formations moving inland. Yet Park, following his C-in- 
C's policy, had to rely implicitly on information fed to his 
headquarters. His greatest fear, he later told a fighter pilot, 
was that his Sector stations would be attacked; he showed his 
faith in communications by adding, 'Without signals the only 
thing I commanded was my desk at Uxbridge'. (144) 
In writing his report on this stage of the battle, Park later 
noted that German fighters often flew much higher than their 
bombers. This tactic gave them height advantage in interception, 
but was not guaranteed always to offer the best protection to 
their charges. He restated the policy on which he and Dowding 
had pinned their faith, 'to engage the enemy before he reached 
his coastal objective'. (145) 
Fighter Command's greatest problem was proving to be shortage of 
pilots. 'I was worried daily from July to September', Park 
recalled, 'by a chronic shortage of trained fighter pilots'. 
There was one clear advantage for the RAF over the Luftwaffe in 
that German aircrew parachuting down over England were lost to 
further action, whereas British pilots might live to fight 
144. Orange, p. 101. 
145. Park's Report is in AIR 2/7355, Report on Air Fighting by 
No. 11 Group, 8 August-10 September 1940,12 September 1940. See 
also Orange, p. 102. 
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another day. Nonetheless, wounds and injuries often precluded 
Fighter Command airmen from returning straight to battle. (146) 
By the end of August, the air defences in the south and the 
south-east were holding, but at considerable cost. Not the least 
cause of the strain exerted on No. 11 Group was Dowding's policy 
of reinforcement, worked out from pre-war days and carried 
through loyally by Park, on whom the main burden was resting. 
The commander-in-Chief referred to this policy in his report on 
the battle, (147) but during early August, even before the 
concentrated offensive against Fighter Command's aerodromes 
began, weaknesses showed. Some squadrons fought themselves to 
exhaustion from persistent combat and heavy losses and thus, for 
a period of time before being withdrawn to a quieter sector, were 
far from efficient. This factor, combined with odds which seemed 
146. C. Shores, Duel for the Sky (London, 1985), p. 54, shows the 
burden caused by pilot casualties. The figure for the Command's 
pilots killed, missing or prisoner rose from 74 in July to 148 
in August. Figures for those wounded or injured in those months 
were 49 and 156 respectively. An interesting contrary view is 
taken by Air Marshal Sir Kenneth Porter, who said that 'shortage 
of pilots was not really considered'; Porter interview, 19 
August 1991. However, the events that led to Dowding's meeting 
with Park on 7 September make this assertion difficult to accept. 
of many examples of lack of pilot training, a typical case was 
that of a young pilot of No. 601 Squadron. 'I flew only an hour 
on Spitfires before I got to the Battle of Britain. On 
Hurricanes I had only ten hours altogether. I never flew a 
Hurricane at night. I never fired its guns'. Interview, 
Squadron-Leader B. Ogilvie, Tunbridge Wells, 11 November 1989. 
147. AIR 8/863, p. 4554, paragraphs 169-72. 
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to confront them in almost every action, caused No. 11 Group in 
particular to enter the next phase of battle at a considerable 
disadvantage. (148) 
148. See AIR 41/15, ADGB, ii, p. 219. Allen, Who Won? p. 149, 
remarks on this inflexibility of strategy. 'It was noticeable, 
during the activity of 18 August when Goering's wrath was 
incurred, that not one aircraft from 12- or 13- Groups received 
battle damage and only two from 10-Group were hit'. 
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PART FIVE: GROWING POLITICAL INTEREST 
Almost every account of the Battle of Britain fails to explore 
the continuing saga of Dowding's appointment and the response of 
politicians to him during August. An examination of his 
leadership, however, is incomplete without this and can be opened 
with a summary of the Prime Minister's attitude. 
The extreme bravery of the pilots of Fighter command and the 
conduct of the battle by their leader gained Churchill's approval 
during the month. Realising that, in spite of Britain's growing 
power of defence, much depended on the actions being fought by 
the RAF, the Prime Minister kept in close touch with the events 
of combat. On 3 August he visited Headquarters, Fighter command 
during the afternoon and that evening entertained Dowding with 
several others, including Lindemann, to dinner at Chequers. Four 
days later, Lindemann asked Churchill to approve of experiments 
which Dowding wanted, relating to RDF with night defence. (149) 
The Prime Minister was thereby well aware of the work being 
carried out by the Commander-in-Chief and of his role within the 
RAF. 
Churchill's approval of Dowding at that stage is shown by a 
letter which he sent to Sinclair on the 10th. The tone displays 
definite displeasure with the Secretary of State, yet great 
sympathy with the leader of Fighter Command. 'I certainly 
understood from our conversation, a month ago that you were going 
to give Dowding an indefinite war-time extension', he began, 
149. Gilbert, vi, p. 711. 
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adding peremptorily, 'and were going to do it at once'. He could 
not understand how any contrary impression had been gained 'about 
my wishes'. Churchill then urged Sinclair to take 'the step I 
have so long desired', adding how wrong it was to keep the 
Commander-in-Chief in uncertainty over his appointment. That was 
not fair, 'least of all to the nation'. Churchill added strongly 
that he could not approve and finished by asking that 'you will 
be able to set my mind at rest'. (150) 
There is only one piece of direct evidence of what prompted the 
Prime Minister to send the letter and thus resurrect the question 
of Dowding's future. Undoubtedly the Commander-in-Chief's 
handling of the battle had been under review for a number of 
days. Possibly the matter had arisen in conversation with 
Dowding himself, or even with Lindemann, who was deeply 
interested in night defence and whose judgement and opinions 
Churchill trusted. 
But the Prime Minister had evidently discussed Dowding with 
Sinclair on the day before writing the letter, because in his 
reply, dated 12 August, the Secretary of State noted that 'after 
our talk on Friday I spoke at once to the C. A. S. I. The letter 
was noticeably apologetic in tone compared with Churchill's 
sharpness. 'I cannot tell you how sorry I am that there should 
have been any misunderstanding', he said, claiming not to have 
ignored deliberately the Prime Minister's wishes, which 'is 
150. AIR 19/572, Enclosure 10A, Churchill to-Sinclair, 10 August 
1940. The only addition to the letter was a note in red crayon, 'Message to Sqds - A. H. M. S. ', - written in Sinclair's hand. 
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the last thing I should want to do'. He added that Newall had 
now written to the Commander-in-Chief, withdrawing the earlier 
time limit of October and this would leave him in 'exactly the 
same position as the other Commanders-in-Chief'. (151) 
on 12 August Newall wrote to Dowding, telling him of the new 
conclusion and commenting that in current circumstances he 
realised the disadvantages involved of the decision taken in 
July. 'I sincerely hope', he concluded, 'that this information 
will be agreeable to you'. (152) 
Dowding replied formally, thanking the CAS for the letter, 'the 
contents of which I have noted with pleasure'. (153) The brevity 
of his response is understandable, having been written on the 
13th, the day on which the Luftwaffe flew 1,485 sorties over 
Britain. He received official notification of the cancellation 
'of the time limit to the period of your appointment' from the 
Air Ministry eight days later. (154) 
On 15 August, a day of enormous activity, Churchill showed 
further evidence of interest in the air war. Eden recalled how 
he and the Prime Minister sat in the Cabinet Room as reports of 
operations came in. (155) Then Churchill went to Headquarters, 
151. Ibid, Enclosure 12A, Sinclair to Churchill, 12 August 1940. - 
152. Ibid, Newall to Dowding, 12 August 1940. 
153. Dowding Papers, HCTD S. 305, Dowding to Newall, 13 August 
1940. 
154. Ibid, Air Ministry to Dowding, 21 August 1940. 
155. Eden Memoirs: The Reckoning, p. 137. 
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Fighter Command and watched the defensive effort. Colville noted 
that, on his return, the Prime Minister was 'consumed with 
excitement' and claimed, after sending news to Chamberlain, 'it 
is one of the greatest days in history'. (156) 
One reason for this was the factor, common to both sides, of 
exaggerated claims of success. Churchill believed that over one 
hundred German aircraft had been destroyed. (157) 
On the following day, Churchill, showing an example of leadership 
significantly lacking on the other side of the Channel, visited 
the headquarters of No. 11 Group at Uxbridge and saw the 
operations Room in action. During the evening he told Ismay, 
'Don't speak to me; I have never been so moved', before going on 
to utter the quotation beginning, 'Never in the field of human 
conflict ... ', which became famous when repeated in his 
parliamentary speech five days later. (158) 
156. Colville Diaries, 15 August 1940. Five days earlier, 
Churchill had stated, in a telegram to the Prime Ministers of 
Australia and New Zealand, 'I do not think the German Air Force 
has the numbers or quality to overpower our defences'. See 
Gilbert, vi, p. 726, quoting PREM 4/43B/1, folios 219-25,10 
August 1940. 
157. Ibid. The actual total was 76 German aircraft. See 
Ramsey, Battle of Britain, pp. 571-75. The exaggerated claims had 
a good effect on civilian morale, especially for those in 
'occupied Britain'. An Englishwoman on Sark shared the Prime 
Minister's enthusiasm for RAP success. Her diary for 15 August 
noted, 'A grand day for Britain - one hundred and sixty planes brought down'. She added that the 'sky has been black' with 
German planes. Julia Tremayne, War on Sark (Exeter, 1981), p. 28. 
158. Ismay Memoirs, pp, 179-80. 
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Yet Churchill showed greater realism'over air losses on the 16th, 
when he minuted Newall, reminding him of Bomber Command's losses. 
Referring to bombers destroyed on the ground the previous day, 
he made a point to which few accounts of the battle allude - 
namely that these losses altered the balance of success between 
the two air forces considerably. (159) 
Churchill's praise for the pilots of Fighter Command was'clear 
from his speech to Parliament on 20 August. It is, nonetheless, 
generally unnoticed that his words that day included great praise 
for Bomber Command. As well as mentioning fighter pilots 'whose 
brilliant actions we see with our own eyes', he showed a 
judgement of what would happen to the enemy. Hitler, he 
predicted, would have no gain if 'the entire economic and 
scientific apparatus of German war power lay shattered and 
pulverized at home'. Churchill's clarity of purpose in seeking 
to hit back-aggressively was never far absent at that time and 
marks an important difference of outlook between him and 
Dowding. (160) 
Three days later, W. P. Crozier, editor of the Manchester Guardian, 
interviewed the Prime Minister. His report summarised the 
guarded optimism being felt, even at the height of battle. 
Churchill said that between 8 and 18 August, Britain had done 
159. Prime Minister's Personal Minute, M. 18,17 August 1940, 
quoted in Gilbert, vi, pp. 736-37. 
160.364 H. C. Deb 5s, c. 1167,20 August 1940. 
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well in the air battle. 'But I don't think it's over. Some 
people do'. He added that a German invasion could not be 
attempted without air superiority - 'that he must have' - and 
that over England, apart from the sea, the bodies of 150 German 
airmen had been recovered in the period. (161) 
To assess the sentiments of Sinclair towards the leadership of 
Fighter command is not easy, because his personal papers from 
this stage were destroyed. (162) Nevertheless, certain deductions 
may be drawn from the recollections of those who knew him. 
First, as may be seen from his letter of 12 August, (163) he 
disliked offending Churchill, who, according to Colville, 
'treated him at times with a half serious levity'. (164) The low 
esteem in which the Australian, Bruce, held him was shared by 
others. (165) 'Chips' Channon disliked his style in 
Parliament. (166) Beaverbrook believed that his opinions could 
161. Crozier Interviews, interview with Churchill, 23 August 
1940. 
162. The Thurso Papers are at Churchill College, Cambridge and 
consist of 197 boxes. According to the Archivist, many of his 
wartime papers were destroyed by two fires. The first was at the 
Liberal Club during the Blitz; the second, accidental, blaze 
occurred at his Scottish home. Visit to Churchill College, 1 
April 1989. For Sinclair, Dowding was an inherited problem. 
163. See above, note 151. 
164. J. Colville, in Action This Day: Working with Churchill, 
edited by Sir John Wheeler-Bennett (London, 1968), p. 195. 
165. See Chapter 1, note 5. 
166. Channon Diaries, p. 264. Channon wrote of Sinclair's speech 
on 20 August which 'made the almost incredibly magnificent 
exploits of our airmen sound dull and trite: his stammer, and his trick of re-iterated over-emphasis are very monotonous'. 
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be easily swayed because, after making a decision, 'he'll go away 
and talk to one of his Air Marshals and then you'll find he 
isn't 
prepared to defend his view any longer - his Air Marshal has 
changed his opinion for himl'. (167) 
There is an overall impression that Sinclair was in the hands of 
the Air Staff. Nonetheless, some thought better of his 
contribution. Douglas, perhaps unsurprisingly, referred to 
his 
'vigour and great ability and success'. (168) Air Marshal Sir 
Robert Saundby*, who served then at the Air Ministry, remembered 
his 'perfect manners, integrity and personal charm'. (169) 
His passage within the Government at this time was made less easy 
because of Churchill's reservations over the abilities of the Air 
Ministry and also through the continuing struggle for power 
between that ministry and Beaverbrook's Ministry of Aircraft 
Production. Beaverbrook appeared to carry more weight with the 
Prime Minister and his pungent style led to controversy with 
Sinclair on several occasions. (170) 
167. Crozier Interviews, p. 198, interview with Beaverbrook, 12 
noon, 24 August 1940. 
168. Douglas, Years of Command, -, p. 278. - 
169. Air Marshal Sir Robert Saundby, The Ampleforth Journal 
(1970), 'p. 84. Saundby added, 'Indeed, we called him "The 
Hidalgo", because of what we-regarded as his "courtly Spanish 
grace"'. Air Marshal Sir Denis Crowley-Milling remembered 
Sinclair speaking 'as if he had twelve plums in his mouth'. 
Crowley-Milling interview, 14 December 1989. For the opinion of 
a Canadian politician, see :A Party Politician, The Memoirs of 
Chubby Power, edited by N. Ward (Toronto, 1966), pp. 196-97. Power 
claimed that Sinclair 'always seemed to be addressing me in 
speeches such as he would make to the House of Commons, and we 
never reached a basis of mutual understanding'. 
170. See above, for example, note 13. 
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Beaverbrook was the third politician closely involved with 
Dowding and Fighter Command and his opinions and interventions 
were of great importance. He was, in relation to Churchill, 
according to Colville, 'the last of his old cronies, and he 
exerted an infallible fascination on him'. (171) Yet while 
serving the Prime Minister loyally, Beaverbrook had reservations 
about his methods, telling Bruce on 2 July, 'Winston thinks he 
is a modern Marlborough'. (172) 
Partly because he saw him as a fellow sufferer from the 
machinations of the Air Ministry and partly through his respect 
for the commander-in-Chief's work in Fighter Command, Beaverbrook 
held Dowding in high regard. He could agree with Pile's 
assessment, written on 19 August, that now, 'thanks to Sir Hugh 
Dowding, an invasion of this country is not practical'. (173) 
Beaverbrook's appreciation of the Commander-in-Chief was 
transmitted to Churchill, influencing his opinion of leadership 
within the RAF. The Minister of Aircraft Production's enthusiasm 
for Dowding was strongly displayed during an interview with the 
ubiquitous and inquisitive Crozier. He spoke of him as 'the man 
whom I regard as coming to the front in everything that relates 
171. Colville, in Action This Day, pp. 105-06. 
172. C. Edwards, Bruce of Melbourne, Man of Two Worlds (London, 
1965), p. 303. 
173. Beaverbrook Papers, BBK D/430, Pile to Boaverbrook, 19 
August 1940. 
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to the war', adding, 'He's a great fellow! ' Some Air Staff 
leaders would have rejected his next assertion. 'There's no idea 
that he won't try'. Before the end of the interview, Beaverbrook 
pressed Crozier to meet Dowding, which he thought would be very 
worthwhile. (174) 
And yet, ironically, although the Canadian was the Commander-in- 
Chief's champion, Beaverbrook's dislike of Newall led' to a 
disclosure of some of the Air Ministry's reservations regarding 
Dowding. This emanated from a document of undeclared origin that 
was circulated among several members of the Conservative Party. 
Entitled, 'A Weak Link in the Nation's Defences', the five page 
typed document was a swingeing attack on the Chief of the Air 
Staff. Unfortunately for Dowding, one section of the paper was 
very critical of him, calling Fighter Command 'a one man show'. 
He had 'inadequate mental ability and a very slow brain'. 
Dowding was a 'complete non-co-operator with authority' and 
treated his staff deplorably. 
A copy of the paper was sent by the Conservative Member of 
Parliament, Irene Ward, to Churchill, who saw it on 21 August. 
in turn, he passed it to Sinclair with the, -comment, "Archie, let 
me have this back. W. S. C. I. Its importance was that it helped 
to carry the Air Ministry's case for Dowding to be removed closer 
to politicians, a side effect never intended by Beaverbrook. 
Possibly, the author was Wing -Commander, E. J-Xing ston-McCIoughry, 
an Australian who worked at the Air, Ministry and, for reasons of 
his own, wished to see Newall removed. ., 
174. Crozier Interviews, p. 199, interview with Beaverbrook, 12 
noon, 29 August 1940. 
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More background to the paper is given by Denis Richards, Portal's 
biographer. He shows the pressure brought by Irene Ward, a 
Conservative back-bencher, on the leadership of the RAF. Having 
been approached by some RAF officers who had no confidence in 
Newall, believed that Dowding's appointment as CAS to succeed him 
would be a disaster, and who wanted Portal to have the position, 
she espoused their cause with determination. Not only did she 
send a copy of the document to the Prime Minister, but also 
passed one to Churchill's confidant, Brendan Bracken. Sinclair 
met her in September and, after Portal had gained the promotion 
in October, wrote to Bracken. He referred to her as 'your 
virago' who probably believed that her intervention had ensured 
the appointment and that 'not for the first time, a goose had 
saved the Capitol'. Certainly the episode proves the power held 
by politicians in affecting Service appointments, a manifestation 
that was to recur for Dowding. 
Another politician who saw weaknesses in Newall was Hugh Dalton, 
at the Ministry of Economic Warfare. In discussions with him, 
one RAF officer regretted 'that the Air Force had not enough 
"power over the port". Old admirals and generals, he said, 
hobnobbed off-stage with Cabinet Ministers who had been at school 
with them, and fixed things up. But the Chief of the Air Staff 
was not at school with anyone who mattered'. Dalton, an Old 
Etonian, offered to help. (175) 
175. Copies of 'A Weak Link in the Nation's Defences' are in 
PREM 4/3/6 and Beaverbrook Papers, BBK D/328. The former file 
has various letters and papers concerning Irene Ward's 
intervention, including a note from Bracken to Churchill calling her 'a rather ferocious female'. See also D. Richards, Portal of 
Hungerford (London, 1977), pp. 168-69 and H. Dalton, The Fateful 
Years, Memoirs, 1931-1945 (London, 1957), pp. 344-45. 
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From the variety of opinions offered by politicians about the RAF 
at that time, together with their mutual relationships, it may 
be deduced that Dowding's efforts in August were well received. 
Nonetheless, the undercurrent of dislike emanating from the Air 
Ministry was starting to gain a wider audience. This happened 
at the stage, late in the month, when changes in Luftwaffe 
strategy and tactics led to the most difficult days in the 
history of Fighter Command - and brought Dowding's pilots in 
No. 11 Group close to being overwhelmed. 
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